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ABSTRACT
ORGANIZED CRIME IN STRONG STATES: VOTE BUYING, MIGRANTS’
EXPLOITATION AND PUBLIC FUNDS MISAPPROPRIATION
Gemma Dipoppa
Guy Grossman
Groups competing with the state, from insurgents to criminal organizations, are widely
believed to emerge in weak states unable to provide protection to their citizens. This
dissertation considers a common but less investigated phenomenon: criminal groups often
expand to states with strong economies and institutions. How do they manage to expand?
Which policies can states adopt to fight against them?
My first paper proposes a theory of expansion. I argue that criminal organizations expand
by striking agreements with political and economic actors facing competition and to which
they can offer critical resources to gain an edge over competitors. I test two predictions of
the theory in the context of move of Southern-Italian mafias to the North. First, I show
that increases in market competition (due to a construction boom) and in mafias’ capacity
to offer cheap illegal labor (by exploiting migrants from mafia-controlled areas in the south)
allowed criminal groups to expand. Second, I find that parties in agreements with criminals
gained a persistent electoral advantage in mafia-infiltrated cities.
This chapter suggests that criminal groups leveraged fragile categories and deals with po-
litical and economic actors in strong states to expand. In my second paper, I show that a
similar strategy allows them to thrive. I study the effects of a campaign providing migrants
in agriculture with the tools to denounce labor exploitation. I find that the campaign in-
creased both police reporting of exploitation and prosecution of criminal organizations, often
responsible for smuggling and controlling migrants. This suggests that fighting migrants’
exploitation directly damages criminal groups.
viii
My third paper studies another non-violent method to fight organized crime: targeting
their revenues. We study an Italian policy fighting mafia-misappropriation of public funds
and find that criminals strategically react by displacing their activity where the policy does
not enforce investigations, underscoring the importance to design anti-mafia policies that
anticipate criminal groups’ sophistication.
My dissertation highlights the need to re-conceptualize criminal organizations not only as
substitutes for weak states, but also as complements to states with strong institutions and
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
Introduction
The emergence of groups competing with the state for power is widely regarded as the
product of state weakness (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). From insurgent groups to criminal
organizations, competitive groups thrive by offering protection to citizens and their property
rights in states that are too weak to offer this service publicly (Gambetta, 1996; Skaperdas,
2001; Acemoglu et al., 2019) Accordingly, scholars and practitioners alike consider the
combination of economic development, strong institutions, and high social capital as the
best weapon to defeat violent groups competing with the state, from rebel groups in India
to Talibans in Afghanistan (Sambanis et al., 2003; Berman et al., 2011).
While this prevailing view sheds light on the emergence of groups competing with the state,
it has troubles explaining a phenomenon which has received little attention but can be
observed across many regions and time periods: criminal organizations frequently expand
to places with strong economies and institutions. From Sicily to the US, from Hong Kong
to Canada, from Calabria to Germany and Australia, criminal organizations have tended
to migrate precisely where institutions are strong, economic conditions stable, and the civil
society active. This choice is very puzzling. Transplanting a criminal organization requires
building anew a reputation for violence, a network capable of delivering information and
favors, and establishing governance over the territory (Smith and Varese, 2001; Varese,
2011). For these reasons, Gambetta (1996) described mafias as “A difficult industry to
export”. Expanding to strong states seemingly makes these tasks even more daunting, as
these states’ capacity to detect and crack down on incipient criminal groups can be expected
to be higher.
In this chapter, I study how criminal organizations expand to strong states. I develop a
theory for where criminal groups are successful at moving, conditional on their desire to
expand, and test it in the context of the expansion of southern Italian mafias to Northern
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Italy. My theory focuses on one distinctive feature of strong states: their capacity to
enforce rules that regulate political and economic competition (Polanyi, 1945). On one
hand, competition provides actors facing it with incentives to look for shortcuts, such as
using illegal labor or vote buying. On the other hand, the enforcement of these rules makes
it risky to take illegal shortcuts, as the state would prosecute the use of illegal competition.
Criminal organizations can solve this problem by offering political and economic actors
critical resources to gain an edge over competitors, such as bought votes and controllable
illegal labor. If an agreement is struck between local actors and criminal groups, this
allows incipient criminals to (i) avoid police detection, thanks to the relation of mutual
dependence with locals, thus making strong-states’ repressive capacity unimportant (ii)
generate a stream of revenues, as local actors pay to receive these services, and (iii) build
networks and establish a reputation for violence in the new territory. This strategy requires
criminal organizations to be able to access, control, and offer illegal resources to local
actors, which periods of mass migration can greatly facilitate. In fact, in several episodes
of expansion, criminal groups have moved together with waves of migrants from the same
area of origin and exploited the fact that these migrants needed employment and were
susceptible to the intimidation of criminal groups, who could credibly threaten them and
their social networks at home.
I test this theory in the context of Northern Italy, a region with high social capital and well-
functioning democratic institutions (Putnam et al., 1994), but which has suffered increasing
levels of mafia infiltration since the 1960s. I first provide qualitative evidence indicating
that during times of boom in the construction sector, in which unqualified labor was in high
demand and costly to hire, mafias struck deals with local businessmen giving them access
to cheap workforce, namely illegally employed southern migrants. These workers came from
the same areas as mafias, and were easy for mafias to exert control over.
Second, I investigate whether this phenomenon was systematic across cities and whether
it contributed to mafias expansion. I collect data on construction and internal migration
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in all Italian municipalities since 1960, and construct a new measure of mafia infiltration
by scraping mafia-related news from historic newspapers and validating them with present
time mafias indicators from judicial sources and NGOs. I instrument both for construc-
tion employment and migration from the south of Italy to test whether their joint increase
determines a higher probability to observe mafia. I instrument construction by exploiting
a law from 1865, which regulated the development of cities above 10,000 inhabitants. I
show that this law generated larger increases in employment in the construction sector in
municipalities above the threshold from the 1960s onwards, without affecting other observ-
able city-level characteristics. I instrument migration using a shift-share instrument and
leverage differential levels of droughts in the south of Italy as push factor. Instrumental
variable estimates show that the joint effect of southern migration and construction has
a large impact on the probability to observe mafia presence. Instead, construction and
migration alone are negative or insignificant, allowing to exclude that mafias expanded by
making profits in the construction industry (owning or extorting businesses) or that mi-
gration might have caused an increase in crime. The effect is also null when we consider
migration from provinces unaffected by organized crime and sectors with large employment
growth but highly regulated or employing high-skilled workers. This result is robust to
using a variety of different definitions of mafia presence, instruments and specifications.
In sum, southern mafias were more likely to successfully establish a permanent outpost
in the north of Italy where a demand for their services existed and they could find the
resources to address it. The service of illegal labor provision and control they offered can be
best conceptualized as a complement to a strong state that would prosecute labor violations
if they were to be denounced, rather than as a substitute to a weak state not providing
sufficient protection to the market.
I then turn from studying the determinants of organized crime transplantation to its effects
to test a second prediction of the theory: that actors striking deals with organized crime
benefit from the agreement, gaining a competitive advantage. Exploiting the instrumental
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variable approach predicting mafia in a difference-in-difference design, I causally identify
the effect of mafia infiltration on political outcomes in the years after the construction
and migration boom started. I find that cities affected by mafias in the 1960-70s display
significantly higher support for the Christian Democracy (DC), the party which the judiciary
has found to have stable connections to organized crime. As should be expected, this effect
is absent before 1958, when mafias started moving north. While in cities without mafia
the DC lost consensus with the disappearance of the communist threat and later with the
largest corruption scandal in the history of the Republic, Tangentopoli, the vote share
gained in cities affected by mafias after infiltration is inelastic to political upheavals and
if anything keeps increasing. The vote share for the DC is larger in infiltrated cities with
higher presence of southern migrants - a group of voters controlled by mafias - while cities
with high southern migration but no mafia presence do not vote more for the DC. Cities
affected by mafias are also more likely to vote for Berlusconi from 1994 onwards, indicating
long-term effects of mafia infiltration on politics. Taken together, this evidence suggests
that the expansion of organized crime leveraged deals not only with economic actors but
also with political actors, including vote buying for specific parties.
A vast literature has described groups in contention with the stateas the byproduct of
the weakness of the state they originated in (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The necessity
to substitute weak states unable to perform their essential functions explains the initial
development of insurgent, rebels and criminal organizations. For example, the Sicilian Mafia
emerged by providing private protection of property rights to landowners at a time when
the Bourbon Kingdom was unable to effectively protect their property publicly (Gambetta,
1996; Bandiera, 2003; Dimico et al., 2017; Buonanno et al., 2015; Acemoglu et al., 2019).
Similar dynamics characterize the emergence of organized crime in Russia (Varese, 2006;
Lonsky, 2020), China (Wang, 2017) and Japan (Hill et al., 2003). A related literature has
examined the strategies that other non-state armed groups, such as rebels and terrorists, use
to emerge (Sánchez De La Sierra, 2020) and expand (Weinstein, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita,
2013; Toft, 2014). A much smaller literature focused on the expansion of criminal groups,
4
including Varese (2011), who uses case studies to compare cases of successful and failed
transplantation and Buonanno and Pazzona (2014), Pinotti and Stanig (2016), Sviatschi
(2018) and Scognamiglio (2018), who study the supply effects of forced resettlement of
criminals on mafia expansion.
My research contributes to these literatures by examining how criminal groups expand
with a specific focus on transplantation in strong states, a phenomenon which current
theories connecting organized crime emergence to state weakness are unable to explain. By
examining the role of mafias as political brokers and labor racketeers, I show that criminal
groups can exist as complements to strong states - providing services aimed at avoiding
states’ prosecution for labor and electoral violations -, rather than as substitutes for weak
states, offering protection when the state cannot provide it.
I also contribute to a growing literature studying the connection between migration and
crime. While past studies have focused on the real and perceived effects of immigration
on security (Dancygier, 2010; Mastrobuoni et al., 2019), in this chapter I take a different
perspective considering immigrants as resources criminals exploit to expand further. This
perspective contributes to explaining why the association immigration-crime persists even
though migrants do not seem to commit crimes at higher rates than natives (Pinotti, 2017).
Understanding the way in which criminal groups expand, striking agreements with local
actors, also allows to build expectations on the effects of infiltration on politics for parties
entering in deals with criminal groups. While other papers have presented evidence that
criminal organizations can affect party vote shares in places like Colombia, Brazil and
Sicily (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Hidalgo and Lessing, 2015; Buonanno et al., 2016; De Feo and
De Luca, 2017), this chapter provides causally identified evidence that criminal groups can
affect voting also in the context of a strong state, with a developed economy and a stable
democracy.
A final contribution is the construction of a new dataset of mafia presence from as early
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as archives of news are available, at the municipal level and which allows to verify the
correspondence of news with other mafia indicators. My news-based measure of crimi-
nal activity has also the potential to be exported to measure of organized crime in other
countries, allowing for consistent comparative studies of organized crime across space and
time.
Once criminal organizations plant roots in an area, it is hard to eradicate them. Research
has shown how crack-down on organized crime can backfire on the state itself and lead
to civilian killings and the rise of new criminal groups (Skarbek, 2011; Lessing, 2017b;
Prem et al., 2019; Castillo and Kronick, 2020; Kronick, 2020). It is therefore of primary
importance to understand the conditions allowing criminal organizations to set foot in a
new area and identify which levers can be pulled to prevent their expansion.
The first chapter concludes that the combination of two factors - local actors facing high
competition and criminal groups having access to migrant workforce they are able to control
and exploit - allowed the expansion of Southern Italian mafias to the North. In the second
chapter, I ask whether fighting migrants’ exploitation can undermine organized crime. Re-
cruiting and controlling illegally employed migrants are activities in which criminal groups
have a natural advantage. First, the routes and contacts used to smuggle illicit products
can also be used to traffic humans, an activity from which organized crime extracts a pro-
gressively large amount of revenues (Caparini, 2014). Second, employers hiring illegally are
exposed to the risk of being reported to the police, especially in case of work related acci-
dents. Using criminal groups as intermediaries to control illegal workers and threaten them
with violence guarantees that this risk is minimized. In the same way that southern mafias
controlled migrants in the North, today criminal groups control and exploit the labor of
migrants in the Italian countryside through the gangmaster system. I study the effects of a
multidimensional campaign which provided migrants working under the gangmaster system
in agriculture with information on their rights as workers and tools to denounce exploita-
tion. I find that the policy is effective in increasing both crackdown on labor exploitation
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and prosecution of members of criminal groups, who often act as gangmasters.
The question of how to fight agains organized crime is also the topic of Chapter 3. Here,
I consider a different strategy used by criminals to thrive in the context of a rich, strong
state: misappropriating public funds. Criminal groups use legal enterprises to apply for
procurement contracts and government subsidies in order to launder money, offer employ-
ment to locals (an important opportunity for patronage) and redirect resources to finance
illicit activities. This strategy is particularly profitable in the context of rich states which
large public spending. According to the European Union Anti-Fraud Agency, every year
between 300 and 900 millions of EU Funds are misappropriated by criminals (OLAF, 2018).
In the third paper, I examine a policy aimed at fighting mafia misappropriation of public
subsidies by screening companies applying above a certain threshold for connections with
mafias. I find that the policy is effective in forcing mafia-related companies to sort below
the threshold of application of the law, producing a large economic loss for criminals. I
estimate that extending controls beyond the threshold would be beneficial even accounting
for estimated costs of screening and considering as benefits only the financial recoveries
from not assigning public funds to mafias.
Over time, organized crime has evolved to seize the opportunities for expansion and profits
offered by modern states, such as migrants’ exploitation and public funds misappropriation.
Identifying these strategies and what allows criminals to seize them is essential for under-
standing the relation between criminal groups and the state and is the precondition for an
effective fight against them.
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CHAPTER 2 : How Criminal Organizations Expand to Strong States
How Criminal Organizations Expand to
Strong States: Migrants’ Exploitation and
Vote Buying in Northern Italy
Abstract
Criminal organizations are widely believed to emerge in weak states unable to protect the
property rights and safety of their citizens. Yet, criminal groups often expand to states with
strong capacity and well-functioning institutions. This chapter proposes a theory accounting
for this phenomenon. I focus on one distinctive feature of strong states: their capacity to
enforce competition. I argue that criminal organizations expand by striking agreements
with political and economic actors facing competition and to which they can offer critical
resources to gain an edge over competitors. I test this theory in the context of Northern
Italy, a region with high social capital and well-functioning democratic institutions, but
which has suffered increasing levels of mafia infiltration since the 1960s. I construct a new
measure of mafia presence at the municipality level, by scraping mafia-related news from
historic newspapers and validating them with present time mafias indicators from judicial
sources and NGOs. I test two predictions of the theory. First, using an instrumental
variable approach, I show that increases in market competition (due to a construction
boom) and in mafias’ capacity to offer cheap illegal labor (by exploiting migrants from mafia-
controlled areas in the south) allowed criminal groups to expand to the north. Second, I show
that parties that entered in agreements with criminal groups gained a persistent electoral
advantage in mafia-infiltrated cities and only after infiltration. This evidence suggests
that mafias’ expansion leveraged deals with economic and political actors in strong states,
pointing to the need to re-conceptualize criminal organizations not only as substitutes for
weak states, but also as complements to states with strong institutions.
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2.1. Introduction
A vast literature has characterized groups competing with the state as the direct product of
state weakness. Fearon and Laitin (2003) suggest that weak institutions makes insurgency
more attractive because rebels can potentially take over the state and reap its benefits. In
civil wars, weak institutions unable to curb violence open the space for protracted conflict
and the strengthening of groups competing for power with the state (Skocpol, 1979; Hegre
et al., 2001; Goldstone et al., 2010). Similarly, criminal organizations have been shown
to emerge as the product of state weakness: when the state has been unable to protect
citizens and their property rights, criminal groups have stepped in, providing these services
privately Gambetta (1996); Skaperdas (2001); Acemoglu et al. (2019); Sánchez De La Sierra
(2020).
While this theory characterizes the origin of groups competing with the state, it has troubles
explaining a common but overlooked pattern: criminal groups often expand to states with
strong economies and institutions. This pattern is surprising, not only because previous
theories rely on state weakness to explain the rise of these groups. Criminal organizations
are not easily exportable industries as they rely on resources that are inherently local to
function. A reputation for violence, a network of informants, connections in the institutions,
the ability to maintain consensus in an area are all resources that cannot just be exported
somewhere else (Smith and Varese, 2001; Varese, 2011). Finally, expanding to strong states
should be harder considering that these states have better capacity to detect and repress
incipient criminals, and all the incentives to do so.
This chapter formulates a theory explaining the move of organized crime to strong states.
In particular, I develop an explanation for where criminal organizations are successful at
establishing a stable presence, conditional on moving. I propose that criminal groups ex-
pands when they are able to strike agreements with local actors facing high competition
and to which they have the capacity to offer illegal resources to overcome competitors, such
as bought votes and controllable illegal labor. If an agreement takes place, criminals can (i)
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avoid police detection, as the mutual dependence with local actors guarantees that no part
involved has incentives to denounce (ii) generate a stream of revenues from service provision
and (iii) create networks in the new territory and start building a reputation for violence.
This strategy is only feasible where criminal groups have access to illegal resources that can
help local actors overcome competitors, such as controllable illegal labor or votes. In line
with this theory, several cases of expansion are characterized by the contemporaneous move
of criminals and migrants from their same area of origin, individuals needing employment,
often unable to being legally hired and on which criminal groups have control thanks to an
already established reputation.
I test this theory in the context of the move of Southern Italian mafias to the economi-
cally and institutionally developed North starting in the 1960s and 1970s. First, I provide
qualitative evidence indicating that during times of boom in the construction sector, mafias
struck deals with local businessmen to give them access to cheap workforce they controlled
- migrants from mafia-affected areas in the south. Second, I test the hypothesis that mafias
expanded in cities with a joint increase in competition (due to a construction boom) and
in mafias’ capacity to offer illegal labor (due to migration from the south). I exploit two
separate instrumental variable approaches to provide evidence in line with this prediction.
Third, using an instrumented difference-in-differences approach, I show that political actors
that - as documented by judicial evidence - entered in agreements with organized crime,
benefited electorally in mafia-infiltrated cities in the North, gaining a competitive edge over
other parties.
Taken together, this evidence demonstrates that organized crime expanded to Northern
Italy by building coalitions with political and economic actors to which criminals were able
to offer a competitive edge leveraging vote buying and illegal labor.
This chapter contributes to a vast literature studying the relation between competitive
groups and weak states (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) and in particular studying the emergence
of organized crime (Gambetta, 1996). Departing from previous studies, this chapter devel-
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ops and tests a theory explaining the expansion of organized crime to strong states. Acting
as political and labor brokers, criminal groups in strong states can be best conceptualized
as complements to states with strong institutions, rather than substitutes to weak states.
Understanding how expansion of criminal groups takes places does not only help providing
a more complete picture of the role of criminal groups in strong states, it also sheds light
on the dynamics that states should be aware of and fight against to prevent the negative
long-term consequences of organized crime infiltration.
2.2. A theory of organized crime expansion to strong states
Stronger and richer states can offer larger profit opportunities. In this sense, it is easy
to imagine why criminal organizations might want to create an outpost in those places.
Previous work has examined the reasons leading criminals to move away from their area of
origin and found that criminals mostly move to escape police prosecution, wars with rivals
or due to forced resettlement (Varese, 2011; Pinotti and Stanig, 2016; Sviatschi, 2018). In
this study, I take the move of criminals as given and I seek to explain why they manage to
establish permanent roots in some places and not in others, conditional on moving.
Obstacles to expansion:
From the point of view of the existing knowledge on organized crime and criminality more
in general, the expansion of criminal organizations to strong states is a puzzle. First, the
prevailing view holds that criminal organizations emerge as substitutes for weak states which
fail to protect citizens and their property rights (Gambetta, 1996; Bandiera, 2003; Buonanno
et al., 2015; Dimico et al., 2017; Acemoglu et al., 2019), but states with strong capacity
accomplish these functions efficiently, suggesting we should not see any criminal group
emerging in these contexts. Second, research in criminology shows that crime expansion
is generally hard to accomplish (Guerette and Bowers, 2009; Weisburd and Telep, 2013;
Johnson et al., 2014). Learning the map of a new territory, identifying weak spots and
assessing risks requires time and effort and has uncertain returns (Johnson et al., 2014).
Constraints to expansion are even more binding for organized crime, which is rooted in
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resources which are inherently local: a reputation for violence, a system of informants, a
network of people owing them favors or that can be blackmailed, and a system of governance
over the territory or over a group of people. For these reasons, Varese (2011) has suggested
that mafia transplantation is more similar to a politician trying to be elected in a different
country than to a company opening a foreign outpost. Third, strong states have better
resources to repress expansion and should be more likely to succeed when expansion is just
starting and criminal groups are not yet strong. Yet, organized crime frequently manages
to set foot in new areas without being defeated by strong states. I theorize a strategy of
expansion which allows to overcome these three obstacles.
Competition:
I start by focusing on a distinguishing feature of strong or relatively strong states, their
capacity to enforce rules that regulate competition (Polanyi, 1945).1 For competition to
properly function in markets and elections, states must have the capacity to enforce rules
and coerce actors to abide by them. The existence of rules regulating competition entails
two consequences. On one hand, higher competition increases the incentives for actors
operating in these markets to look for shortcuts, such as using illegal and underpaid labor
or buying votes. On the other hand, the enforcement of rules regulating competition makes
it riskier to take these shortcuts. Businessmen trying to hire illegally risk being reported
to the police while trying to recruit and are exposed to the risk of being blackmailed by
employees that are hired informally. These risks increase if unexpected shocks damage the
working relation, such as a negative income shock or a work-related accident, which might
push the employee to change her mind and decide to denounce. Finding voters to which
to propose vote buying and guaranteeing their silence over the transaction can be equally
risky for politicians.2
1Although several definitions of state strength have been proposed (see (Berwick and Christia, 2018) for
a review), for the purpose of this theory the sufficient conditions are the capacity to enforce rules regulating
competition (Polanyi, 1945) and the capacity to provide public protection of property rights.
2See (Bliss and Tella, 1997) for a discussion of why perfect competition does not entail the absence of
corruption. See also (Stigler, 1972) for the similarities between political and economic competition.
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Criminal organizations can offer a solution to these problems as they often have the capacity
to control the behavior of workers and voters such that reporting risks are substantially
decreased.
Capacity to offer illegal resources:
Access to a network of low-income controllable people is a distinctive feature of criminal
organizations across countries. First, criminal groups generally originate and maintain their
strongholds in poor communities in which the incentives to accept illegal forms of employ-
ment are higher. Second, even when they move away from their original area, control over a
group of low-income people is often maintained by exercising forms of control over migrants.
This is because historically criminals have moved together with masses of migrants from the
same area of origin as criminals. All the examples mentioned in the introduction respond
to this logic: Sicilians migrating to the US (Cressey, 2017), Russian migrants escaping the
Soviet Union to Europe (Varese, 2006), refugees from the civil war in Salvador to the US
(Sviatschi, 2018), Italians from Calabria in Germany and Australia (Calderoni et al., 2016),
and so on.
Migrants from the same origin as criminal groups are susceptible to their reputation as
credibly threatening and have the power to retaliate against them or against family members
who stayed behind. When migrants have scarce opportunities to integrate in the destination
society, because they are clandestine or for lack of integration policies facilitating their
entrance in the new labor market, organized crime can profit from its proximity and power
over migrants to offer them employment in absence of a legal contract while guaranteeing
that migrants will not report their employers, even in case of negative shocks or work-
accidents. This can be the case for legal migrants facing frictions in entering the legal labor
market and it is even more for illegal migrants, unable to access legal employment and
subject to the threat of expulsion.3
3Notice that the behavior of states with respect to migrants - lack of controls over their rights as employees,
lack of integration policies - cannot be characterized as a sign of state weakness. Rather, it is a choice that
states with varying degrees of strength and resources availability make whether to integrate migrants or
leaving them in a condition of poverty and marginalization.
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I argue that members of criminal groups from the same area of origin as migrants, speaking
their same foreign language or dialect, and able to use their social networks at home to
threaten punishment have enough power over migrants to exercise forms of control and
exploitation, such as labor racketeering and vote buying.
Expansion:
What do criminal organizations obtain in return from the provision of illegal services to local
actors facing high competition? Other than generating rents (local actors pay criminals for
their services), an agreement produces two important consequences for expansion. First, a
system of mutual dependence with local actors reduces the probability that criminals will
be reported to the police, making the repressive capacity of strong states less consequential.
Second, it provides criminal groups with the opportunity to build the resources on which
their power is rooted in the new territory: networks within the community, the acquisition
of a reputation for violence, the possibility to blackmail businessmen and politicians to
obtain information and favors. I contend that, in exchange for the services they provide,
criminal organizations create the conditions allowing them to establish their presence in a
new territory.
Hypothesis: Expansion takes place when criminal groups are able to strike agreements
with local actors facing competition to which they can offer critical resources to gain a
competitive edge. An agreement guarantees that criminals go unreported and provides them
with the opportunity to build local resources (networks, reputation, governance).
Criminal organizations minimize the probability that the state prosecutes businessmen for
illegally hiring workers and politicians for illegally mobilizing votes. They do so by using
their own channels for recruitment - thus removing any direct linkage to political and busi-
ness actors - and by guaranteeing silence over the transaction thanks to their intimidation
power. While competitors or institutional actors might try to denounce these illicit ac-
tivities, documenting them judicially is hard in absence of parts willing talk.4 Organized
4The next section reports examples of such behavior: for example, union members were aware of the
system of labor exploitation workers were subject to and tried to denounce it, but they were unable to find
workers willing to testify and they became themselves targets of mafia threats.
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Table 1: Obstacles to expansion from the literature and explanations offered by this theory
on how criminal organizations (CO) overcome them
Obstacles to expansion How CO overcome them
(literature) to expand (this theory)
CO emerge providing private protection CO expand providing intermediation services (
(substitute to a weak state) complement to a strong state)
Difficult to recreate local resources Recreate local resources
(reputation, networks, governance) thanks to agreements with local actor
and governance over migrants
Strong states have the capacity to repress CO avoid state repression by creating
incipient criminal groups incentives for their partners not to denounce
crime’s capacity to enforce informal contracts and maintain them private is most useful in
places where the cost of the illegal transaction becoming public is highest – in strong states,
where this behavior would be most effectively prosecuted. In this sense, differently from the
previous literature, this theory conceptualizes criminals as offering businessmen and politi-
cians a service of protection from strong states’ prosecution for illegal competition (thus a
complement to a strong state), rather than protection in place of a state unable to provide
it publicly (a substitute to a weak state). While the view that criminal groups emerge
substituting weak states has proven useful to explain the emergence of criminal groups, it
does not offer insights into how criminal groups establish roots in places in which the state
offers effective security and property rights’ protection. My theory and findings, instead,
allow to explain how criminal organizations expand to states with strong institutions, high
level of competition, prosperous economies, and high social capital.5
Testable Predictions
I test two predictions of the theory. First, the theory predicts where expansion will take
place: criminal groups should expand where states enforce rules regulating competition,
competition is high and criminals have the capacity to offer local actors critical resources
to gain a competitive edge. I consider a context in which the state establishes and enforces
5Section A.1 in the SI discusses more in detail the differences between this study and (Varese, 2011).
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rules regulating competition and there is variation in the extent of market competition and
in criminal groups’ capacity to offer illegal resources.
Prediction 1: Determinants of expansion. Criminal groups expand where competition
is high and criminal groups have access to illegal resources.
Second, the theory predicts that actors who strike agreements with criminal organizations
should benefit from this agreement by gaining a competitive edge. I test this prediction using
variation in political outcomes of parties that, based on judicial evidence, have and have
not made agreements with criminal groups in cities with and without mafia infiltration.6
Prediction 2: Effects of an agreement.Actors striking deals with organized crime benefit
from the agreement, gaining a competitive advantage.
2.3. The Expansion of Southern Mafias to the North
The expansion of southern mafias to the center and north of Italy started in the late 1950s
and took shape through the 1980s. In those years, Italy - especially if we exclude the
South - was a comparatively strong state, with a firm a monopoly of violence within its
territory, a modern bureaucracy, a well-regulated market society and a large public sector.
The conditions identified as conducive to the emergence of criminal groups – the lack of
protection of citizens’ security and of their property rights, creating the demand for private
forms of protection - were absent, in a state that had crime rates in line with other countries
and property rights well enforced. The 1960s and 1970s were also the years of the “economic
miracle”, a boom in construction and manufacturing which increased the competition to
hire unskilled workers and attracted a mass of southern migrants looking for employment
in the center-north.7 The size of this migration was impressive: from the start of the
boom in 1958 to its slowdown in 1974, a total of 4 million people had resettled to the
6Testing whether businessmen benefited from the agreement is not feasible in this context, as this would
require knowledge on which businessmen entered in collusive agreements with mafias, but names of companies
found guilty are not disclosed nor data on individual companies are available at this time. Additionally, while
political competition involves long-term actors (parties) whose performances can be continually observed over
election cycles, the same strategy is not feasible for companies, unless they are extremely long-lived.
7Before this time, there had been close to no internal migration, as the Fascist regime explicitly aimed at
reducing migration flows. Right at the end of Fascism, ethnic Italians living in Istria, Quarnaro and Dalmatia
(annexed to Yugoslavia after WWII) were forced into a diaspora which brought 250-300.000 people to move
to the closest area in Italy, the north-east. Those migrants, however, were moving only a few kilometers to
the west and were very similar to the population that hosted them.
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center-north, corresponding to one fourth of the entire southern population (Figure 1). The
vast majority of migrants was employed, often illegally, in the construction industry.8 In
1962 it was estimated that 70% of the construction workforce in Genoa, 80% in Turin and
85% in Milan came from the south. Most of the migrants worked for extremely low pays
and were subject to frequent work accidents. Many lived in disorganized urban centers in
the peripheries of the big cities, spoke dialects and often no Italian and they were largely
discriminated against (Ascoli, 1979). The phenomenon of mass migration ended in 1973-74,
when the oil crisis reduced the speed of economic development in the north. Since then,
migration from the south has continued at lower intensity.
Figure 1: Number of migrants from southern
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Together with the migrants, a number of
mafia members also moved to the center-
north, some pushed by their own ambitions
and some brought there by the state.
The state forcibly relocates mafia
members
Until 1995, the state had a policy forc-
ing mafiosi to internal exile by relocating
them to other cities outside of their region.
The policy of soggiorno obbligato was a by-
product of the idea that mafias are the re-
sult of a backward environment, so that relocating mafiosi to a more developed place would
break their ability to organize a criminal group (Varese, 2006). Far from breaking crimi-
nality, according to both the Parliamentary Commission investigating on mafias and recent
empirical work by Buonanno and Pazzona (2014) and Pinotti and Stanig (2016), this policy
favored mafias’ expansion by pushing people with criminal skills to new virgin territories.
8The construction industry is one of the sectors in which even today criminal groups make large profits
(ANSBC, 2019) and one of the sectors at high risk of criminal infiltration according to Gambetta and Reuter
(1995).
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At the same time, other mafia members also moved towards north spontaneously.9 The
Parliamentary Commission investigating on mafias suggests that even mafiosi sent to exile,
in some cases, managed to be relocated in cities of their choice. Even if forced resettlement
created an additional supply of mafiosi moving towards north (Varese, 2011), their pres-
ence did not automatically translate into mafia expansion10 and it remains unclear what
determined criminals’ success at creating new outposts, conditional on moving.
The racket of migrant workers
What did mafia members do in the north after they resettled? Evidence from newspapers
and from the work of the Parliamentary Commission investigating on organized crime sug-
gest that mafiosi undertook a variety of different criminal activities, from extortions and
usury to kidnappings. Another common pattern is their involvement in the construction
sector11 and in particular in the racket of migrants from the south as workforce in the
booming construction industry. A series of judicial and political investigations following a
scandal which took place in Turin in 197112 allows to understand the way in which this
system worked.
First, most construction companies were relatively small and relied on subcontracting to
perform the different functions required to produce finished buildings, a practice which was
only allowed in certain categories of construction works (Law n. 1369/1960). Additionally,
since construction work is discontinuous and requires varying numbers of laborers depending
on the size of the job, it is necessary to have occasional workers available on call. At a time
9To mention some notable examples, the boss Joe Adonis moved to Milan, Geraldo Alberti from Cosa
Nostra to Cologno Monzese, the ’Ndrangheta boss Giacomo Zagari to Piedmont and Frank Coppola to Lazio.
10For example, although the province of Cuneo was the first in the Center-North for number of resettled
mafia members (CPA, 1976), this province ranks 98th over 103 in the provincial level index of mafia presence
developed by (Calderoni, 2011).
11The first mafiosi arriving in Lazio, for example, established their residency along the coast in rapid
urbanistic development and invested in construction. For example, the boss Frank Coppola moved in a sea
town close to Rome, Torre San Lorenzo, bought land and buildings and obtained permits to build (CPA,
1976). The Cosa Nostra bosses from the Cuntrera-Caruana family established their residency in Ostia. The
’Ndrangheta family Gallace and Domenico Tripodo moved further south on the coast, in Anzio, Nettuno
and Fondi. All operated in the construction sector.
12The scandal saw a specialized piece worker killing four ’Ndrangheta members out of exasperation for
the level of exploitation to which he was subject as a worker in the construction industry. La Stampa, May
3, 1971, p.5
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of boom in sectors employing unskilled labor and of low unemployment, it became difficult
for businessmen in the construction sector to find cheap and intermittent workforce.13 To
cut costs and times, many businessmen relied on informal subcontracting to people capable
of controlling illegal workers. This process happened in a proper – extralegal – marketplace:
in Turin, workers showed up in the morning at the train station, where members of mafias
hired as many workers as they need. Mafias received a cut from both the businessmen and
the migrants for their service.14 When work-related accidents took place, and they were
common,15 mafias could guarantee that migrants would not report them to the authority for
fear of repercussions on themselves or on their family members who stayed behind.16 Even
if unions tried to penetrate this system and help workers, their offer was difficult to take
due to mafias’ intimidatory power.17 A reportage by the newspaper L’Unità suggests that
mafia members entered in this business “Certain of their impunity, which does not derive
from their own strength, but rather from that of the system: they are useful for profits, so
they will never be touched”. 18
Businessmen: According to the Parliamentary Commission, businessmen accepted the
intermediation of mafias out of convenience: they faced increasing competition to hire
unskilled workers and the pool of candidates was mainly composed of southern migrants,
since local workers preferred employment opportunities offering more regular income and
13CPA 1976, p.288.
14In Turin, the price of this service for businessmen, varied between 50 and 150 Lire per square meter
built, corresponding to between 25 and 75% of the pay of a specialized piece worker. For workers, a fee
was often asked in advance of even starting to work. In a case of racket uncovered by the investigators, a
worker was asked to pay 120,000 Lire to be allowed work. For a house of 100 square meters ( 1000 Sq. Feet)
employing ten workers, mafias could make as much as 1,200,000 Lire – corresponding to about 12,000 USD
today. La Stampa, May 3, 1971, p.5
15According to the Inspectorate of Work, the number of work-related deaths in one year, only in the
construction sector and only in the Turin province, was 63, a number higher than any other sector and
province and which is likely to be an underestimate. Regional Council of Piedmont, February 9, 1972, n.82,
p.11.
16L’Unità, May 9th, 1971, p.6.
17A union representative explains: “When we try to interrogate them, workers stay silent or provide false
information. Meanwhile, mafia members engage in threatening acts against us. They do so not so much to
scare us, rather to show workers that they are stronger than we are. They do not openly threaten us, they
use subtler ways. Once, out of the construction site, I found my car damaged. Another time, a block of
bricks had fallen on it. Another time, there was a hole created by bullet shot against the car door”. Regional
Council of Piedmont, February 9, 1972, n.81, p.11.
18L’Unità, May 9, 1971, p.6.
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lower risks. Additionally, hiring without a contract allowed to evade taxes on labor and
social security, cutting the cost of labor in half. Since work accidents were extremely
common, the intimidatory power of mafias was important to prevent workers from reporting
their situation of irregularity to the police.19
What fraction of the construction companies in a city was in collusion with mafias? The
most extreme case discovered by the judiciary was that of Bardonecchia, territory of the
boss Rocco Lo Presti, where it was estimated that about 85% of the companies relied on
the services provided by organized crime. In Turin, a much larger city, where the first scan-
dal exploded and investigations were conducted, between 70 and 80% of the construction
workforce was subject to racketeering.20 Other cities subject to systematic investigations
had smaller but still significant fractions of the companies involved.
This anecdotal evidence is in line with Gambetta and Reuters (1995), who discuss that large
collusive agreements are the most efficient for mafias to manage. Unlike agreements with
few participants, they reduce the potential for new racketeerers to enter the market and
increase profits from participation fee collection. Having more members guarantees a better
capacity to control pricing in local markets and makes exit from these agreements costly for
participants. While businessmen outside of the agreement have incentives to request police
investigation on these practices, anecdotal evidence from the attempts made by unions to
break the system (discussed above) suggest that obtaining evidence sufficient to denounce
was extremely hard in absence of workers willing to talk.
If such a large fraction of business owners hired mafia as intermediaries, who were they
competing against? In the context of Northern Italy, competition to hire unskilled labor
extended beyond the construction sector and applied to most of the sectors that were
booming, including manufacturing and mechanics. Using criminal groups as labor racketeers
allowed businessmen not only to drastically cut on labor costs, but also to recruit difficult
19La Stampa, May 11th, 1971
20Parliamentary Commission on the phenomen of the Mafia in Sicily, 1976, Legislature IV, p.280.
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to find manual workers at affordable prices.
Migrants: Why did migrants accept to work without a contract and under the threat of
mafias? The Parliamentary Commission suggests that mafias managed to obtain control
over migrants not only with intimidation, but also by offering immediate and much needed
help while migrants faced unemployment and social marginalization.21 In this sense, the
commission identifies the lack of services to help migrants match with employers and in-
tegrate in the new society as the root cause of the phenomenon of labor racketeering.
Interviews conducted by the press with union members also suggest that most of the em-
ployees accepted to work without protection because regularization and insurance would
be curtailed from their pay and this represented a large wedge for migrant workers, whose
objective was to accumulate as much money in the shortest time possible to send them
home and to go back to live in the south themselves.22 Qualitative evidence suggests that
a combination of short time horizons on the part of the laborers with the lack of a social
safety net and ineffective labor market regulation led workers to prefer to join the mafia
labor racket rather than go through official channels.
The state: The state, and the institutions in charge of discovering and repressing this
phenomenon, seem to have actively responded to the threat of mafia expansion, at least in
the Turin case. Right after the first scandal in 1971, the judiciary started investigations in
all the municipalities in the surrounding area. The Unions (Cisl, Cgil, Uil) held a joint con-
ference on this topic and the regional council of Piedmont created a special commission to
investigate on these crimes, presenting a report in November 1972. Also the Antimafia Com-
mission in 1974 examined this phenomenon. However, this mobilization was not sufficient
to eradicate the phenomenon: even in Bardonecchia, the city subject to the highest level of
scrutiny, the Parliamentary Commission estimated that the market for labor still involved
about 30% of the workforce in 1974, three years after the repression activity started. The
21Mafia members waited for migrants at the train station and offered them employment as soon as they
stepped foot in the north (La Stampa, December 3 1969, p. 9).
22La Stampa, September 30th, 1971, p.4
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likelihood that the state could collect sufficient evidence to convict criminals was very low,
as both businessmen and migrants agreed to mafias’ intermediation. As a result, variation
in the quality of institutions is unlikely to explain differing levels of mafia infiltration. The
most important mistake of the state seems therefore not so much in having been ineffective
in the few cases in which racketing was denounced or discovered (here repression was im-
mediate and investigation capillary). Rather, the state failed to offer a structure capable
of coordinating the supply of work represented by migrants and the existing local demand,
and it failed to enforce laws on workplace treatment and to provide immigrants with the
resources necessary for their integration in the new society. In this respect, the state was
not weak, as its lack of action towards the integration and protection of migrants was the
result of a lack of interest in creating integration infrastructures, rather than of incapacity.23
This space left empty by the state was readily occupied by mafias.
2.4. Data
2.4.1. Mafia presence
For the time period 1960-80s in Italy, there is no systematic data on mafia presence available
from institutional sources. I create a measure of mafia presence by scraping newspapers
articles discussing typical mafia-related crimes starting from 1960.24 A first order concern
using this method is that we might observe instances of mafia in a territory not because
of intense mafia activity, but rather due to a successful judicial activity, which might take
place exactly where mafias are weaker and less able to conceal their presence. I address
this concern in two ways. First, I scrape not only news explicitly containing the word
mafia or ’Ndrangheta, but also typical crimes committed by mafias, such as extortions,
kidnappings, vote buying, drug trafficking and labor racketeering. Second, I validate the
measure obtained from news by comparing it to official indicators of mafia presence available
23In those years, there was no active debate in favor of creating integration policies for southern migrants,
which explains the states’ disinterest in this topic. If anything, there was a debate on restricting immigration,
as southerners were perceived as a threat to the economy and culture of the North by part of the society
(Fofi, 1964).
24My source is the archive of the national newspaper La Stampa, which is available since earlier than the
1960s and is free access.
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from 1990s onwards. I gather information on (1) goods, properties and firms seized to
mafias25 (2) city councils dissolved due to mafia infiltration26 (3) mafia-related victims27
and (4) judicial evidence on which cities have a permanent ‘Ndrangheta cell.28 These
information come from different sources, from institutions to NGOs, and locations, from
local to national. Each of these measures is positively correlated to each other, which
coefficients that range from 0.05 for very sparse measures (e.g. city-councils dissolved for
mafia infiltration) to 0.5 for high density indicators. If mafia strongholds may successfully
divert the investigative activities of the local police, it is less likely that they can also affect
the activity of the parliamentary commission or of national newspapers.
Finally, since the type of activities mafias undertake might vary as a function of their level
of penetration in the territory, with newly infiltrated places being less likely to display
instances of violence to avoid alarming local authorities, I track multiple types of crimes,
ranging from violence to extortion and infiltration in the legal economy.
For each scraped observation, I extract the date, location, title and the body of the article.
For the subsample of news which do not have a location tag, I extract the name of the
city where the event took place from the article’s body and validate this procedure on the
sample of news for which the newspaper itself reports the location of the event. For each
city, I obtain a measure of news per capita that I aggregate at the decade level. Through
this process, I am able to create the first municipal-level measure of mafia presence which
varies in time earlier than the 1990s for the whole country.
In 17% (N=1046) of the cities in the center and north of Italy there is at least one news
25Law 646/1982, data are provided by the National Agency for Seized and Confiscated Goods (ANBSC).
26Law 221/1991 first established that city councils found to be infiltrated by criminal organizations would
be dissolved and replaced by a public official nominated by the State in charge for one or two years, until
new elections take place.
27A report on the victims of mafias was put together by a network of more than 1,200 NGOs working
to counteract mafia activity by aggregating information from newspapers, books and police reports. I then
transformed this report into a database including year, location and name of the victim. While data start
being collected from very early on (the first victims are reported in 1863), there are only 17 observations in
the period 1960-90 in the center and north of Italy, 3 of which in Milan.
28Information coming from reading of documents of the trials against mafia presence in the center-north
of Italy: Aemilia, Crimine, Geena, Infinito, Maglio, Minotauro.
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related to mafias in the period 1960-1989 and over this time period the number of mafia-
related news, as well as the fraction of cities with news, is steadily increasing (Figure 22).
Within these cities, the median number of mafia-related news is 2 or 8 per 10,000 residents.
While on average cities with mafia-related news are larger, there are news related to mafia
in towns of all sizes, including the smallest, and a plot relating news per capita and pop-
ulation shows no positive monotonic relation between these two variables (Figure 30, SI).
Descriptive statistics on the main index of mafia presence and the variations used for ro-
bustness are included in Table 15, SI while Table 16, SI compares census indicators in cities
with and without mafia-related news. Additionally, Figures 25 and 26 in the Appendix map
each of the measures individually.
Validation of the news as a measure of mafia presence
To what extent is the distribution of news reflective of the true presence of mafias in 1960s-
80s? While there are no data at the same point in time, we can compare news in 1960-1989
to the distribution of mafia presence later on, from 1990 to today, when official indicators are
available.29 News and official indicators agree in classifying cities as with or without mafia
presence in 78% of the cases.30 To examine the covariance between these two measures
more closely, in Figure 2 I map the distribution of news 1960-1989 and official indicators
1991-2018. Since the objective is to assess the extent to which the two measures overlap,
in this figure I compare the density of news and official indicators without normalizing by
population, which changes (potentially endogenously) over time. We observe a relatively
high correspondence in mafia presence across the two maps, reflective of a 0.77 correlation.
29While indicators are available from the 1990s, in this decade almost none of the indicators reports
positive signs of mafia presence in the North, as the activities of mafias in this period were still undetected.
While newspapers start mentioning the presence of mafia members and typical mafia-crimes already in the
1960s, the recognition that mafias had moved to the North and their prosecution starts in the 1990s. Due to
the lack of positive observations, a comparison between news and indicators in this decade (the only period
in which the two databases overlap) does not convey relevant information (map in Figure 29, SI.)
30The remaining 21% is composed of 11% of observations classified as having mafia presence today (official
indicators) but not in 1960-89 (news) and 10% have news related to mafia in 1960-89 but no official indicator
recording mafia presence today. Considering only cities with mafia presence today, 33% of those already
displayed instances of mafia-related news in the 1960-80s.
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Both maps indicate mafia presence in the surroundings of Rome, Milan, Turin and Genova.31
Mafia is also present in the most common touristic destinations of the 1960-1989, the coastal
area of Ravenna and Viareggio, as well as Venice. This pattern could be in line with mafias
settling where large construction development took place in the years of the expansion, as
those cities were the main destinations of the first mass tourism in Italy. There is instead a
larger number of news than official indicators in the region of Piedmont, in the north-west.
This likely happens because Turin is the city where the first scandal revealing the existence
of mafias in the north took place. In line with this interpretation, before the scandal, which
took place in 1971, the number of news in Piedmont is comparable to that of other regions.32
Aside from this area, the two maps display a very high level of covariance in mafia presence,
even though they rely on different sources and refer to different time periods, validating news
as a predictor of mafia presence.
Comparison to other mafia measures
Compared to existing measures, my index allows to map mafia presence in Italy for a
considerably longer period, starting from 1960 and until today. Current measures of mafias
at the municipal level used in the literature start from the 1990s or later (Dugato et al.,
2019). Mafia measures available as far back in time are completely absent or only reported
for Sicily at a specific point in time (Cutrera, 1900). Not only the method followed in this
study allows to map the entire country from as early as archives of news are available, at
the municipal level and to verify the correspondence of news with other indicators, it also
has the potential to be comparable to measures of organized crime in other countries built
using the same methodology, allowing for consistent comparative studies of organized crime
across space and time.
31The prevalence of mafia in large cities in the center-north is also verified in (Dugato et al., 2019). The
opposite pattern holds in the south, where mafias tend to settle in smaller centers.
32The number of news in the decade 1960-1969 alone is plotted in Figure 28, SI. The scandal triggered
the first journalistic and judicial investigations on this phenomenon, with several commissions investigating
the presence of mafia in the cities surrounding Turin. It is therefore not surprising that the number of news
related to mafia in this region is higher than in other places. In the analysis section, I will test the robustness
of results to accounting for Piedmont, as well as for only considering news which have nothing to do with
labor-racketeering.
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Figure 2: Mafia presence as defined by news 1960-1989 and official indicators 1990-2018
Note: The map on the left plots the maximum number of news related to mafia (extortion, kid-
napping, drug trafficking, labor racketeering, vote buying and news mentioning the word mafia or
’Ndrangheta) recorded in a city-decade between 1960 and 1989. The right panel plots the official in-
dicators of mafia presence (average of standardized number of goods and properties seized to mafia,
firms seized to mafia, mafia-related homicides, ’Ndrangheta outposts uncovered by the judiciary and
city councils dissolved due to mafia infiltration) between 1991 and 2018. The source and time span
of each indicator, as well as the validation of news are discussed in Section 2.4.1.
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2.4.2. Other data
I obtained data on the number of employees by sector in each city and decade starting from
1951 from the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT). While this number does not
include illegal workers, a higher population share of employed workers in the construction
sector indicates an industry in expansion and in need of unskilled workforce to hire. I
combine employment in construction with data on inter-provincial migration, tracing the
number of people moving from each of the 103 provinces of origin to each province of
destination every year from 1955 onwards.33 Figure 27, SI shows the geographic distribu-
tion of these two variables in per-capita terms before the economic boom started, in 1951
(construction) and 1955 (migration).
Other data used in the analyses include (1) census data on city characteristics from 1951
onwards, which I use as additional controls and for placebo tests, (2) census population in
1871, used to build the instrument for construction, (3) the Drought Severity Index in 1961-
1989 provinces from Van der Schrier et al. (2006), used to instrument southern migration,
(4) the number of forcibly resettled mafia members34, used for exploration of the mediating
effect of this variable and finally (5) national elections results 1948-2008 at the city level
from the Ministry of Interior Affairs. Descriptive statistics on all variables are included in
Table 15, SI.
2.5. Determinants of Expansion
2.5.1. Empirical Strategy
In this section, I start by introducing the baseline estimating equation. I then build and
discuss the instruments for construction and immigration.
33I received the data from the IRPPS (Istituto di Ricerche sulla Popolazione e le Politiche Sociali). Since
provinces vary over time, the institute has aggregated them to the 103 provinces present in the period
1974-1994.
34Commissione Parlamentare d’Inchiesta Antimafia, 1976
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Baseline Estimation
I test the hypothesis that it is more likely to observe mafia expansion in cities with a joint
increase in construction employment and in immigrants from the south, a workforce over
which criminal groups had the capacity to exert control. In particular, I estimate:
Yit+1 = αi + βt + γCit + δMpt + ζC ×Mit + εit (2.1)
where Yit+1 is mafia presence in city i and decade t+ 1 = [1970, 1980], Cit is the population
share of employees in the construction sector in t = [1960, 1970], Mpt the population share
of immigrants from the south in province of destination p and αi and βt are city and decade
fixed effects. Fixed effects imply that the coefficients γ, δ and ζ capture the change in mafia
presence within the same city over time. This allows to exclude that results are driven by
fixed differences in city characteristics, such as being a large, wealthy or low social capital
city. To account for the concern that population is itself an outcome of migration, the
number of migrants is scaled by the province population at time zero, 1951, before the
migration waves started (Card and Peri, 2016).35 Standard errors are clustered at the city
level and the linearity assumptions to capture interaction effects using a linear model are
tested in Section A.3, SI.
The coefficient of interest ζ captures the joint effect of an increase in construction employ-
ment and migration from the south on mafia presence. A positive effect of construction
alone could simply indicate that mafias expanded by making profits in the construction
industry, either owning businesses themselves or extorting other business owners. Simi-
larly, an increase in migration alone could point to a role of migrants in favoring mafias
expansion, for example because they engage in criminality themselves. Focusing on the
interaction between construction employment and immigration from the south, instead,
allows to specifically consider the contribution of a demand for unskilled labor to mafia
35Results obtained using current population are consistent and reported in Table 29, Col 3.
28
expansion when a migrant workforce is available for exploitation. If only this coefficient
positively predicts mafia presence, then a boom in construction is only important to the
extent that mafias can offer their services as providers of cheap workforce, and not for the
other possibilities mentioned above.
In this baseline regression, estimates are likely to suffer from both omitted variable bias and
reverse causality issues. For example, the reason why migrants are pulled in an area could be
correlated with other time-varying factors that also attract mafia presence (e.g. economic
development) or mafias themselves might attract southern immigrants. A similar story
could be told for constructions, as investment in this sector might be higher due to mafia
presence (Di Cataldo and Mastrorocco, 2019). I deal with endogeneity and reverse causality
by instrumenting both construction employment and southern migration. The coefficients
γ, δ and ζ capture the weighted average causal response in mafia presence to a unit change
in treatment for those cities whose treatment status is influenced by the instrument. For
example, the coefficient γ captures the average causal response in mafia-related news to a
1 standard deviation increase in construction employment with weights proportional to the
number of cities in which construction changed as a function of the instrument.
Notice that the theory I propose is about the effect of the interaction between migration and
construction employment, but these two variables alone are likely to have a direct effect on
mafia presence for reasons that have little to do with the theory. For example, an increase in
employment opportunities might reduce the number of people willing to undertake criminal
activities. For this reason, I partial out the effect of these variables and focus on the
interaction rather than on the total sum of the coefficients, as this would incorporate other
effects than the impact of labor racketeering on mafia expansion.
Instrument for Construction
To instrument construction employment, it is necessary to find an exogenous shock which
produced an increase in construction employment in a quasi-random subset of cities, while
not affecting other outcomes which might be correlated with mafias arrival, such as economic
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development. In 1865, the Kingdom of Italy approved a law allowing the adoption of
a regulatory plan to cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants.36 While no complete list
of cities which eventually adopted the plan is available, a partial collection shows that
at least 25% of the cities above the threshold adopted it and none below the threshold
did, suggesting there were no defiers.37 Adopting a regulatory plan led cities to decide
of their development in advance, building infrastructures where new neighborhoods were
to be created. In the 1960s, after the law was removed and the construction boom had
started, cities which had been subject to better designed urban development and which had
therefore more homogeneously spread infrastructures in place to build new neighborhoods,
entered the economic boom in a better position to develop further and experienced a larger
growth in construction. The cities affected by this policy are mapped in Figure 3 (red dots),
which also shows the population share of construction employment after the start of the
boom, in 1961.
The impact of the Law: Whether the policy actually produced a jump in construction
employment is tested formally with a regression discontinuity design. Results, presented in
Figure 4, show that the growth in construction employment jumps at the 10,000 inhabitants
threshold in the years 1961-1971: being subject to a regulatory plan put these cities in a
better position to develop faster when the boom in construction started. This effect is only
visible during the years of the boom (1960s and 1970s) while it is absent both before (1951,
no anticipation effects) and after, in the 1980s (Table 18,SI). This is consistent with the effect
we would expect from a pre-planned urbanistic expansion: at the start of the construction
boom, cities which developed according to the plan have a slight advantage because of
better spread infrastructures facilitating the construction of new neighborhoods. Before
the boom started, in 1951, this marginal advantage does matter so much as to determine
differential construction growth. Two decades after the start of the boom, this advantage
36Law 2359/1865, Capo VI, Art. 86 was in force until 1942.
37Additionally, cities which adopted the plan for sure and cities on which we have no information have
a similar distribution of construction employment, an indirect evidence that both groups might have been
subject to regulated development (Table 17, SI). More details on the law are included in Section A.4.1.
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disappears and cities which had been exposed to regulated development in the nineteenth
century look the same as those that did not. Importantly the Law affected construction in
the 1960s and 1970s, but did not have a lasting impact on any other characteristics of the
cities recorded in the census in either 1951 or later (Table 20- 23, SI), which is reassuring
in terms of exclusion restriction.38 Additionally, an effect on construction exists only at the
10,000 population threshold and not at others (Table 19, SI). These results, the assumptions
behind the RDD and other robustness tests are presented in detail in Section A.4.2, SI.
Instrument specification: I exploit the exogenous positive effect on construction em-
ployment induced by this Law to instrument employment in the construction sector. In
particular, I interact a dummy equal to 1 for cities above the population threshold at
the time the law was approved (Above10k, varying at the city level) with the growth in
construction employment over time at the national level net of the contribution of city i.
Formally:
ZCit = Above10ki ×∆C−∆Citt (2.2)
where the second term is the national per-capita growth in construction employment net of
the contribution of city i.39 Since Above10k depends on population in 1871 (the first census
after the approval of the law), there is the concern that city size might drive the effect. To
account for this possibility, both in the first stage and in the main analysis, I control for
the interaction of population in 1871 and the national growth in construction employment
(Pi,1871 ×∆Ct). This control ensures that the instrument only captures the jump in con-
struction at the discontinuity, rather than incorporating the fact that (i) cities with larger
population grow more and (ii) the effect of the regulatory plan on construction might be
larger in bigger cities. In other words, this control guarantees that the only component of
the instrument that is exploited is the shock in construction produced by the Law and that
factors such as the actual city size or the way a larger city would be differentially affected by
38text
39In leaving out the contribution of city i (leave-out instrument), I follow the most recent literature using
instrumental variables (e.g. Tabellini (2020b)). Results are robust to including this contribution.
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Figure 3: Construction employees per capita 1961 (blue) and cities assigned to adopt a
regulatory plan (red)





























Note: Panel (a) overlaps construction employees as a share of the city population in 1961 with the
cities which are assigned to adopt a regulatory plan according to Law 2359/1865 (red dots). Panel
(b) shows the effect of the removal of a regulatory plan in place between 1865 and 1942 (for cities
above 10,000 inhabitants) on the growth in construction employment in 1961 and 1971. Section A.4.2
provides details on the estimation and robustness of this result.
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a larger national growth in this sector, are accounted for. Section A.4.3 provides a graphical
representation of how the instrument predicts construction using examples from two cities
above and below the cutoff.40
Identifying assumptions: Table 2, Column 1, tests the first stage and shows that the
instrument strongly predicts construction employment in 1961-1971 while Figures 44- 45,
SI indicate a monotonic effect of the instrument on construction. As discussed above, the
threshold impacted construction employment but did not have any visible lasting impact
on any of the other characteristics of the cities recorded in the Census, providing evidence
in favor of the exclusion restriction. Identifying assumptions are discussed in more detail
in SI, Section A.6.
Instrument for Migration
The instrument for southern migration is built using a modified version of the shift-share
instrument (Card, 2001). The idea behind this instrument is that immigrants tend to cluster
geographically and new waves of migrants are more likely to settle where pre-existing groups
of individuals from their area of origin are located. If early settlers act as pull factors for
subsequent migrants from the same area of origin, then their presence can be used to predict
future migration without relying on current migration flows, which might be endogenous.
The shift-share instrument exploits this logic by interacting two terms: (1) the share of
initial settlers from a certain origin o who settled in province of destination d at t = 0
(in our case this is 1955, before mafias and mass migration started) with (2) the flows of
migrants of the same origin at the national level at time t, net of the contribution of province
40The existence of a population cutoff allows to estimate an RDD for (1) the effect of the threshold on
construction and (2) the effect of the threshold on mafia presence. The IV is my preferred estimation strategy
for three reasons. First, it allows to consider the interaction between construction and migration which,
as discussed above, is the quantity of interest in this chapter as it can be more directly linked to the role
mafias played in exploiting migrant workforce in the construction sector. Second, even if the RDD allows to
run heterogeneity analyses by high and low levels of migration, it forbids to account for the endogeneity of
migrants destinations choices, which instead can be done with the IV (see next section). Finally, the RDD
forces to run analyses only on the smaller sample of cities around the cutoff, discarding all information on









where P is province population at t = 0,41 σod is the share of initial settlers of origin
o living in province d in the north in 1955, and the second term is the national flow of
immigrants of origin o that migrated at time t, net of those that settled in province d.42 This
instrument is built such that the only component that varies at the local level is the share
of migrants at time zero, before the move of mafias to the north. This choice accounts for
the possibility that reverse causality - for example, that mafias attracted southern migrants
where construction was higher - determines the finding. The second component, the national
growth rates, predicts how the initial shares evolve in each province without relying on
province d predictive power, as this would introduce endogeneity. Appendix A.5 illustrates
the way in which the instrument is built and the variation underlying the prediction using
an example from two provinces of origin and three provinces of destination.
Identifying assumptions: The instrument positively and strongly predicts the share
of southern migration (Table 2, Column 2) and this relation approximates monotonicity
(Figure 44- 45, SI). The same conclusions about instrument strength and monotonicity
hold when considering the instrument interacting the two instruments for construction and
migration (Table 2, Column 3).
Drought severity as a push factor: A recent literature has shown that violations of the
exogeneity assumption in the shift-share instruments could arise from having either shares
or flows systematically related to characteristics of the provinces of destination receiving
more migrants from that sending province (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018; Borusyak et al.,
2019). To account for this possibility, I run a robustness test in which the flows of migrants
41Following Card and Peri (2016), I do not scale the instrument for the contemporaneous population
because this might introduce endogeneity in the instrument. However, I show results scaled by endogenous
current population in the robustness section.
42Also in this case, I follow the recent literature using instrumental variables in leaving out the contribution
of city i (e.g. Tabellini (2020b)), but results are robust to including it.
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are predicted by exogenous pushes in migration patterns: the drought severity in different
provinces of the south of Italy. At a time in which the transition from the countryside
to the city was largely in progress, a severe drought would cause more people to abandon
land cultivation in the south and look for employment elsewhere. This expectation is
confirmed by a nonparametric plot of the relation between drought severity and number
of migrants to the north (Figure 46), as well as by regression estimates (Table 25). I use
the drought severity index from each sending province elaborated by Van der Schrier et al.
(2006) to predict migration flows in each year from 1961 to 1971 exogenously. Besides
relying on quasi-random variation, this instrument additionally lowers the serial correlation
in migration flows over time, another issue threatening the validity of shift-share instruments
(Jaeger et al., 2018). First stage results are displayed in Table 26, SI and show that also
this instrument is relevant. Finally, I address the concern that observations with similar
exposure shares might have correlated residuals, making standard errors invalid (Adão et al.,
2019), following Borusyak et al. (2019) and showing that coefficients estimated at the shock-
level are equivalent to conventional shift-share coefficients (Table 27). Importantly, with
this instrument, no assumption is made on who migrates, whether poor unemployed people
or members of criminal groups, so that the migration variable can potentially determine
the arrival of both.
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Table 2: First Stage
(1) (2) (3)
Emp Constr Migr from the Emp Constr
per capita south per capita x Migr South
Z Constr Emp 0.017 0.050 0.019
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Z for Migr -0.104 0.702 0.305
(0.023) (0.023) (0.037)
Z Constr x Z Migr South 0.009 -0.086 0.005
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 11,926 11,926 11,926
Number of cities 5,963 5,963 5,963
City, Decade FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean DV 0 0 0
SW F-Stat 19.9 93.9 81.7
A-R Wald Test 28.1 28.1 28.1
Note: First-stage of Equation 2.1 testing the impact of each instrument (Z) on each
variable. All values are standardized to their z-scores. Regressions control for the in-
teraction of population in 1871 (determining the assignment of the regulatory plan)
and growth in construction employment and include city and decade fixed-effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the city level. I report the Sanderson-Windmeijer
F-statistic for models with multiple endogenous variables.
2.5.2. Results
The main results of the instrumental variable estimation are presented in Table 3, Column
2. First, the direct average causal response of construction employment on mafia related
news is negative and significant. This finding echoes a large literature which has shown that
employment reduces crime by increasing the opportunity cost to engage in illegal activities
(Blattman and Annan, 2016), which in this context might have made it harder for mafias to
find enough recruits to expand to new areas. Second, the direct effect of southern migration
on mafia is also negative, although barely significant. This is in line with recent literature
on the relationship between immigration and crime, showing that migration has either no
impact on the crime rate or that it reduces it, as migrants have lower propensity to commit
crimes than natives once employment is controlled for.43 The negative direct effect of these
43See for example Bianchi et al. (2012); Bell et al. (2013); Reid et al. (2005); Pineau and Waters (2016)
36
two variables on mafia presence allows to exclude that criminal organizations expanded
by making profits in the construction industry (owning or extorting businesses) or that
migration itself might have caused an increase in crime.
Instead, the coefficient of interest capturing a joint increase of construction and migration,
has a positive and significant impact on mafia presence. When both migration and con-
struction increase by one standard deviation, there is an increment of 0.098 mafia-related
news per 100 inhabitants. If we consider a median-sized city of 2,000 inhabitants, this would
pass from having no instance of mafia presence discussed in the newspapers to 2 news in
a decade, relative to a city experiencing growth in construction but not in migration (or
growth in migration but not in construction employment).
To illustrate this interaction, Figure 5 plots the change in mafia presence caused by an
increase in construction employment by values of migration from the south (left panel).
For above average levels of southern migration (i.e. at and above zero), an increase in
construction employment increases the probability to observe mafias. A similar dynamic is
visible considering the change in mafia presence caused by southern migration (right panel):
for sufficiently high levels of construction employment, an increase in southern migration
generates a positive change in the probability to observe mafia expansion. Like in every
instrumental variable approach, results have to be interpreted as the effect on compliers, i.e.
those cities in which construction and migration changed as a result of the instrument.44;45
44Since this is a setting with 3 continuous regressors and 3 instruments, it is not possible to profile
compliers, as there would be (i) a different set of compliers for every level of each variable and (ii) for every
combination of values of the variables (Abadie, 2003).
45The difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates indicates that construction employment, migration and
their interaction are endogenously related to mafia presence. The positive bias in the OLS coefficient for
construction could be due to its correlation with economic development, which is likely to attract mafias
for the larger profit opportunities it promises. Migration from the south is likely to both attract and be
attracted by mafia members, explaining the positive bias in the OLS. Places with high levels of construction
and migration tend to be more educated and more likely to vote for the Communist Party before mafias
arrival, a circumstance which might have made it harder for criminal groups to expand, by reducing their
margin of action. Additionally, as in all IVs, 2SLS estimates correct for measurement error in the independent
variables by capturing only the variance in regressors caused by the signal and leaving out the noise. While
the OLS estimates are skewed towards zero by attenuation bias, the IV estimates reduce this bias and result
in larger coefficients.
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Table 3: Joint effect of construction employment and southern migration on mafia presence
(1) (2)
Mafia (OLS) Mafia (2SLS)
Emp Constr pc 0.0026 -0.169
(0.0041) (0.052)
Migr South pc 0.0216 -0.032
(0.0082) (0.017)
Emp Constr x Migr South 0.0039 0.098
(0.0057) (0.041)
Observations 11,926 11,926
Number of cities 5,963 5,963
City, Decade FE Yes Yes
Note: OLS (Col 1) and 2SLS (Col 2) estimates of Equation 2.1,
capturing the effect of construction employment per capita, mi-
gration from the south per capita and their joint impact on mafia
presence. All regressors are standardized to their z-scores. Mafia
presence is defined as the population share of news related to mafia
in a city-decade at t + 1 (1971-1981). City and decade fixed ef-
fects are included in all estimates, together with a control for the
interaction of population in 1871 (determining the assignment of
the regulatory plan) and national growth in construction employ-
ment. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
Robustness
A first order concern is how much results depend upon the way mafia presence is defined.
Does the treatment increase mafia presence or just the probability that mafia-related crimes
take place and are reported, which might coincide with where mafias are weakest? While
this is a typical limitation in the literature on crime (Crost and Felter, 2016), this setting
allows to speak to this concern. In the robustness section (Section A.7, SI), I obtain a closer
mapping between mafia-related news and official indicators of mafia presence starting from
1990s and which (i) are reported from different levels of government, reducing the concern
that we only observe mafias where institutions are not captured, and (ii) return a complete
picture of mafias’ activity, from violence to their infiltration into the economy. I use a lasso
and a random forest algorithm to select only news that predict official indicators of mafia
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Note: The left figure plots the marginal effect of instrumented construction employment on mafia-
related news by quartiles of southern migration. Each coefficient is obtain from regressing mafia on
construction subsetting the sample for the relevant quantile of migration. The figure illustrates for
which values of migration construction has a positive effect on mafia presence. Similarly, the right
figure plots the marginal effect of instrumented southern migration on mafia presence by levels of
construction employment.
presence from later on. Results are also robust to excluding news of labor-racketeering and
news mentioning the word mafia or ’Ndrangheta. I assume mafia presence to be present
even if it was not observed at t when it was at t−1 and I consider a placebo test using lagged
news at t − 1.46 I also winsorize news to exclude that potential outliers drive the findings
and transform the dependent variable to logarithmic to account for its skew towards zero
(results in Table 28, SI).
I also test the robustness of results across a set of different specifications and transformations
of the instruments, such as exogenously predicting the flows of migrants using drought
severity in the south as push factor, restricting the sample to the optimal bandwidth selected
by the RDDs and considering the regions Abruzzo and Molise as southern Italy (Table 29).
These and other tests are described in detail in Section A.7, SI.
46The negative, close to insignificant coefficient on this test reduces the concern that more news could be
reported in the region of Piedmont just because this is where the newspaper La Stampa is located.
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In Section A.8, SI, I further characterize results in three ways. First, I show that high
levels of competition to hire unskilled labor (high construction employment) rather than
competition between businessmen for consumers (higher number of firms) triggered mafia
presence. Second, I discuss why it is unlikely that criminals moved north with the explicit
ex-ante plan of exploiting a demand for construction employment and southern migration
and rather it seems more plausible that places in which these conditions were present are
those in which mafias were successful at planting roots. Finally, I subset the main analysis
by levels of forcibly resettled mafia members in a province (Pinotti and Stanig, 2016) and
show that, although more resettled mafiosi might have made expansion easier, results are
robust across levels of resettled mafia members.
2.5.3. Tests of the mechanism
Migrants not subject to mafias control: An important part of my hypothesis is that
migrants have to be controllable by mafias for them to be exploited as illegal workforce.
Migrants from the south are subject to the reputation of mafias and they can often be
blackmailed with the threat of hurting their family members who stayed behind if they
rebel or denounce. Instead, this reputation and coercive power should not apply to the
same extent to migrants coming from regions outside of the south. I thus repeat the main
analysis using migration from all other regions of Italy excluding the south as independent
variable. Table 4, Column 1 shows that the effect on mafia presence disappears completely
when we consider migrants who come from the center and north of Italy. Although the
instrument for northerners migration is not strong, we observe that neither migration alone
nor migration interacted with construction seems to have any effect on mafia presence and
if anything the coefficients are negative (Column 1, Table 4).
Competitive but regulated or not labor intensive sectors: Another implication of
the hypothesis is that cheap illegal workforce must be a useful tool to reduce competition.
In sectors that are not labor intensive or where hiring illegally is not an option, the offer
of cheap illegal labor might be unattractive to local actors, even if competition is high.
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In the years of the economic miracle, car manufacturing, petrol chemistry and retail sales
were also booming together with the construction sector. However, the retail sales of the
1960s and 1970s consisted of small shops, mostly employing family members, not in need
of additional workforce and selling to local customers, such that speaking the language
was important to be in the business. The car manufacturing and petrol-chemistry sectors,
instead, were overwhelmingly dominated by Fiat and Eni, two large companies, one of
them public, the other under close public scrutiny and thus both unable to hire illegally. In
all these three examples, the offer of illegal labor was unattractive to local actors and we
should not expect the interaction of migration and growth in employment to predict mafia
presence. Instrumenting each of these types of employment using a shift-share instrument,
we observe an insignificant effect on mafia expansion in all cases (Column 2 and 3, Table 4).
Skill-intensive sectors: Sectors requiring high-skilled labor are unlikely to benefit from
the offer of unskilled workforce. Again, the effect of an increase in employment in these sec-
tors47 on mafia presence is null whether we consider the coefficient alone or in combination
with migration from the south (Column 4, Table 4). These results need to be taken with
caution since the first stage is weak.
47The categories present in the Istat which clearly employ skilled workers are financial and insurance
services, press and editorial services and communications.
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Table 4: Test of the mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migr not under Not labor in- Highly regulated High-skill
mafia control tensive (Retail) (Fiat, Eni) labor
Share Employed 0.197 -0.370 0.269 0.059
(0.573) (1.230) (0.936) (0.061)
Migr North pc 0.069
(0.121)
Emp x Migr North -0.349
(0.677)
Migr South pc 1.265 -0.037 0.037
(4.270) (0.281) (0.012)
Emp x Migr South -1.441 0.126 -0.005
(4.991) (0.512) (0.017)
Observations 17,889 11,926 11,926 11,926
Number of cities 5,963 5,963 5,963 5,963
City, Decade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Stat 51.55 296.9 45.20 34.44
SW F-Stat 1.350 0.160 0.120 1.600
A-R Wald test 9.500 31.50 55.60 40.30
Note: Col 1 replicates the main analysis using migration from the center and north of Italy (not
under mafias control). Col 2 and 3 consider employment in sectors booming but not in need of
unskilled illegal workforce because not labor intensive or highly regulated. Col 4 examines sectors
employing high-skilled workers. Mafia presence is the population share of news related to mafia
at t+ 1 (1971-1981). City and decade fixed effects are included in all estimates. Only Col 1 con-
trols for the interaction of population in 1871 and growth in construction employment. Standard
errors are clustered at the city level.
2.6. Effect of mafia on politics
Up to this point, we have considered what allows criminal organizations to expand to
new areas. I now turn to examining its effects: does criminal infiltration impact politics?
Studying the effect of criminal infiltration on politics allows me to test a second prediction of
the theory: that actors striking a deal with organized crime will benefit from the agreement,
gaining an edge over competitors. I exploit the existence of judicial evidence documenting
agreements between criminal organizations and the Christian Democracy (DC), to test
whether the party gains votes in cities infiltrated by criminal organizations.
While it was never the party as a whole to be infiltrated by organized crime, a number of
members of the DC were either part of or had agreements with criminal groups and the
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existence of an electoral exchange has been documented both judicially and empirically.
Mafias’ support for the DC started from the very first elections after WWII as a way to
extract political favors from the party which had clearly emerged as the leading one (Lupo,
2009). Trials for mafia association have involved important members of the party, including
the seven times Italian DC Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. While Andreotti was later
acquainted for insufficiency of proofs, the judges described the PM as having “an authentic,
stable and friendly relationship with members of the Sicilian Mafia” (Dickie (2004), pp. 322-
3). From an empirical perspective, De Feo and De Luca (2017) have shown that in Sicily,
cities affected by mafias (instrumented with its 1900 distribution) were 13 percentage points
more likely to vote for the DC. Was the same pattern taking place in the center and north of
Italy? Anecdotal evidence from a few cases in which the presence of mafias was uncovered
suggests so. For example, in the town of Bardonecchia, the boss Rocco Lo Presti had asked
migrants working for him to transfer their address in the north in order to be able to vote
there and switch the balance in favor of the candidate for mayor he had connectinos to.
The city council of Bardonecchia was subsequently dissolved for being controlled by criminal
organizations. Besides Bardonecchia, eight other city councils in the center and north of
Italy were dissolved for the same reason and many other cases of vote buying which did not
lead to a council dissolution are reported by newspapers.
2.6.1. Empirical Strategy
I test if and to what extent the vote share of the DC in the center and north of Italy changed
in cities infiltrated by mafias using an instrumented difference-in-difference approach. I
instrument mafia presence exploiting the exogenous variation in construction and migration
described in Section 2.5.2 to obtain a measure of average predicted mafia in a city. Relying
on instrumented mafia presence allows me to account for why mafias established in certain
cities and not in others, a behavior which is likely to be correlated with voting patterns.
While a quasi-randomly assigned treatment is not necessary in DiD designs, in this case
simply using mafia presence as treatment does not yield parallel trends in voting for the DC
before mafia arrival (Table 32, Col 2, SI). In cities with mafia, there was already an increase
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in DC vote share in the 1953 elections, a pattern which might have facilitated criminals’
endogenous settlement in these cities. I then exploit the absence of mafias in the center-
north up to until election year 195348 to estimate a difference in difference specification
comparing cities with and without (instrumented) mafia presence, before and after the
arrival of mafias. Specifically, for each city i and election year e, I estimate:
V oteit = ηi + κt + λM̂afiai × Poste + µXie + νie (2.4)
where M̂afiai is average predicted mafia presence from the instrumental variable approach
described in Section 2.5.1, Postt is a dummy equal to one after 1957 and ηi and κe are
city and election year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is λ, capturing the effect of
predicted mafia presence on the vote share of the Christian Democracy in each election year
from 1958 (first election after mafia arrival) onwards. For ease of interpretation, I transform
predicted mafia presence into its zscore. In all regressions, I control for migration from the
south, construction employment and their interaction (X) to account for the exclusion
restriction. Also these variables are predicted from IV estimates as they are endogenously
related to the treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. Section A.9.1, SI
discusses the identifying assumptions in detail, showing the existence of parallel trends in
vote share before the arrival of mafias and discussing the exclusion restriction.
2.6.2. Results
After the start of mafia expansion, an increase by one standard deviation in predicted mafia
presence produces a 1.2 percentage points increase in the vote share of the DC (Table 5),
corresponding to a 2.5% increase with respect to an average of 45%. Since the number of
voters (the denominator in the DC vote share) might itself be endogenous to mafia arrival,
I also consider estimates using the absolute number of votes for the DC in its logarithmic
transformation and controlling for city population. Results in Column 2 point to the same
48Not only the boom in migration began from later on, but also the policy of forced relocation of mafiosi
only started in 1956. Anecdotally, all recorded cases of mafia presence in the north start from after this
period. It is thus safe to consider 1953 as a time before the arrival of mafias.
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Table 5: Effect of predicted mafia presence on DC vote share 1948-1992 (DiD)
(1) (2)
Vote share DC Log total DC vote
Mafia x Post 1957 0.012 0.025
(0.002) (0.006)
Observations 62,870 62,784
Number of cities 5,961 5,961
City FE Yes Yes
Election Year FE Yes Yes
Mean DV 0.452 6.427
Note: Results from the DiD in Equation 2.4, estimating the ef-
fect of mafia presence (predicted from IV estimates) on vote for
the DC after mafia-arrival (Post 1957). In Col 1 I consider the
vote share and in Col 2 the log of total votes controlling for city
population. Controls for construction employment, southern mi-
gration and their interaction (predicted from IV estimates), city
and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered
at the city level.
conclusion, although the effect size is smaller.49 This finding is robust to considering year
1958 as pre-mafia arrival and to removing controls for migration and construction (Table 34,
SI).
2.6.3. Is the electoral advantage driven by mafias?
In absence of judicial evidence, it is hard to demonstrate empirically that the electoral
advantage of the Christian Democracy in mafia-affected cities was driven by mafias’ capacity
to provide votes to the party. However, I provide suggestive evidence in line with this
possibility and I discuss the likelihood that alternative explanations drive the findings.
Voting pattern: stable and persistent in the face of political shocks
In Figure 6 and Table 32, Col 1, SI, I examine results year by year by interacting predicted
mafia presence with each election year and using year 1953 (pre migration boom) as reference
category, so that coefficients can be interpreted as the change in vote share for the DC from
49A smaller effect size considering total votes implies that cities affected by mafias turnout at lower rates.
This is partly due to a reduction in vote for left wing parties (Table 33, SI), which might be consistent with
turnout suppression.
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before to after mafias’ arrival in cities without mafia (first set of coefficients) and with mafia
(second set of coefficients). The pattern of vote in cities without mafia coincides with what
we know from the history of the DC. From the mid-seventies, the DC started losing voters,
a crisis which became deeper with the fall of communism and the exhaustion of the anti-
communist mission which had fueled the party’s supremacy. In 1992, with Tangentopoli,
the largest corruption scandal in the history of the Italian Republic which directly hit
the Christian Democracy (Daniele et al., 2020), the vote share for the DC dropped by 15
percentage points compared to 1953. The party was dissolved the subsequent year.
While the voting pattern in non-mafia cities reflects the historical trajectory of the party,
the differential change in vote share for the DC in mafia-cities compared to before 1953
is positive and growing in each year, ranging from plus 0.4 in 1958 to plus 2.1 percentage
points in the last year of elections, 1992. This pattern is somewhat surprising: the electoral
advantage the DC gained in cities with mafias is inelastic to large historical upheavals, such
as the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of communism, as well as the largest corruption
scandal in the history of the Italian Republic. Additionally, the electoral advantage we
observe in cities with mafia is small (as we would expect form mafias’ capacity to buy votes
in the context of a strong democratic polity only recently infiltrated), increasing over time
and rather stable. If criminals have the capacity to use their influence to mobilize voters,
we should not expect them to be able to buy 5% of votes in one year and 0.2% in the next.
This competitive edge, only characterizing mafia-affected cities, appearing only from after
the arrival of mafias, that is small but growing and unresponsive in the face of political
shocks which determined a dramatic fall in consensus everywhere else, is suggestive that
this edge might have been provided by increasingly infiltrated criminal groups.
Targets of vote buying
If mafias were indeed buying votes for the DC, who were they gathering these votes from?
Consistently with the the theoretical framework, if mafias had control over southern mi-
grants, we should expect places in which southern migrants were more present to vote for
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Note: Change in vote share for the DC in each year post 1957 (after the arrival of mafia in the center
and north). The first set of coefficients refers to year FE, the second to the interaction of each year
with mafia presence.
the DC at higher rates. There is some evidence in favor of this hypothesis: interacting the
population share of migrants from the south with predicted mafia presence, I find that cities
with more migrants and mafia presence turned out at larger rates after mafia infiltration
and turned out more for the DC both if we consider its vote share and its absolute votes
- although the coefficient is marginally insignificant in both cases (Table 6). The result
might still be unconvincing if we suspected that migrants that moved to cities without
mafias are of a different type (e.g. more educated than those moving to cities with con-
struction booms). If this was the case, the finding that migrants vote more for the DC
only in mafia-affected cities could be the consequence of demographic differences, rather
than in the pressure imposed by mafias on their voting behavior. This does not seem to be
the case: more educated voters tended to vote more for the DC (Table 35), meaning that
demographic differences, if anything, might bias the result we observe in Table 6 towards
zero.
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Table 6: Effect of mafia and migration on DC vote share and turnout 1948-1992
(1) (2) (3)
Turnout DC share Log DC votes
Mafia Post 1957 -0.005 0.011 0.006
(0.001) (0.003) (0.009)
Migr South -0.054 -0.049 -1.115
(0.011) (0.023) (0.116)
Mafia Post x Migr South 0.015 0.017 0.219
(0.005) (0.015) (0.153)
Observations 62,871 62,871 62,785
Number of cities 5,962 5,962 5,962
City Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Results from a DiD estimating the effect of mafia arrival joint with
southern migration per-capita (both predicted based on IV estimates) on
turnout, DC vote share and log DC votes from 1948 to 1992. Controls
for predicted employment in construction, city and year fixed effects are
included and standard errors are clustered at the city level.
Effect on politics in the long run: vote share for Berlusconi
The Christian Democracy dissolved after the elections in 1992, buried by the Tangentopoli
scandal. But if vote buying was taking place in some cities, what happened to mafia-
controlled votes? Recent judicial evidence is proving that Silvio Berlusconi inherited both
the incumbency advantage of the DC and the connection with criminal groups.50 I test
whether this support is visible in the data. In this specification I use a simple IV approach
without relying on the pre-post difference, as there is no period before mafia arrival that
could allow using a DiD. Election year fixed effects are, however, included. Comparing cities
with and without mafia in each election year after 1992, I find that mafia-affected cities are
significantly more likely to vote for the party of Silvio Berlusconi. The result is positive but
insignificant considering the total vote for the party (Table 7).
50For example, it is proven that for 20 years Berlusconi transfered semesterly payments of 50 million Lire
to Cosa Nostra and that the Cosa Nostra boss Vittorio Mangano was living in Berlusconi’s house, hired as
a stable boy for horses (See L’Espresso., February 23, 2018). Another trial is currently examining the role
of Berlusconi in the season of mafia-related massacres of 1993-1994. (Il Corriere, September 25, 2019.)
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Alternative stories
Voting for security: The electoral advantage of the DC in mafia-affected cities might
be compatible with other interpretations besides vote buying. First of all, voters might be
reacting to mafia presence by voting more for the right-wing party (the DC). Historically,
this was not the case. While mafias’ expansion to center and northern Italy started in the
1960s, the state only acknowledged transplantation in the late 1990s and still today only
8.5% of survey respondents believe mafias “exist also in the rest of Italy” (Libera, 2019).
Second, if any party could be depicted as actively opposed to criminal organizations, this
would rather be the Communist Party. For this explanation to drive results we would
thus need to assume that voters were (i) sophisticated enough to realize that mafias were
expanding to their city, although institutions did not acknowledge it and even now this
perception is not diffused, and at the same time (ii) ignorant enough to be incorrect on
party’s stances with respect to mafias.
Voting against migrants: Second, these results could reflect natives’ reaction to the
arrival of southern migrants. If cities affected by mafias were also more likely to receive
southern migration and if voters were opposed to it, they might have voted at higher rates
for the right-wing party. This interpretation is also compatible with the result showing
larger effects in cities with southern migration. First, all regressions control for migration
to partial this effect out. Second, if an anti-southern immigration story explains results, we
should expect that after the collapse of the Christian Democracy, those votes transfer to the
party which most of all represented anti-southerners instances, the Lega Nord. However,
results in Table 7 show that this is not the case: the Lega Nord received significantly less
votes in cities infiltrated by mafias.
Migrants vote DC: A third possible explanation is that migrants themselves voted at
higher rates for the DC and later for Berlusconi. In Table 6 we can observe that, while
southern migrants in mafia-affected areas are more likely to vote for the DC, this is not
true in general of migrants from the south. In both columns, we observe a negative and
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Table 7: Effect of mafia presence on voting in the long-run (1994-2008)
(1) (2) (3)
Berlusconi Berlusconi Lega Nord
vote share log tot votes vote share
Mafia predicted 0.005 0.013 -0.007
(0.001) (0.012) (0.002)
Observations 29,178 29,174 29,178
Number of cities 5,959 5,959 5,959
City FE No No No
Election Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean DV 0.247 5.847 0.139
Note: IV estimates of the effect of mafia presence on vote 1994-
2008. Election year fixed effects are included and standard errors
are clustered at the city level.
significant coefficient, meaning that migrants voted less for the DC in cities without mafia.
That migrants from the south only vote more for the DC in cities with mafia presence and
not in general suggests that this alternative explanation does not drive the findings.
Other differences between cities: Finally, differences between cities with and without
predicted mafia presence do not seem to explain the differences we observe in voting. For
example, replacing population with mafia presence in Equation 2.4 yields a zero, insignif-
icant coefficient (Table 35, Col 1, SI). I replicate the results replacing mafia with all the
covariates on which the largest differences between cities with and without mafia are found:
coefficients, even when positive and significant, are too small to explain the findings.
2.7. Conclusion
While the emergence of criminal organizations has been attributed to problems inherent to
weak states, their expansion to a number of areas with strong institutions and flourishing
economies requires a new explanation. I propose a theory according to which organized
crime expands to strong states by striking alliances with local actors facing high levels of
competition. Criminal groups offer illegal resources to these local actors to gain an edge
over their competitors. I show that an important case of successful criminal expansion, the
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move of southern Italian mafias to the north, responded to this logic and was allowed by
two factors: a boom in construction which caused an increase in demand for cheap unskilled
labor and the arrival of immigrants from the same area of origin as mafias which the state
did not integrate and over which criminal groups had control. The provision of cheap
irregular labor to local actors gave criminal groups the opportunity to create networks of
mutual dependence in their destination territories without risking to be denounced to the
police. This explains why the repressive apparatus of a strong state failed in counteracting
the infiltration of mafias to the center and north of Italy. I provide evidence in line with the
theory also by testing a second prediction: that actors striking agreements with criminal
groups should gain a competitive edge from the agreement. I exploit the existence of judicial
evidence of connections between criminal groups and the Christian Democracy to show that
this party gained an electoral advantage in cities infiltrated by criminal groups, only after
infiltration.
While in this chapter I examine the expansion from south to north of Italy, there are a
number of other cases in which the migration of criminals and people from the same area as
criminal groups coincided. For example, in the early days of the Italo-American mafia in the
US, mafia-members were acting as intermediaries between locals and their compatriots to
exploit them as labor force through the so-called “padrone system” Lupo (2009). The most
prominent criminal group currently present in the US, the MS-13, arrived from Salvador
at the same time as a wave of refugees escaping civil war. Similarly, the formation of the
Mhallami criminality, currently one of the most dangerous groups in Germany, coincided
with the immigration of people of Turkish-Mhallami origin and ’Ndrangheta presence in
Australia has been linked to the waves of migration from Calabria in the 1950s. Today,
anecdotal evidence on the Nigerian Black Axe expansion into Italy suggests that this group
is thriving by exploiting the work of migrants from their country of origin at conditions close
to slavery in the agriculture and construction sectors. Control over migrants, capacity to
strike deals with local actors and necessity to build reputation, networks and governance are
features common to all types of criminal groups. That other cases of expansion of criminal
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organizations to strong states have similar characteristics to those studied in this chapter,
suggests that the dynamics I documented using micro-level evidence from Italy might travel
to other regions.
The dynamics documented in this chapter are, in conclusion, rather common: the combi-
nation of a mass of poor, marginalized migrants and a group of criminals exploiting them
for profit has happened across many countries and time periods. Up to this point, however,
it was not clear that this phenomenon of exploitation could contribute to criminal groups’
expansion. An important policy implication of my results relates to immigration policy.
Immigrants are more likely to resort to exploitative illegal employment options offered by
criminal groups when states fail to facilitate their integration and even more when integra-
tion in the legal market is made difficult by immigration laws. This study suggests that
reducing the opportunities for criminals to profit from migrants’ condition goes beyond the
protection of victims and spills over into the prevention of organized crime expansion.
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CHAPTER 3 : The Electoral Effects of Fighting Migrants’ Exploitation
The Electoral Effects of Fighting
Migrants’ Exploitation: Evidence from an
Information Dissemination Campaign
Abstract
Policies that favor the integration of migrants frequently increase xenophobic voting and
backfire against their promoters, making integration a politically difficult objective to pur-
sue. I study the effects of new type of intervention that seeks to integrate migrants by giving
them the tools to denounce cases of labor exploitation in agriculture. I exploit the city-time
varying nature of the intervention to test its effect on both immigration and politics. The
intervention (i) increased police reporting of labor exploitation and prosecution of criminal
organizations, who are often responsible for smuggling and controlling migrants; (ii) raised
awareness among the civil society and policymakers and, importantly, (iii) increased the
vote share for pro-integration parties while producing no surge in far-right parties voting.
I propose an explanation for this last result and test it with a survey experiment: learning
about migrants’ exploitation might have fostered sentiments of sympathy and a desire for
more integration for migrants, shifting moderate voters towards pro-immigration parties.
This chapter shows that fighting migrants’ exploitation directly hurts criminal groups and
identifies the conditions under which integration policies can improve migrants’ situation
at no political cost for parties supporting them.
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3.1. Introduction
As migration flows increase across countries, governments are presented with the difficult
task of identifying policies that effectively promote migrants’ integration while also minimiz-
ing the prospect of backlash from the electorate. Policies that remove barriers to migrants’
employment have been shown to reduce both unemployment and crime rates (Hainmueller
et al., 2016; Pinotti, 2017), but they have also proven an important pull factor for the arrival
of new migrants (Blair et al., 2020; Holland et al., 2020), an eventuality strongly opposed
by a sizable fraction of constituents for both cultural and economic reasons. When govern-
ments decide to pursue integration policies, they are often targets of electoral backlash and
lose their majority to xenophobic parties (Sniderman et al., 2007; Marbach, 2020). On the
other hand, giving voters the power to decide which migrants should be granted citizen-
ship has produced lower naturalization rates and substantial discrimination (Hainmueller
and Hangartner, 2019). The tension between the benefits of integration and its electoral
costs makes the need to identify policies that promote integration without creating political
backlash a first order priority.
In this chapter, I study a new type of intervention that was launched by a union in a limited
number of locations, but which could be scaled up nationally. This initiative differs from
previous studies in that it seeks to facilitate migrants’ integration by endowing them with
the tools to denounce labor exploitation. Starting in 2007, the Italian union for agricultural
workers launched an information dissemination campaign of in-person canvassing to provide
migrants working in agriculture with information about their rights as workers and ways
to denounce cases of gangmaster system. The initiative aimed at fighting the systematic
exploitation of undocumented migrants in agriculture, working for extremely low pay, in
conditions of enslavement1 and often under the control of criminal organizations.2 Between
1Enslavement is the term used by the judiciary and the crime for which many of the gangmasters have
been prosecuted (Article 603 Ter, Penal Code).
2Migrants working in agriculture are often victims of human trafficking by foreign mafias in agreement
with local criminal organizations. These groups smuggle migrant workers to Italy promising good employ-
ment conditions, but then force them into hard labor and control their behavior under threat of retaliation
against themselves or their family members. Source: Parliamentary Commission Investigating on Mafias,
Document XXXIII N. 30, Legislature XVII, page 52.
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2007 and 2015, the union identified and reached 48 locations in which labor exploitation
was taking place and provided workers with information as well as legal assistance. Impor-
tantly, undocumented migrants can apply for a special residence permit in case they can
demonstrate they have been subject to exploitation, an application that unionists offered
help in preparing.
I assess (i) whether this intervention was effective at increasing reporting of cases of labor
exploitation, (ii) whether it raised awareness among the public and state institutions and
(iii) whether it had electoral consequences. To identify the effect of the intervention, I
present results across different specifications which account for different sources of potential
bias. First, I present results in a classic Difference-in-Differences framework comparing
treated cities to the full sample of cities in the control group. To account for possible
selection bias in the choice of treated locations, I restrict the control group to a sample
selected based on matching on pre-treatment city-characteristics. Third, I relax the parallel
trends assumption using a staggered treatment design, comparing only within the sample
of treated cities those treated earlier or later. Finally, I account for treatment heterogeneity
bias by using a stacked design on the model of Deshpande and Li (2019). I present three
results.
First, the intervention increased reporting of exploitation, as measured by media coverage of
cases of gangmaster system in the two main national newspapers. News in treated cities do
not simply document the intervention of the union, rather they report cases of denounced
and prosecuted labor exploitation and of civil society and policymaking initiatives against
gangmaster system. The intervention also led to a substantial increase in the number of
properties that were seized due to being discovered as owned by criminal organizations.
This finding can be interpreted as the direct effect of the intervention, which by increasing
reporting against gangmasters, often affiliated with criminal groups, led to the discovery
and seizure of more mafia-owned properties.
Second, the intervention increased institutional mobilization against this phenomenon: in
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treated cities, there is an increase in the rate at which public administrations redistribute
mafia-seized properties for public use. The increase is particularly large for redistribution
towards local agricultural cooperatives, who employ workers legally and commit to non-
exploitative working conditions.
Finally, I consider the effects of the intervention on voting. I find that the union initiative
increased the vote share for the far-left by 1 percentage point, an increase that is statistically
significant and consistent across specifications. While evidence on other parties is less
reliable due to the lack of parallel trends, both far-right and moderate right, as well as
center-left parties, which in Italy have supported strict laws against immigration, seem to
lose votes in treated areas.
A large literature has shown how exposure to immigration can fuel natives’ hostility against
migrants (Hangartner et al., 2019) and voting for far-right parties (Dustmann et al., 2019;
Tabellini, 2020a). In particular, politicians of any ideology that favor migrants’ integration
in the labor market are punished electorally (Dustmann et al., 2019; Marbach, 2020) and
there is evidence that politicians strategically reject refugees in periods close to elections
(Gamalerio, 2018). While previous papers focusing on purely economic policies have found a
backlash against pro-integration parties, the intervention considered in this chapter differs in
that, besides favoring integration, it also sheds light on the situation of extreme exploitation
migrants are subject to and highlights their condition of victims. Another strand of the
literature on migration has highlighted how deservingness is an important trigger of natives’
approval for migrants’ integration (Alesina et al., 2018) and that severe vulnerability is
a crucial determinant of acceptance of asylum seekers by natives (Bansak et al., 2016).
The experience of learning about migrants’ exploitation in treated localities might have
fostered sentiments of sympathy towards migrants and a desire for less severe policies on
immigration, shifting moderate voters towards pro-integration parties. I propose to test
whether this mechanism explains the findings using a survey experiment. Results from the
analyses and from this experiment will allow to establish under which conditions migrants’
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integration policies can result in no backlash against parties favoring them.
This chapter also relates to the literature studying policies that favor the integration of
migrants (Munshi, 2003; Bansak et al., 2018) by highlighting how such policies can produce
positive spillovers into the fight against organized crime, when migrants’ labor is recruited
and controlled by criminal groups. In this sense, this chapter connects to the literature
studying criminal organizations’ exploitation of migrants (McCarthy, 2014; Dipoppa, 2020).
In line with the idea that criminal groups thrive by exploiting migrants’ for their profits, this
chapter shows that a policy favoring migrants’ integration can directly damage organized
crime.
3.2. Context
3.2.1. The Gangmaster system in Italy
The gangmaster system is a form of illegal recruitment and control of the labor force that
relies on intermediaries (gangmasters, in Italian “caporali”) to informally hire and control
short-term workers. This practice is common in sectors relying on seasonal and unskilled
labor, such as constructions and agriculture. In the Italian context, it has long been domi-
nated by criminal organizations. Criminal groups have a comparative advantage in recruit-
ing poor and fragile populations, often smuggling migrants from other countries, and in
enforcing informal contracts using threats and violence to achieve compliance in absence of
the law.
A recent picture of this phenomenon in the agricultural sector is provided in the reports by
the Eurispes and by the Placido Rizzotto Observatory. Estimates by to these institutions
suggest that the Italian gangmaster system currently involves 400,000 agricultural workers
employed by 30 thousand companies. Of these workers, 49% are estimated to be irregular
and 40% are in a situation of severe exploitation. The typical pay for a worker victim of
this system in a full day of work can reach 50 euro in gross amounts. This sum, however,
is subject to considerable cuts: workers are usually forced to pay for transportation to the
fields, food and water directly to the gangmasters, who end up paying them a net of 20-30
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Euros for the full day, about half the pay they would receive if they were hired under the
official contract. The most exploited workers are paid 1 Euro per hour of work.3
While the gangmaster system also employs Italians, the vast majority of workers in condi-
tions of extreme exploitation are international or cross-border migrants: paid less, working
extremely long hours4, living in ghettos made of metal plates and without access to ser-
vices and current water, migrants are hired illegally in 76% of the cases.5 Migrants are often
smuggled by criminal networks with the promise of good employment opportunities and then
forced to accept labor at exploitative conditions under threat of retaliation by criminals.6
This phenomenon has attracted periodic attention from the media and institutions, usually
in correspondence with with woeful news stories7 or migrants’ revolts against gangmasters.8
In several occasions, migrants that mobilized other workers to denounce their condition and
achieve change were targets of threats and violence, sometimes assassinations.9
3.2.2. The intervention by the union
In 2007, unionists from the Federazione Lavoratori Agro-Industria (FLAI) in Puglia orga-
nized a multidimensional campaign to reach locations where exploited workers lived. They
provided workers information about their rights, suggesting them to denounce their gang-
masters and, when workers were irregular migrants, offering them help in preparing an
application for residence permit for work exploitation.10 The intervention included a re-
3Fourth Report Agromafie e Caporalato, FLAI-CGIL, July 12, 2018.
4For example, the judicial inquiry investigating on the gangmaster system in Rosarno, Calabria, ascer-
tained that migrants were forced to work in the fields for 12-14 hours a day for a net pay of 10-25 Euros (La
Repubblica, April 26, 2010).
5Migrant workers constitute 37% of the total workforce in agriculture and 28% are in conditions of severe
exploitation (Fourth Report Placido Rizzotto, page 119).
6Parliamentary Commission Investigating on Mafias, Document XXXIII N. 30, page 52-55.
7For example, news discussed the death due to exhaustion for working for excessively long hours of a
migrant in Nardo’ (Il Fatto Quotidiano, July 21, 2015) and the case of 12 migrants who died while being
transported to the fields in a vehicle full beyond capacity (La Stampa, August 7th, 2018).
8In 2010, the migrant workers of Rosarno organized a series of demonstrations against their gangmasters
which culminated in the arrest of 30 people connected to mafias. In 2011, the migrants in Nardo’, Puglia
organized another protest which also led to the discovery and dismantling of a system of extreme exploitation.
9It was the case for Soumaila Sacko, Malian agricultural worker and human right activist killed in 2018
(Frontline Defenders) and for the Pakistani Siddique Adnan, killed in 2020 (L’Ansa, June 7th, 2020)
10Non-EU citizens without a regular residence permit and victims of labor exploitation can receive a
residence permit lasting 6 months and renewable for 12. This permit allows legally working in Italy and, at
its expiration, can be converted into a longer residence permit for autonomous or subordinate employment.
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peated interaction between unionists and workers, translating in the exchange of a large
amount of information and, in some cases, in the creation of a trust and friendship re-
lation.11 Unionists also visited migrants and agricultural workers living in the city and
interacted with the local population to inform them of the initiative they were carrying on
and of the conditions of exploitation migrants in their city were subject to.12
The first cities reached by the intervention were in Puglia, a circumstance which according
to the promoters might be connected with the historical tradition of unionism in agriculture
dating back to the figure of the unionist Giuseppe Di Vittorio.13 The first localities reached
by the intervention were not those with highest levels of exploitation, even within the
region: according to a classification done by the union of where workers are more exposed
to exploitation on a 1-3 scale,14 the first 9 cities targeted in 2008 were both level 2 (N=4)
and level 3 (N=5), even though other level-3 locations were present in the region and were
either reached by successive interventions in 2011 and 2013 or never targeted. A similar
pattern is visible in other regions.
The intervention was then reproduced in a Campania in 2010 with the name “Street-Union”
(in Italian, “Sindacato di Strada”), which would become the official name of the campaign
adopted by union groups across the entire country. In the 8 years for which the report of
the union provides information on treated localities, unionists reached 48 locations from the
south to the north of Italy (mapped in Figure 48, SI).15 In the most recent years, the union
has started focusing on obtaining change at the institutional level, pushing for and obtaining
a new law against the gangmaster system (Law N.199/2016 ) which extends punishment to
the business owner, and not only to gangmasters, and increases the resources to help the
Art. 22, commi 12 quater and quinquies, Legislative Decree n. 286/1998.
11Interview conducted by the investigator with Marco Omizzolo, Sociologist and activist, March 27th,
2020.
12Interview conducted by the investigator with Jean Rene Billongo, Coordinator of the ’Placido Rizzotto
Observatory’, June 4th, 2020.
13Interview conducted by the investigator with Jean Rene Billongo, Coordinator of the ’Placido Rizzotto
Observatory’, June 4th, 2020.
14Second Report “Agromafie e Caporalato”, 2013, pages 229-394.
15Notice that new locations might have been targeted after 2016, which is when the report with information




Why the campaign might fail: There are at least two reasons why an intervention aimed
at fighting gangmaster systems could be ineffective in both achieving higher reporting and
in raising awareness. First, the gangmaster system hinges on the existence of indigent
and undocumented individuals who are ready to accept exploitative working conditions to
receive an employment opportunity. An intervention that does not target the root cause of
this phenomenon - either poverty or, for undocumented migrants, the impossibility to find
a legal employment - might be ineffective at producing reporting since these workers might
lack (or believe they lack) alternative employment opportunities. This is, however, less the
case for workers subject to mafia blackmailing, who might be looking for an opportunity
to escape exploitation,16 or if an outside option materializes - in particular, the possibility
to obtain a legal working permit. The intervention is also likely to reduce frictions in
information about alternative employment opportunities, which might let workers realize
they have other (and better) options elsewhere.
A second important reason why the intervention might fail is the counteraction by organized
crime. As discussed, several activists have lost their lives in the attempt to mobilize workers
against this phenomenon, the most recent only a month ago. The threat of retaliation by
criminal groups might be sufficient to discourage the activity of the unionists involved in this
intervention. While mafia-related threats against them did indeed take place, unionists tend
to be embedded in networks of politically sophisticated individuals, with the resources to
demand protection from the police and the capacity to increase their visibility and mobilize
public opinion around them in case they receive mafia threats, making them difficult targets
of violence.17
16For example, a number of victims of smuggling are told they need to work to repay their debt from
transportation.
17Low visibility is indeed one of the most important predictor of who becomes a victim of organized
crime-related violence (Daniele and Dipoppa, 2017).
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Discovery of gangmaster system cases: On the other hand, there are also good reasons
to believe the intervention might be successful in fighting against gangmaster systems.
As mentioned, reporting might be in the interest of migrants willing to escape extreme
exploitation and attempting to obtain a residence permit. If this is the case, we should
observe an increase in news reporting cases of gangmaster system discovery and repression
in treated locations.18 Since extreme exploitation is often achieved by resorting to criminal
groups for intermediation, we should observe an impact on organized crime prosecution
if indeed the intervention led to denouncing particularly in cases in which migrants were
severely exploited.
Public opinion: Additionally, the intervention might have an effect on public opinion.
As highlighted in interviews I conducted with unionists, citizens were often unaware and
shocked to learn that enslavement was taking place in their very city. If public opinion is
mobilized by the intervention, we should observe an increase in news discussing civil society
initiatives against gangmaster system as well as a mobilization by the institutions to fight
this phenomenon.
Voting: Finally, the intervention might affect voting. In the last decade, both the center-
right and center-left governments promoted restrictive policies on immigration, with center-
left governments proposing and sealing a pact to intercept migrants trying to cross the
Mediterranean and send them to Libya, an initiative criticized by several institutions, in-
cluding nonpartisan ones like the UN.19 In this context, I thus expect voters swayed in
favor of integration to start voting for the far-left at higher rates rather than to vote for the
center-left.
3.3. Data
News of gangmaster system: The first outcome considered in the analysis is the number
of news related to gangmaster system, a database I assemble by collecting news from the two
18Data on actual reporting to the police are not available.
19The Guardian, November 14, 2017
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main Italian national newspapers, Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica. In the first case,
the newspaper search tool allows the direct visualization of the number of news containing
the word “caporalato” in each year and city and I thus simply copy this information from
the website. For La Repubblica, instead, I scrape the date and the body of the article and
successively searched the name of cities in the body of the article. This second newspaper
has provided a much larger coverage to news of gangmaster system: La Repubblica reports
2010 news over the period 2000-2018 while Corriere only covers 490 cases and only starting
in 2006. In both newspapers, the number of news covering this topic steadily increases
over time, reflecting the increasing salience of this topic in public discourse (Figure 7). I
collect news up to 2016 as this is the last year for which information on where treatment
was assigned is available.
Goods, properties and firms seized to mafias: Since the approval of Law n. 646/1982,
Italy is endowed with a judicial tool to seize goods, properties and firms which are found
to be controlled by members of criminal organizations. Since 1996 (L. 109/96), the law
also mandates that goods seized to mafias should be destined to social use. Mafia-owned
properties can either become part of the state patrimony (in which case they are often
used as offices) or assigned to local administration, who can redistribute them for free
to Cooperatives, NGOs and other associations. Information on both seized and destined
goods is publicly available through the National Agency for Seized Goods (ANBSC). Both
the number of seizures and redistributions has been increasing over time, although without
a constant and monotonic increasing pattern (Figure 8).
National Elections: National elections results for the Second Republic (1994-2018) come
from the Minister of Interior. Italian parties and electoral system were dramatically rev-
olutionized after 1992, when the Tangentopoli scandal led to the end of First Republic
(Daniele et al., 2018) and thus electoral outcomes before 1994 elections do not represent
a meaningful comparison. I group party formations into 4 categories consistent over time:
far-left, center-left, center-right and far-right. When a party is ideologically extreme, it is
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indicated as such independently on whether in a particular year it runs in coalition with the
moderate party. Instead, parties that always run in coalition are grouped in the respective
centrist category.20 In Table 36, SI, I provide the full list of parties and the groups to which
they are assigned. To better isolate the variation produced by the treatment, I consider as
dependent variable the change in vote share of each party from one year to the next, rather
than its levels. Additionally, to account for the possibility that the observed variation in
vote share results from a change in turnout (the denominator of vote share), I calculate the
vote share as the number of votes divided by the total number of citizens entitled to vote.21
Figure 9 plots the evolution over time of the change in vote share for the four groups of
parties, with extreme parties naturally being subject to larger variations and the far-right
receiving a peak of votes in the 2018 elections.
Cities targeted by the intervention: Information on which cities are reached by the
intervention is taken from the report on labor exploitation in agriculture redacted by the
union of agricultural workers, FLAI (Third report, 2016, p. 187). In the period from 2007
to 2016, union members built and maintained a relation with exploited immigrants working
in 49 cities across 8 regions of Italy, spanning from south to north. The implementation was
staggered: first Puglia, then other regions in the south. In 2013, the union targets the plain
of Metaponto, reaching 23 small locations in this area. Then they expanded to locations in
the north of Italy (the timing of treatment is plotted in Figure 10).
3.4. Empirical Strategy
To identify the effects of the unionist campaign, I rely on a difference-in-differences strategy
comparing cities which were and were not targeted by the intervention, before and after it
took place. For city i and year t, I estimate the following city and year fixed effects model:
20Since the Five Star Movement participated in national elections only from 2013 and it is not possible to
examine pre-trends, it is not considered in the analysis.
21In Italy, every voter is automatically registered to vote without the need to take any action. The number
of potential voters is thus unaffected by mobilization campaigns which might have an effect on this quantity
in other countries.
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Yit = αi + βt + γTreatit + εit (3.1)
where Treat is a city-specific time-varying indicator taking value 1 only in cities and years
in which the unit is targeted by the intervention. City and year fixed effect guarantee that
any time-invariant characteristic of the location or of the year is partialled out from the
effect.
The first factor that might invalidate the identification of the treatment effect is that treat-
ment assignment is non-random: union members are likely to have targeted areas where
workers were highly exploitated and where they had sufficient human resources to employ in
the campaign. This might translate in the outcomes being already on different trends before
the intervention. For example, cities reached by the campaign might have a larger foreign
population and might already vote for far-right parties at higher rates before treatment. If
the outcomes of interest present systematically different behaviors across treated and con-
trol units even before the start of the intervention (i.e. if pre-trends are not parallel), then
the identification of the effect of treatment is not possible using standard approaches.
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3.4.1. Parallel Trends
I start by testing whether trends can be considered as plausibly parallel across treated and
control units in Figure 11 and 15. For each outcome of interest, I plot the interaction
between each year and treatment status using the year before treatment as base category.
Notice that since treatment is staggered over time, the first post-treatment coefficients are
not indicative of the full treatment effects, as they only represent 10 treated units in 2008
(from 2013, treated units become 40). Instead, the trends in outcomes before 2008 are the
focus of this analysis.
For news about gangmaster system (Figure 11, Panel a), there is clearly no significant trend
in the pre-period: all coefficient are insignificant and their distribution is flat at zero for the
entire period. For properties seized to mafias (Panel b), coefficients are also insignificant
and fluctuating around zero. Coefficients from 2003 to 2006 are slightly higher, but in a way
that is compatible with previous yearly variations. A similar pattern is displayed for mafia
properties destined for social use (Panel c). While lack of significance is potentially driven
by low statistical power, the absence of a trend in the data and the possibility to observe a
long pre-period in which no clear trend is visible (8 years for news, 25 for seized properties,
11 for destined properties), is reassuring in reducing concerns about non-parallel trends:
treated and control cities do not seem to differ systematically in terms of the outcomes of
interests before treatment period starts.22
For political outcomes (Figure 15), instead, treated and control units can only be meaning-
fully compared across 3 election periods before treatment starts, as elections before 1994
feature a different set of parties and electoral rules. In this case, the reference year is elec-
tions 2006. For center-right and center-left parties, the pre-trends cannot be considered
parallel: in both cases, there is a negative drop in 2001 and variations over time are as large
as those observed in the treated period. For the extreme parties, instead, pre-trends appear
parallel, with the change in vote share stable at zero and insignificant.
22In Figure 49 SI, I also report parallel trend tests for firms seized to mafias and destined for social use,
which also do not display patterns in line with violations of parallel trends.
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Since pre-trends can plausibly be considered parallel for only some of the outcomes de-
scribed, in the next paragraphs I propose alternative identification strategies which either
reduce the extent to which selection of treatment units matters (using propensity score
matching to identify a more similar control sample) or relax the parallel trend assumption
completely by only comparing treated units among themselves (staggered design).
3.4.2. Matching design
I use nearest neighborhood matching to identify a control group that presents similar char-
acteristics as the treated units on a variety of substantively important characteristics. I
match treated to control units on the following pre-treatment characteristics from Census
2001: the percentage of population employed in agriculture and in unskilled labor, unem-
ployment rates, population and its density, foreign population and analphabetism rates.
Additionally, I match on the number of FLAI union members at the regional level in 2006,
an information I obtain from the union website. A balance table reveals that the algorithm
is effective in substantively reducing differences across treated and control units and that
balance is improved not only on the covariates used for matching purposes, but also on
other characteristics of the cities (Table 37, SI). Parallel trends tests are slightly improved,
particularly for political outcomes (Figure 52 and 56, Appendix).
3.4.3. Staggered design
In a third alternative specification, I exploit the staggered roll out of the intervention
to restrict the analysis to treated units only and rely on variation in the timing of their
treatment. This strategy reduces the number of observations and automatically drops the
last year of treatment, in which all units are treated and there is no control, but it also
allows to relax the assumption that trends between treated and control group are parallel,
since it uniquely relies on within-treated units variation. In this case, the identification
assumption is only that there is no strategic selection into treatment timing, i.e. that
differences between localities which were treated earlier or later are not correlated with the
outcome. As discussed in Section 3.2.2, the decision to treat a city was decentralized to the
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local labor union and localities with highest levels of exploitation were not systematically
targeted first, suggesting that selection in treatment timing should not be a primary concern
in this context.
3.4.4. Stacked design
The staggered nature of the intervention, which reached different location at different times
is, on one hand, an advantage, as it allows to exclude the effect of other events that might
have happened at the same time as the treatment. This allows to exclude that a contempo-
raneous shock to the treatment is responsible for the observed effect in each of the previous
specifications. On the other hand, dynamic DiD designs exploit comparisons between early
treated and late treated units which can be biased if treatment is not constant across groups
or times (Goodman-Bacon, 2018).23 To exclude that findings are driven by heterogeneity
bias, I follow Deshpande and Li (2019) and repeat the main analysis on a database in
which only the first year of treatment is considered for each treated observation. This ex-
ercise mechanically removes the possibility to operate comparisons across early and late
treated units, as it sets observations as missing after their first year of treatment. Table 8
summarizes the identification strategies used to assess treatment effects while relaxing one
identification assumption at the time.
23For example, imagine that the intervention increases news related to the gangmaster system by 5 in
the first year after treatment and by 2 in the second year. When using early treated units as controls,
we will estimate a smaller treatment effect because in the second year after treatment, early treated units
still display an increase in news and thus, even if late-treated units also have +5 news in their first year of
treatment, we will estimate a treatment effect of only +3.
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Table 8: Summary of estimation strategies employed
Strategy Description Issues it addresses
Classic DiD Full sample of observations
Matched DiD Nearest neighborhood matching Control sample more
to identify control group similar to treated
Staggered DiD Only keeps treated obs No need to assume
parallel trends
Stacked DiD Only keeps first year Heterogeneous
of treatment treatment effects
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Figure 11: Parallel trends test






































































































































































































































































































































Note: Coefficients from the interaction of treatment indicator (equal to 1 in
treated cities) and year dummies. The blue vertical line indicates the reference
category (year 2007). In the first year of treatment, only 10 cities are reached by
the intervention, while by 2013 they are 40. Regressions include city and year
FE and standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Note: Coefficients from the interaction of treatment indicator (equal to 1 in treated cities) and
election-year dummies. The blue vertical line indicates the reference category (election year 2006).
In the first year of treatment, only 10 cities are reached by the intervention, while by 2013 they are
40. Regressions include city and year FE and standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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3.5. Results
3.5.1. News coverage of gangmaster system
The analysis starts by performing a reality check: did the intervention increase reporting
of cases of gangmaster systems? In Table 9, I test the effect of treatment on the population
share of news related to gangmaster system in each city. Results indicate a significant
increase by 4 news in 100,000 inhabitants in targeted cities (Column 1), an effect which
becomes smaller and more precise when we consider the matched control sample (Column
2). In both case, the effect is large and represents a ten or twenty-fold increase with
respect to the average population share of gangmaster system-related news in a city. Results
are not significant using the staggered design (Column 3). This is not concerning since
this specification is only aimed at relaxing the parallel trend assumption which, however,
holds well for this outcome. Finally, the result is robust to using only the first year of
treatment (Column 4), suggesting that possible heterogeneous treatment effects do not
drive the findings. In the Appendix, I show results’ robustness to using the total number of
news instead of the population share (Table 39, SI) and to using only news from Corriere or
only from La Repubblica, the two newspapers data are scraped from (Table 38, SI). Notice
also that reverse causality - an increase in news in treated units could be the reason why the
union targeted certain locations - is ruled out by the existence of extremely flat pre-trends
in the years before treatment.
An important question is whether the increase in news comes from workers reporting and
police prosecuting cases of exploitation at higher rates or from politics and society dis-
cussing about this topic at higher rates. To answer this question, I read and classify a
random sample of 100 news in treated cities. The majority of news (37%) discusses cases
of migrants denouncing or police operations against labor exploitation. Second, there are
journalistic reports on the topic (24%) and demonstrations or initiatives by migrants or by
the civil society to achieve change (23%) and finally policymaking initiatives to fight this
phenomenon (16%). The examination of the content of news articles provides evidence that
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the intervention increased both reporting of cases of exploitation and the activism of local
civil society and institutions to achieve change.
Table 9: Treatment effect on news related to gangmaster system (DiD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Matched Staggered Stacked
Treated 0.0408* 0.0267** -0.0257 0.0385*
(0.0208) (0.0114) (0.0323) (0.0208)
Observations 137,258 1,649 833 153,406
R-squared 0.158 0.160 0.171 0.144
City and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean DV 0.0016 0.0022 0.0182 0.0022
Note: The table reports results from a DiD capturing the change in news
about gangmaster system in cities treated with the union intervention,
before and after the intervention took place. The DV is the population
share of news in 1000 inhabitants. City and year FE are included and
standard errors are clustered at the city level.
3.5.2. Properties seized to mafias and mafia properties destined to public use
Properties seized to mafias
The second question investigated is whether an intervention aimed at fighting labor ex-
ploitation had positive spillovers as an anti-mafia policy. As discussed, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the most severe cases of exploitation involve members of criminal organiza-
tions, who perform the function of controlling workers and preventing them from reporting
to the police or seeking help. If the union intervention is successful in particular on cases of
severe exploitation and if organized crime is indeed involved, then we should expect higher
rates of reporting to result into a higher likelihood of police discovery of mafia-related ac-
tivities. Table 10 indicates that cities targeted by the intervention experience a significant
increase of 1.2 or 1.3 more goods seized to organized crime - thirteen times more than the
average in the full sample (Column 1) and four times the average in the matched sample
(Column 2). As for news, the lack of significance in the staggered design should not be
regarded as problematic given the existence of parallel pre-trends. Results in the stacked
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Table 10: Treatment effect on goods and properties seized to mafias (DiD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Matched Staggered Stacked
Treated 1.331*** 1.159* 0.304 0.704**
(0.471) (0.637) (1.462) (0.353)
Observations 274,890 3,264 1,666 291,060
R-squared 0.172 0.179 0.188 0.163
City Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean DV 0.109 0.337 1.021 0.103
Note: The table reports results from a DiD capturing the change
in goods and properties seized to mafias in cities treated with the
union campaign, before and after the intervention took place. City
and year FE are included and standard errors are clustered at the
city level.
design (Column 4) confirm the robustness of results to treatment heterogeneity bias. Seiz-
ing firms to mafias is a rarer event - for example, there are 44,462 seized properties in
the database but only 5,365 seized firms. While less precise,there is also evidence that the
number of firms seized to organized crime increased in treated cities (Table 40, SI).
Properties destined to public use
Since 1996 (Law 109/1996), properties seized to organized crime can be reassigned for the
use of the community, either as administrative buildings or given to local administrations
who assign them for free to cooperatives and associations that perform activities useful for
society as a whole. While these properties represent freebies for public administrations,
distributing them is bureaucratically complex24 and often criminal groups retaliate against
those endowed with their former properties exactly as a strategy to make this redistribution
ineffective. Very often, this means that properties seized to mafias are left unused. A
surprising effect of treatment is that it also increases the number of properties that are
reassigned for public use after being seized to organized crime. This effect is statistically
significant and large (an eighteen-fold increase with respect to the average in the full sample)
24Complexity is dictated by the cost to restructure these properties, which are often left unused for years,
and by the necessity to screen out figureheads of criminal organizations who could acquire back the property.
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Table 11: Treatment effect on mafia properties destined for public use (DiD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Matched Staggered Stacked
Treated 1.053* 0.706 0.853* 0.973*
(0.564) (0.578) (0.482) (0.501)
Observations 161,700 1,920 980 177,870
R-squared 0.291 0.215 0.228 0.289
City Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean DV 0.0617 0.259 0.650 0.0685
Note: The table reports results from a DiD capturing the change
in goods and properties seized to mafias that were destined for
public use in cities treated with the union campaign, before and
after the intervention took place. City and year FE are included
and standard errors are clustered at the city level. All regressions
control for the number of goods seized to organized crime. This
regression includes data from 1996, when the law for the social
use of mafia properties was approved.
and robust across specifications (Table 11). The effect is unlikely to be the automatic
product of the increase in seized properties in treated cities, since the average time between
the seizure and the destination of a property is 2023 days (Cisterna, 2012).
Why do administrations redistribute properties seized to mafias at higher rates in cities in
which the union intervention made cases of exploitation salient? If administrations face
political pressure for adopting measures against exploitation, this is what we should expect.
Anecdotally, financing cooperatives of agricultural workers has been a common strategy to
fight against exploitative practices in agriculture. In line with this interpretation, properties
redistributed in treated cities are more likely to be destined to cooperatives in agriculture
(Table 41, Col 1-4, SI) and for social purposes (a definition which includes cooperatives)
rather than to be used for public offices, which is the most common use of these properties
(Table 41, Col 5-8, SI).25
25The same information on destination of the good and type of activity are not available for firms.
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3.5.3. Voting
The final outcome considered is whether the intervention had an impact on voting. Was
the experience of learning about cases of enslavement in the voters’ own city sufficient to
impact their view of immigration and their voting behavior? To better isolate the effect of
treatment, in this specification I consider the change in voting as dependent variable rather
than the levels, as above.26 Results should thus be interpreted as the effect of treatment
on the change in vote share for each party from the previous year. Another important
reminder in interpreting these results is that this is the only outcome for which the number
of years available before treatment starts is too small to assess whether the parallel trends
assumption holds and this is particularly true for the moderate parties categories, as pre-
trends are often significant. As a result, in this case it is fundamental to test whether the
staggered design specification is consistent with the other results.
Table 12 reports the results for all groups of parties and all four specifications. The Center-
Right and Center-Left parties have negative coefficients, indicating a reduction in vote share
from the previous year. The Center-Left result is of opposite sign and insignificant in the
staggered design, which makes this result not believable in light of the lack of parallel
trends for this outcome. For Center-Right, the negative coefficient is significant also using
the staggered design, but significance disappears completely using the matched sample and
the vote share as dependent variable instead of the changes (Table 42, SI). Results for the
Far-Right parties are mixed, with the sign of the coefficient changing across specification and
behaving in a similar way in the robustness tests. The only result that is highly consistent
across specifications and largely significant is the effect on the Far-Left parties vote share.
In treated cities, far-left parties experience a positive and significant change in vote share
corresponding to an increase by 30% in their vote from the previous year, a three-fold
increase with respect to the average change in vote share for this group of parties.27 In
26Results using the vote shares in levels are consistent and reported in Table 42, SI, but the pre-trends
are less convincing using this outcome.
27Extreme parties formations and their voters vary more from one year to another than centrist parties
and as a result their change in vote share is naturally larger.
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levels, this effect corresponds to an increase in far-left parties vote share by 1% (Table 42,
SI). The effect is present in each year after treatment, with a large positive change in 2013
and an equally high vote share in 2018, translating into a zero change coefficient from 2013
to 2018 (Figure 15).
If the intervention is responsible for the change in vote share, we should observe larger effects
in cities that were treated closer to elections. In Table 43, SI, I test the same specification
on the subsample of cities which were treated less than one year before elections: for all
parties, the change is larger considering this subsample. The change in vote share for the
far-left is of 40% with respect to the average change of 10%.28
Mechanism
In future iterations of this chapter, I would like to test the plausibility of this mechanism
using a survey experiment on a sample of constituents living in locations where migrants
are exploited, but who were not targeted by the information dissemination campaign. The
treatment will consist in learning about the condition of exploitation migrants are exposed
to in the city of the respondent and on the effects of an information dissemination campaign
launched in other cities on the condition of migrants. Subjects in the control group would
instead be exposed to a more classic treatment informing them about basic statistics on
migrants’ presence and integration in the workforce in their city. The survey will then assess
whether treated subjects respond by becoming more in favor of integration and whether
this translates into a higher likelihood to pick hypothetical candidates that are in favor of
integration policies. The survey experiment is described in Appendix B.4.
3.6. Conclusions
This chapter studies the effects of an information dissemination campaign aimed at fighting
labor exploitation of migrants in agriculture by providing them with the tools and the
28In the SI, I present results disaggregated for the Lega Nord only instead of including this party in
the far-right group. This choice is conceptually suboptimal, as most far right parties are explicitly against
immigration and not only Lega Nord. Results are not consistent across specifications, preventing to reach
meaningful conclusions on this outcome.
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Table 12: Treatment effect on change in vote share (DiD)
Full Matched Staggered Stacked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Center-Right Center-Right Center-Right Center-Right
Treated -0.0440** -0.0255 -0.133*** -0.0626***
(0.0207) (0.0298) (0.0439) (0.0224)
Mean DV -0.0207 -0.0186 0.00985 -0.0207
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Far-Right Far-Right Far-Right Far-Right
Treated -0.605*** -0.693 0.909* -0.0958
(0.214) (0.681) (0.473) (0.324)
Mean DV 0.958 1.259 0.868 0.958
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Center-Left Center-Left Center-Left Center-Left
Treated -0.0842*** -0.0498 0.0182 -0.0775***
(0.0231) (0.0336) (0.0524) (0.0295)
Mean DV -0.0785 -0.108 -0.112 -0.0785
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Far-Left Far-Left Far-Left Far-Left
Treated 0.318*** 0.328** 0.515*** 0.616***
(0.105) (0.132) (0.139) (0.166)
Mean DV 0.117 0.135 0.161 0.117
Observations 46,867 540 283 46,819
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports results from a DiD capturing the change in vote share in cities
treated with the union intervention, before and after the intervention took place. City
and year FE are included and standard errors are clustered at the city level. In all
specifications, I control for the number of voters. All data on national elections since
1994 are included.
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incentives to denounce severe exploitation. This is a different policy with respect to others
previously considered by the literature in that it does not only promote economic integration
but also highlights the condition of exploitation migrants are subject to. The intervention
was effective in increasing police reporting of cases of exploitation. Since gangmasters are
often members of criminal organizations, higher reporting rates had a spillover effect on
the seizure of mafia-owned properties, which increase in treated cities. In this sense, this
chapter contributes to the literature showing that organized crime exploits migration for its
own profits and that hitting criminals’ capacity to exploit migrants directly damages their
business.
Treatment also raised awareness of this phenomenon among the public opinion and the
institutions. Finally, differently from other policies, this intervention did not produce a
backlash against pro-immigration parties. Instead, parties that had a more pro-integration
stances gained votes in treated cities. In line with previous literature, I interpret this finding
as the result of feelings of deservingness for migrants caused by learning the condition of
severe exploitation they were subject to. In future iterations of this chapter, I plan to
test this hypothesis using survey experiments. While this set of conclusions is valid in
this context, scaling up this intervention at the national level might potentially produce
different effects than those observed. If reporting gangmasters to the police became the
equilibrium, smuggling and controlling migrants would become extremely costly and might
stop being a profitable business. On the other hand, systematic reporting could only be
achieved if exploited migrants who denounce are effectively rewarded with a humanitarian
residence permit, a strategy which requires governments to grant legal status to a relatively
large number of migrants and which might produce a different effect on voting. Findings
from this study suggest that governments willing to scale up this intervention while avoiding
backlash would need to invest in communication to highlight to voters the extreme condition
migrants are subject to. In conclusion, at least some types of integration policies can be
carried on without a backlash against pro-integration parties when voters learn about the
severe exploitation migrants can be subject to.
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CHAPTER 4 : Fighting Organized Crime by Targeting their Revenue
Fighting Organized Crime by Targeting
their Revenue: Screening, Mafias and
Public Funds1
Abstract
Repressive policies to fight criminal organizations are often met with a violent response
from criminal groups. Are non-repressive strategies more effective? Curbing criminal rev-
enues can be a powerful tool if the threat of investigation is credible and if criminals are
unable to displace their activity to avoid controls. We study an Italian policy fighting
mafia misappropriation of public funds by screening companies applying for subsidies over
150,000 Euro. We find that a group of firms starts self-selecting below the threshold imme-
diately after its enforcement. Those firms are concentrated in mafia affected cities, display
worse performances, operate in typical mafia sectors and have balance sheet indicators of
money laundering. While avoiding violence, non-repressive strategies might produce dif-
ferent unintended consequences: criminal organizations react with an immediate strategic
displacement which reduces states’ capacity to detect them, highlighting the importance
of designing policies that anticipate the sophistication of criminal organization in targeting
their revenues.




In many countries, criminal organizations have emerged as important political and eco-
nomic actors, accumulating enough resources that states are forced to decide whether to
fight or to coexist with them (Staniland, 2015). However, the choice of fighting can come
with considerable costs in terms of violence: policies to crack down on drug cartels in Cen-
tral and South America were met with an impressive surge in homicides (Lessing, 2017b);
the beheading of criminal groups has resulted into wars of replacement (Calderón et al.,
2015; Castillo and Kronick, 2020). Mass incarceration policies have also backfired, causing
the formation of new criminal networks (Skarbek, 2011), and when stricter jail conditions
were adopted to prevent networks formation, criminals fought the state back, pushing it to
compromise.2
While repressive policies seem to be met with a violent response, there is less evidence on
the effectiveness of policies aimed at fighting organized crime through non-repressive meth-
ods. Policies such as increased monitoring of infiltrated sectors and screening of financial
transactions and public tenders have the potential to cut down criminal revenues and thus
prove powerful tools to fight against organized crime. On the other hand, they might also
turn out to be ineffective if (i) the threat of investigation is not sufficiently credible and if
(ii) criminals are able to displace their business or use figureheads to make it undetectable.
In this chapter, we study an example of one such policy: the Italian Antimafia Information
law. This policy aims at cutting one of the major sources of criminal revenues in a growing
number of countries, public funds. Either through public contracts or through subsidies,
criminal groups often manage to subtract large amounts of money directly to the state. For
example, criminal organizations have embezzled the bulk of European subsidies for green
energy and agricultural production by creating ad-hoc companies which disappeared after
2In Italy, the approval of tighter detention measures for mafiosi started a season of massacres which led
to the “State-Mafia Pact”, a negotiation between Cosa Nostra and the Italian State to attenuate detention
measures in exchange for the end of the siege (Lupo, 1996). A similar strategy was adopted by Brazilian
gangs trying to avoid members’ separation across different prisons( Washington Post 2019).
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receiving funding (Caneppele et al., 2013).3 According to the European Anti-fraud Agency,
every year between 300 million and 900 million Euros of EU funds are funneled in the hands
of criminals (European Anti-Fraud Office, 2017).
The Italian Antimafia Information Law was designed to prevent misappropriation of sub-
sidies by checking on firms’ connections with organized crime if they apply for subsidies
over 150,000 euros. There are three features of this setting which make it particularly apt
for studying criminal firms’ behavior. First, the Italian screening process focuses solely
on the relationships with mafias: this allows us to connect firms’ behavior in response to
the policy to this specific crime, rather than to other illegal behaviors. Second, the law
was substantially strengthened in 2013. We can thus consider differences in the number of
subsidies awarded at the discontinuity before and after the new law to account for constant
characteristics of subsidies at this threshold. Finally, the police bears the full costs of the
investigations and no other crimes besides mafia-connection are investigated; the policy is
designed to cause no delay in the granting of the funding; and firms play no role in this
process, allowing us to exclude the possibility that they simply sort below the threshold to
avoid bureaucratic costs or for fear of being prosecuted for other crimes.
We use data on all firm subsidies co-financed by the EU from 2008 to 2015 and estimate
the difference in funding at the 150,000-euro threshold before and after the 2013 strength-
ening of the law. We identify the amount of sorting using difference-in-differences (DID)
estimates – but we show that bunching estimation provides very similar results. Unlike
repressive policies, this law had no effect on mafia-related crimes, but it still produced
unintended consequences: from before to after the 2013 law strengthening, the number of
subsidies for just below the 150,000 Euros threshold became four times higher than in any
other bin. This suggests that firms related to mafia reacted strategically by systematically
applying for funds just below the screening threshold. We test multiple empirical implica-
tions of this explanation. We find that sorting is stronger in mafia-affected cities and in
3This scandal resulted in the resignation of Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico and the murder of the
journalist reporting on it, Ján Kuciak.
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sectors traditionally infiltrated by organized crime. Moreover, firms sorting right below the
threshold are more likely to display worse performance, such as delaying the conclusion of
the funded project and finding private co-financing. They are also substantially more likely
to have been created right before applying for subsidies, and they have lower bank debts;
both characteristics align with our knowledge of how mafia-affiliated firms conduct money
laundering operations (Bianchi et al., 2017; Transcrime, 2018). Our findings are robust to
using different sizes of bins and are not determined by 150,000 euros being a round number.
We also run a series of placebo tests on cases in which we should not expect to see sorting.
Finally, in an attempt to estimate the cost of sorting for mafia-connected firms, we find
that after 2013, fewer subsidies over 150,000 euros were awarded in mafia-affected cities.
This chapter is the first study of a screening policy designed to fight organized crime misap-
propriation of public funds. Mafia-related companies adopt an immediate strategic reaction,
suggesting that the threat of screening is effective. The law is successful at pushing a number
of applications below the threshold, which we interpret as an economic loss for mafia-related
companies, who would have otherwise applied for higher subsidies. However, the effective-
ness of the policy is limited to where the controls are enforced, since mafia-linked firms can
easily game the law by applying for amounts just under the threshold. This leads to two
policy implications. First, a back of the envelope calculation suggests that lowering the
threshold would be socially beneficial, as mafias losses would be higher than the bureau-
cratic costs of additional screenings. Second, criminals’ immediate strategic response points
to the importance of designing policies that anticipate crime displacement, for example by
screening criminal behavior continuously, rather than only above arbitrary thresholds.
This chapter connects to three literatures. Primarily, we contribute to the emerging lit-
erature on policies to fight against organized crime. Previous studies have focused on
counter-narcotics policies (Dube and Naidu, 2015; Lessing, 2017b; Durán-Mart́ınez, 2017;
Castillo and Kronick, 2020; Kronick, 2020), kingpins killings (Calderón et al., 2015), mass
incarceration and deportation policies (Skarbek, 2011; Sviatschi, 2018). Instead, we focus
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on a non-repressive policy aimed at decreasing organized crime profits by preventing their
misappropriation of public resources. Differently from previous studies, we shed light on
organized crime involvement into white-collar crimes. This is an under-studied topic which
concerns several developed countries in which criminal organizations launder their profits
into legal businesses (Le Moglie and Sorrenti, 2017).
More broadly, our study connects to the literature studying states’ fight against sophis-
ticated criminal activities which react strategically to states’ attempts at fighting against
them. Those includes policies to curb money laundering (Findley et al., 2015), terrorism
financing (Morse, 2019; Limodio, 2019) and policies producing crime displacement (Get-
manski et al., 2019).
An important implication of these findings is that mafias’ capture of firm subsidies might
contribute to explain why European transfers destined for development have triggered eco-
nomic growth in most European regions, but not in Southern Italy (Becker et al., 2013). In
this sense, our study also relates to the literature showing how organized crime can impact
politics. Others have studied how criminal groups influence politicians’ selection (Alesina
et al., 2016; Fergusson et al., 2020), voting (Hidalgo and Lessing, 2015; Blattman et al.,
2018) and policy making (Daniele and Dipoppa, 2017; Trejo and Ley, 2017). Our findings
suggest that criminal organizations can additionally impact the effectiveness of policies for
development.
4.2. The Antimafia Information Law
The Antimafia Information Law is part of a broader effort by the Italian state to crack down
on organized crime which intensified starting in the 1990s, after a season of mafia-related
killings of notable public figures. This policy was designed to prevent mafia-linked firms from
receiving government subsidies by requiring the police to screen firms applying for subsidies
to determine if they have connections to mafias. Unlike other policies preventing access to
subsidies for firms with criminal records existing in other countries, the policy we consider
exclusively targets organized crime, allowing us to identify the effect of this intervention
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on mafia-related activity rather than on a mix of fiscal evasion, corruption or other illegal
behaviors. The government initially passed this law in 1965 and updated it in 1994 and
1998 to adjust to the transformations of criminal organizations over time. Importantly,
this policy was strengthened in 20134 expanding both the scope and the effectiveness of
controls. Checks were extended to family members, often used as figureheads in the past
(Fantò, 1999); to NGOs and public firms; to new types of mafia-related crimes, such as waste
trafficking. The law was made more effective by unifying the legislation and by creating
a centralized dataset of mafia-related information. Finally, the law rounded the threshold
of application from 154,937 to 150,000 euros.5 Below this threshold, firms applying for
subsidies have to simply provide a self-certification, stating the lack of any criminal charge.
The process to release subsidies is initiated by a public body (usually a regional government
or a Ministery) and generally aims at supporting firms’ investment and human capital
growth. Each call can include different eligibility rules. Eligible firms submit a budget
for their project proposals and, after an evaluation process, the awarding bodies list the
winning firms; only at this point they contact the Territorial Police Office (Prefetture)6 to
release the Antimafia Information. Figure 16 graphically shows the steps of the application
process.
In Italy, there are 103 Prefetture and each has only access to information on local subsidies
over which they have authority. There is also no central authority investigating on cases
of subsidies misappropriation, unlike for public procurement contracts, for which a specific
national agency was created to perform constant scrutiny. These two institutional features
might explain why the pattern of sorting we document in this chapter was not already
highlighted and fought against by the state.
4Law n. 159/2011, enforced on February 12, 2013.
5The threshold was initially 300 Million Lire.
6Prefetture are Interior Ministry agencies representing the central government in each province.
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Figure 16: The Antimafia Information Law, application process
4.3. Hypothesis: Sorting below the threshold
How do mafia-linked firms react to screening policies? The first question is whether the
policy presents a credible threat for criminal groups at all. In this case, qualitative evidence
suggests that the previous version of this law was not effective at even representing a threat
for criminals, due to the variety of ways in which police checks could be bypassed (Fantò,
1999). If the policy is credible, then there are several responses criminal firms can adopt.
First, can risk and apply nonetheless. In our context, they can apply for subsidies above
150,000 euros and risk a very high likelihood of rejection and seizure of the company. This
strategy seems uncommon, as an insignificant number of firms are rejected during the police
screening process. Second, they can apply below the threshold and forego potential profits.
To minimize the loss, they can apply for amounts just below the threshold. Third, they
can apply for subsidies above the threshold but circumventing the law using figurehead as
owners of the company. This strategy is optimal when the cost of finding a trustworthy
figurehead is lower than the cost of foregoing potential profits due to applying for funds
below the threshold. We provide suggestive evidence on this strategy in Section C.6 in
the Appendix. In Appendix Section C.6, we also briefly discuss two alternative strategies:
applying for multiple subsidies and using different front firms.
4.3.1. Alternative reasons to avoid the threshold
This section discusses alternative reasons why firms might sort below the threshold. We
substantiate this discussion by providing qualitative evidence on the procedures followed
by the Prefetture in releasing the certificate. We sent a list of open questions to each of the
country’s 103 Prefetture (Provincial Police Offices) under the Freedom of Information Act
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and obtained an answer from 44 of them.7
Bureaucratic costs
The Italian government designed the Antimafia Law to avoid placing any burden on firms
by shifting all costs to the police. Firms have no role in providing documentation, as
all documents are gathered through local institutions. The screening process, conducted
entirely by the Prefetture, consists of verifying information on a digital database, matching
firms’ data with the owners’ criminal records. Only where mafia ties are suspected is the
local police office contacted for further investigations. This rarely occurs: all Prefetture
confirmed that on-site checks are rarely executed. Generally firms do not experience any
bureaucratic costs to obtain this certification, unless they have connections to mafias.
Police corruption
Firms might fear police extortion and apply below the threshold to avoid it. This hypothesis
is in sharp contrast to the Italian setting, in which corruption levels in the police are low
both in relative and absolute terms. In absolute terms, only 11% of Italians think the police
is corrupt, according to Transparency International. This is below the EU average of 22%
and in line with other Western EU countries (e.g. 8% in France, 11% in the UK, 12% in
the Netherlands). In relative terms, the police is the most trusted institution by Italians,
according to a 2013 survey, the three Italian police authorities, Carabinieri, Polizia and
Guardia di Finanzia were the most trusted institutions with levels of trust above 70%. As
a comparison, only 36.6% of Italians trust the Catholic Church, 19,5% trust unions and
7% trust political parties8. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no
case of police corruption related to the release of the Antimafia Certificate. Finally, in the
empirical analysis, we test whether cases of firms sorting are concentrated in provinces with
high levels of institutional corruption, and we show that this is not the case (Table 47, SI).
7The sample of respondents is geographically representative, with a balanced response rate from Prefet-
ture in the South (43%) and includes several Prefetture located in heavily mafia affected provinces (50%).
8Eurispes
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Avoiding project delays and misjudgement
The law requires the certificate to be released within 30 days or else it is considered granted
exactly to prevent firms from being excluded from a call due to bureaucratic delays. We
can also rule out that firms are afraid to be rejected due to uncertainty on their relationship
with mafia-members: the law allows no ‘grey areas’ in the rejection of the certificate, a
code followed by 100% of the Prefetture in our sample. As additional evidence, we show
that firms sorting below the threshold are not more likely to be located in municipalities
with highly inefficient local bureaucracy (Table 47, SI). Even if some firms applied below
the threshold just to be conservative, we would expect a small sorting mostly coming from
amounts right above 150,000 Euros. As we illustrate below, instead, what we find is a
substantively large sorting coming from larger amounts.
Risk of being charged for other crimes
Firms might sort for fear of being charged for other non-mafia crimes, such as tax evasion.
As discussed above, the Prefetture only screen for mafia connections and not other criminal
offenses, as indicated by both the law and the replies to our questionnaire. Additionally,
even if a business owner was guilty of another crime, this could not lead to the rejection of
the Antimafia Information. Finally, the Prefetture are not in charge of any other white-collar
type of crime, including tax evasion (investigated by the Guardia di Finanza). A business
owner must be simultaneously uninformed about the Prefetture duties and informed about
the law changes introduced after 2013 for non-mafia-related sorting to be possible. Again,
even in this implausible scenario, it seems unlikely that businessmen would forego large
amounts of profits instead of collecting these information.
In conclusion, the law and the procedures followed by the Prefetture suggest that only
connections to criminal organizations should lead a firm to worry about the Antimafia




The empirical analysis is based on data publicly available at OpenCoesione, an open gov-
ernment project including all projects covered by the Cohesion Policy and financed by
European Structural Funds with a national co-financing requirement. The data consist of
the EU multi-year budget for 2007–2013, which includes projects that could be financed up
to the end of 2015. Data on the current cycle (2014–2020) are not available yet and they
will be entirely released at the end of the current cycle. The total Italian expenditure was
46 billion euros, partly allocated to firms, for which this fund represents the largest source
of financing.
We restrict our analysis to subsidies close to the 150,000 threshold, starting from 50,000
euros, as below this threshold the number of projects increases substantially, complicating
the analysis. We drop projects above 250,000 euros to maintain a symmetrical window
around the discontinuity. In any case, there are few projects above 200,000 euros, as firm
subsidies can be released above this threshold only under specific conditions (European
Commission Regulation No 1407/2013). Our results are not dependent on this restriction
(results available upon request). The available data include only awarded (not requested)
subsidies. This is not a concern, as in the vast majority of the examined calls for subsidies
the selection committee evaluates only whether to award the submitted project; therefore
the requested budget generally corresponds to the awarded funding.9 Even when they do
not, this measurement error would bias our estimates towards zero.10
The second data source is Aida, a database provided by Bureau Van Dijk including data on
all 2 million Italian firms required to file their accounts.11 However, due to missing company
9Besides consulting the application forms, we also submitted a FOIA request to local institutions awarding
subsidies to investigate this matter. We gathered data on more than 3,500 requested subsidies distributed
across eight calls. In all cases, the requested subsidy and awarded subsidies corresponded. We discuss more
in detail the consequences of observing subsidies awarded in Section C.2.1, SI.
10A possible bias could take place if local authorities strategically assigned funds below the threshold to
avoid bureaucratic costs. However, such a mechanism should be time invariant or less likely after 2013, as
the bureaucratic burden for the police and the local awarding institutions have likely decreased with the
new law due to the availability of a centralized database of mafia-related crimes.
11All firms requesting subsidies have to file their accounts publicly.
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identifiers in the OpenCoesione database, we can only match 45% of the observations. For
consistency, we use the matched database for the main analyses, but include all tests on the
full sample of companies in the Appendix (Section C.4). We show that the matched sample
is representative of the full, with a comparable number of subsidies in each year (Table 46,
Appendix). Overall, our final matched sample includes almost 10,000 subsidies spread
across 437 different calls. In the Appendix, we include descriptive statistics (Table 45) and
we plot the distribution of projects by economic sector and institution in charge of the call
(Figure 58).
Figure 17 plots the distribution of subsidies 50,000–250,000 euros for the periods before and
after 2013. The figure shows a striking jump in subsidies released right before 150,000 euro,
the threshold at which the Antimafia Law applies after 2013. This descriptive evidence is
in line with the hypothesis that firms self-select below the threshold to avoid Antimafia
screening. A similar jump is not visible at the pre-2013 threshold of 154,937 euros. We
observe other peaks at 60,000, 100,000 and 200,000 euros, but those are quite similar before
and after 2013, suggesting their presence is related to round numbers acting as reference
points (Ashworth and Heyndels, 1999), while we observe a very different pattern for the
150,000 euros bin before and after 2013, when the number of subsidies increases by almost
4%.
4.5. The effect of the policy: firms sorting at the threshold
4.5.1. Estimation strategy
We test for the presence of sorting in subsidies at the 150,000-euro threshold using a DID
specification12. First, we collapse the database into bins of 1,000 euros, obtaining 1,608
bins of values between 50,000 and 250,000 euros for each year from 2008 to 2015. We
then compare the number of subsidies in each bin before and after the strengthening of the
Antimafia Law in 2013, focusing on the bin right below the previous threshold (funding
between 154,000 and 155,000 euros) and just below the new threshold (funding 149,000–
12A regression discontinuity is not the correct approach in this context, as the forcing variable – the
amount of funding – is endogenously determined.
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150,000 euros, where the value of 150,000 euros is included). Specifically, for each bin j in
year t, we consider:







δjtBinj ∗AntimafiaLawt + εjt
(4.1)
where NSubsidiesjt is the count of the number of subsidies in each bin-year; Binj is a
vector representing each bin in our distribution (amount between 50,000 and 250,000 euros,
in which the first bin, 50,000–51,000 is the base category); AntimafiaLaw is a dummy
equal to 1 after the strengthening of the Antimafia Law in 2013. Our coefficient of interest
is δ when a = 149, 000− 150, 000, capturing the increase in subsidies in the bin just below
the threshold after 2013. We are also interested in testing whether the old law, with the
threshold of 154,937 euros, had any effect on sorting. Notice that with in this specification
standard errors are calculated on a binned database using the actual number of subsidies
per bin as outcome variable and are thus close to zero. We can, however, estimate the
same specification using, instead of the vector of Bin, a dummy equal to 1 for the bin
a = 149, 000−150, 000. In this way, the estimated standard errors are correct and return an
almost identical result (Column 2, Table 13). We also run the same specification including
region times year fixed effects to account for fixed and trending differences between regions.
In Appendix C.3, we also show that results are equivalent to adopting a bunching estimation
strategy.
4.5.2. Identification assumptions
The model correctly identifies sorting at the threshold if the assumptions of the DID are
met. First, to the best of our knowledge, no other change at the 150,000 euros value took
place after 2013. It is possible that some local governments set a maximum of 150,000 euros
92
in subsidy calls. Our data do not include information maximum values, but to account for
this possibilty we research all calls in the 149,000–150,000 range and drop the one call which
had this maximum. This process biases our results towards zero by asymmetrically reducing
the sample in the 150,000 euros bin only.
We demonstrate the parallel trend assumption showing that trends in the number of subsi-
dies in treated (150,000 euros) and control units are parallel before 2013 and that the gap
in levels between treatment and control groups does not impact the differences in trends.
Figure 18 consider the average number of subsidies grouped by year and 10,000-euro values
(101,000–190,000 euros).13 and shows a general common trend across the several control
groups (colored) and our treated group (black thick line). The differences in levels are
mostly due to more subsidies of smaller amounts (101,000–120,000 euros). This pattern is
unlikely to affect trends when focusing on the comparison between subsidies just below and
just above 150,000 euros. In Figure 67, SI we show that results hold if we split the sample
by whether a city displays or not mafia presence.
4.5.3. Results
Figure 19 and Table 13, Column 1 show the results from estimating Equation 4.1. In Column
2 of Table 13 we replace the Amount for each bin with a dummy equal to 1 when the amount
is 150,000 euro. In Figure 19 each dot is a coefficient representing the change in the number
of subsidies in the corresponding bin after the enforcement of the Antimafia Law in 2013;
the dotted vertical line indicates the 150,000-euro threshold. In the bin right below the
threshold, there are 29.2 more subsidies after 2013 with respect to the bin just on the other
side of the threshold (150,001–151,000 euros), a strikingly large difference corresponding to
a 387% increase in the mean number of subsidies per bin and an outlier of the distribution
located at more than 4 standard deviations away from the mean. Instead, considering the
155,000-euro coefficient for the old law, the change in the number of subsidies was -1.17
before the threshold was removed and 0.17 after. Both coefficients are in line with average
13Notice that we consider a different bin size than in the main specification (10,000 euros instead of 1,000)
so that we can observe a trend rather than idiosyncratic variations.
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by 10,000 Euros value
Note: The figure plots the average number of subsidies per year for groups of 10,000 euro values. The
treated group is 141,000–150,000 euros, including all subsidies just below the threshold of application
of the law (thick black line). All other groups are controls. Within each group, the yearly average
is calculated on the 1,000-euro bins database. For example, an average of 8 for the treated group in
2009 means that in the 10 bins between 141,000 and 150,000 euros, the average number of awarded
subsidies was 8.
fluctuations over time in our distribution, and the negative sign before 2013 indicates that,
even with the old law, firms were not systematically sorting at this threshold. This behavior
is in line with anecdotal evidence suggesting that screening was ineffective before the 2013
law strengthening. Figure 19 also demonstrates that there are no comparable differences
at other round numbers after 2013. We also test a more demanding specification including
region times year fixed effects to absorb any fixed and trending difference across regions in
Figure 60.
Findings are not driven by a specific year after the enforcement of the new law (Appendix
Figure 64, panel a), they are robust to increasing or reducing the size of the bins to 2,000,
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500 or 100 euros (Appendix Figure 64, panels b-d), to changing the reference category
(Figure 65, left), to removing year fixed effects (Figure 65), and to using the full sample of
subsidies rather than the subset for which we could match information on firm characteris-
tics (Appendix Section C.4). Appendix C.7 shows that the increase at 150,000 Euros comes
from subsidies which were awarded above the threshold before 2013, as documented by the
presence of a missing mass in the distribution above 150,000 euros after 2013. Additionally,
we do not observe sorting where we should not: in cities dissolved for mafia infiltration,
the Information is required for any amount of subsidies, and we observe no sorting. Sim-
ilarly, in agricultural funds it is hard to establish the amount ex-ante as this depends on
crops realizations and again we observe no sorting. Results are discussed in Appendix,
Section C.2.3.
In summary, how many firms applying for funds are connected to mafias? If mafia-connected
firms drove the entire jump, then at least 3.8% of the firms receiving European subsidies
would be connected to criminal organizations. This estimate is a lower bound for two rea-
sons. First, firms connected to mafias might keep applying for amounts below 150,000 euros
independently of the Antimafia Information Law. Second, other firms connected to mafias
might still circumvent the threshold using alternative methods (see the Appendix C.6). It is
therefore likely that organized crime misappropriation of public funds is considerably larger
than what we can estimate.
4.6. Is sorting driven by mafia-connected firms?
4.6.1. Stronger sorting where mafia is present
If mafia-related companies are driving sorting, we should expect sorting to be stronger in
areas with greater criminal presence. We indicate as mafia-infiltrated cities with one of
the following indicators: city councils dissolved due to ties between criminals and local
politicians, mafia victims, firms and property seized from criminal organizations. This
measure allows to measure mafia presence at the micro level while also accounting for
different types of activities (from violence to control of the legal economy) and different ways
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Table 13: Change in subsidies by bin after 2013 Law
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bin=149-150,000 9.833 8.288 5.333* 7.333*
(0) (0.381) (0) (0)
Antimafia Law 0.146 -0.407 0.412* 0.0730
(0.325) (0.280) (0.163) (0.162)
Bin=149-150,000×Law 29.17* 29.72* 4.167* 6.667*











Observations 1,608 1,608 3,216 3,216
Number of bins 201 201 402 402
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction Bins × Law Yes No Yes Yes
Mean DV 5.99 5.99 2.99 2.99
Sd DV 6.56 6.56 3.84 3.84
Note: The table shows results from the DID model (Equation 4.1). The
DV is the number of subsidies awarded in each bin. We report only the
coefficients of interest, for the bin below the new Antimafia Law threshold
(149, 000 − −150, 000 bin) and below the old threshold (154, 000 − −155, 000
bin). AntimafiaLaw (or Law) is a dummy equal to 1 after 2013. In column
2, we estimate the same specification using, instead of the vector Amount, a
dummy equal to 1 only when the amount is in the 150,000 euros bin and equal
to 0 for every other bin. Mafia (Col 3) is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one
indicator captures mafia presence (at least 2 indicators, in Col 4). The refer-
ence category is 151,000 euros. Standard errors are clustered at the bin level.
*p<0.05
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Note: The figure shows coefficients from the DID in Equation 4.1, estimating the change in the
number of subsidies for each bin before and after the Antimafia Law approval. The coefficient of
interest is at the 150,000-euro threshold (first vertical line). The second vertical line represents the
154,937-euro threshold imposed by the old law. The reference category is 151,000 euros. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the bin level.
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to unveil it (from judiciary-driven discoveries, such as seizures, to homicides). Appendix
Figure 59 shows the distribution of mafias in Italian cities based on this measure.
We estimate a triple-difference model interacting each bin of the distribution of subsidies
with AntimafiaLaw, as in Equation 4.1, and with a dummy indicating mafia presence.14
Figure 20 and Table 13 (column 3) show that sorting is mostly driven by firms located
in mafia-affected cities, where there are 20.8 more subsidies just below the threshold with
respect to the effect measured by the simple interaction AntimafiaLaw x Bin = 150, 000
– which is still positive, with a coefficient of 4.2.15 Results are robust to adopting a more
restrictive definition of mafia, in which the dummy Mafia takes value 1 only in cities with
at least two indicators recording mafia presence (Table 13, column 4).
4.6.2. Sorting in kinship-based criminal organizations
In a similar vein, we test the heterogeneity of the results based on the organizational struc-
ture of one of the main Italian criminal organizations: the ’Ndràngheta (from Calabria),
which, unlike Camorra, Cosa Nostra and Sacra Corona Unita (from Campania, Sicily and
Apulia, respectively) relies heavily on family ties for its recruitment (Varese, 2006). We
expect the new Antimafia Law to be more disruptive for firms linked to this criminal orga-
nization, as it imposes checks on the business owner’s family members. ’Ndràngheta-linked
firms might be more likely to sort below the 150,000-euro threshold after 2013 due to the
difficulty of finding alternative figureheads outside the family. In this test, we consider
only the sample of provinces in which at least one of the three criminal organizations is
active, and test whether there is a stronger sorting after 2013 in the areas dominated by the
’Ndràngheta than in those dominated by Camorra or Cosa Nostra. We use the Transcrime
(2013) index to classify provinces based on the presence of a specific criminal organization.
While this measure is only available at the province (rather than city) level, it allows us
14To estimate this model, we create a new binned database of subsidies in which each bin is duplicated
and in order to identify the number of subsidies awarded each year in cities with and without mafias. The
number of observations is therefore doubled.
15In Figure 67, we replicate the common trend analysis presented in Section 4.5.2 distinguishing by areas
with and without mafia presence.
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to assess the prevalence in each area of one or the other criminal structure, a piece of in-
formation we do not have at the city level. We run a triple-difference model similar to the
one presented above for mafia-affected cities, this time at the provincial level. In this case,
we interact Bin x AntimafiaLaw with a dummy taking a value of 1 in provinces affected
by ’Ndràngheta, 0 in provinces affected by Camorra or Cosa Nostra, and missing other-
wise.16 The bottom panel of Figure 20 plots the differential effect of the Antimafia Law in
’Ndràngheta-affected areas and compares it to the results we presented in the previous test
on mafia presence. In line with our expectations, the probability of sorting to avoid the
threshold is considerably higher in ’Ndràngheta provinces, suggesting that the Antimafia
Information Law was more disruptive for ’Ndràngheta related firms.17
4.6.3. Sorting firms behave like mafia companies
In this section, we show that firms that sort exhibit different traits in terms of project
performance, financial accounts, sector and longevity. We consider a dataset at the subsidy
level, rather than a binned one, to account for the individual characteristics of firms and
subsidies. 18 For a subsidy i awarded by institution s in year t to a firm based in municipality
m, we estimate the following equation:
Yislmt =σs + µm + θt + γ1AntimafiaLawt + γ2JustBelowislm
+ γ3AntimafiaLaw ∗ JustBelowismt + γ4Xismt + εismt
(4.2)
where σs µm and θt are, respectively, the type of firm receiving the subsidy, the type of
institution awarding it, city and year fixed effects; AntimafiaLaw is a dummy equal to
16We also consider areas in which ’Ndràngheta as well as other mafia groups are both active to be
’Ndràngheta active provinces . Different definitions of this variable, allowing for mutually exclusive cat-
egories, do not change the results of this test but they affect the significance of the findings.
17All the results presented in this section are replicated on the entire sample, and explained in more detail
in the Appendix.
18In order to consider firm- or subsidy-level characteristics, we cannot use the same identification strategy
as in Section 4.5, which relied on a binned database in which each observation corresponded to a bin-year,
with bins corresponding to values between 50,000 and 250,000 euros. Instead, we could consider the firm- or
subsidy-level specification. As few firms received more than one subsidy in our sample, we prefer a subsidy-
level analysis. Therefore, in these specifications, we control for whether more than one subsidy has been
issued to the same firm.
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Note: The two top panels plot coefficients from the DID estimate (Equation 4.1) interacted with a
dummy indicating mafia presence in a city. On the left(right), we show the change in the number
of subsidies per bin after the approval of the Antimafia Law in cities without(with) mafia presence.
In the three panels below, we present a similar test by ’Ndràngheta presence.
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1 after the approval of the 2013 law; JustBelow is a dummy equal to 1 for subsidies just
below the 150,000-euro discontinuity and above 149,000 euros. We add controls for years of
activity and number of projects for which firm i receives funding. The dependent variable
Y refers to characteristics of a subsidy or firm, depending on the specification. This DID
specification allows us to consider whether firms sorting at the 150,000-euro threshold after
the approval of the Antimafia Law differ in meaningful ways from those submitting requests
at any threshold before and after 2013.19
We present the results from these analyses in Table 14. Firms sorting below the threshold
of application of the law are significantly more likely to display worse project performances:
they are more likely to delay the conclusion of the project by almost 3 months (Column 1)
and 25% less likely to find private sources of co-financing (Column 2). They are 31% more
likely to operate in typically mafia-affected sectors, such as construction and transportation
(Varese, 2011; Lavezzi, 2008), and 17% less likely to be in research, innovation and education
(Columns 3 and 4). Sorting firms are also 7% more likely to have been created less than
two years before receiving the subsidy, a result compatible with the possibility that the firm
was expressly created to apply to the call for subsidy (Fantò, 1999; Savona et al., 2016)
(Column 5).20 The effect of short-lived firms is substantial in magnitude if we consider that
the average life of a company in our database is 16.6 years. Finally, the Board of Director
of sorting companies is 16% more likely to come from a mafia-affected province, even when
we compare observations within the same city (Column 6).
We also investigate whether these firms differ from others in terms of financial outcomes.
Consistently with recent evidence on criminal firms (Transcrime, 2013; Furciniti and Frustagli,
2013), we find that firms that sort have lower debts by almost half a standard deviation
with respect to other firms, and lower bank debts by 514,000 euros (Appendix Table 48,
19However, the sample of firms receiving more than one subsidy is too small around the 150,000-euro
threshold to implement specifications including firm-level fixed effects.
20Note that only in this test, we control for firms’ legal status, as many calls focus only on start-ups,
whereby very young firms could be over-represented in our sample. The results are not affected by this
additional control. Note also that columns 5 and 6 have a lower number of observations due to missing data
in the dependent variables.
101
Columns 1 and 2). The intuition behind this finding is that if criminals exploit a firm for
money laundering, they often camouflage the illegal source of cash by repaying ‘fake debts’
to external or internal creditors. As a result, they close their balance sheets with lower
debts than average and, specifically, with lower debts from banks, which are heavily regu-
lated against money laundering and do not allow opportunities for recycling through fake
debt declarations. These lower debts are unlikely to stem from virtuous behavior of these
firms, if we consider that they also display worse performance in terms of delays and private
co-financing and that they do not display higher profitability. Running the same analysis
using return on assets as the dependent variable, a measure of firm productivity, we indeed
find negative and insignificant effects (Table 48, Column 5). This inconclusive finding is
likely the mix of several effects at play when considering criminal firms: on the one hand,
they might just be an unproductive proxy used for money laundering. On the other hand,
they might be productive firms that flourish due to extortion and violence, which distorts
the competition and captures entire markets. The idea that mafia-related companies can
be used either as pure money laundering devices or as a source of actual profit is supported
by evidence from Mirenda et al. (2017). We also provide results on cash and cash ratio, on
which the literature has provided contrasting predictions. We find a weakly positive effect
on cash ratio and no effect on cash (Table 48, Columns 3 and 4).
The sample of firms just above
We replicate all the tests in Table 14 comparing observations just below the threshold with
those just above it, in the group 150,000–160,000 euros (we cannot compare the sample 149-
150,000 to a symmetric sample above the threshold as this would overly reduce the sample).
The group applying for little more than 150,000 euros consists of firms that exceed the
Antimafia threshold even when they could avoid being screened for mafia connections with
very limited losses in terms of foregone profits. Therefore, they constitute an ideal control
group of firms with no mafia connections. When comparing this group with sorting firms,
the coefficients on delay, private co-financing, sectors and board of directors are substantially
larger. We do not find statistically significant results on firms’ longevity, which might be
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driven by the small sample size. All results are shown in Appendix Table 49.
4.6.4. Alternative reasons to avoid the threshold
In section 4.3.1, we discuss a set of reasons which might explain why some firms sort below
the threshold, including avoidance of police corruption or bureaucratic inefficiency. Here,
we investigate whether firms sorting below the threshold are more likely to be located in
areas with high levels of institutional corruption or bureaucratic inefficiency: our aim is to
exclude that firms are sorting to avoid the risk of i) incurring into corrupted local police or
ii) of dealing with particularly inefficient local institutions.
We replicate estimation (2), considering two outcomes, first, whether a firm is located
in a municipality in which there has been at least one corruption related investigation
(corruption, bribery, malfeasance, graft or embezzlement) in the period 2004-2014. In a
second test, we measure bureaucratic inefficiency by the speed of payments at the municipal
level (in the period 2003-2012), that is, the ratio between the outlays actually paid and the
outlays committed in the municipality budget. This is a commonly used proxy to measure
bureaucratic efficiency at the local level (Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013).21 As those
outcomes are measured at the city level, in these specifications we only include region fixed
effects.
Column 7 and 8 of Table 14 show that sorting firms are not more likely to be located in
municipalities with higher levels of corruption or bureaucratic inefficiency.
4.7. Conclusions
In this chapter, we study a policy designed to reduce criminal revenues by screening mafia-
connected firms out of public calls for subsidies. Our results point to a strategic and
sudden response by mafia-affiliated firms, which immediately react to a new law enforcement
and submit applications right below the threshold. We provide evidence in line with the
interpretation that companies sorting are mafia-related. Among the others, we show that
21Both corruption and speed of payments data are collected for the above mentioned years by the Italian
Ministry of Interior.
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sorting is driven by cities affected by mafias and that this effect is even stronger if we
consider a kinship-based criminal group (’Ndrangheta), which is more likely to have been
affected by the investigation of family members included in the Antimafia Information Law.
We also study the characteristics of firms sorting at the threshold and show that they
are considerably different from firms that do not and display features consistent with our
knowledge of mafia-related companies.
The strategic sorting we observe implies that firms believe i) that the anti-mafia checks will
not be undertaken below the 150,000 euros threshold and ii) that the police will not – at
least in the short run – find out about the strategic sorting of mafia-affiliated firms. Are
these assumptions plausible? The first relies on the repeated interactions between firms
and local institutions: if, before 2013, the police was enforcing controls only below the
old threshold at 154,937 euros (as confirmed by our questionnaire to Prefetture), business
owners might expect a similar pattern with the new law. The second assumption is plausible
if we consider that i) Prefetture have access only to local data, which might not necessarily
show the patterns identified in this chapter, and ii) there is no national authority in charge
of tackling the influence of mafias in calls for firm subsidies.22 This might explain why we
are the first to highlight such patterns in firm subsidies data.
Our findings highlight the evolving face of criminal organizations, which in recent decades
have expanded their businesses to new geographic areas and infiltrated the legal economy in
unprecedented ways. The strategic and sudden response of mafia-affiliated firms to this law
strengthening should be taken as additional evidence of how well structured and organized
is the presence of criminals in the legal economy and in the misappropriation of public
money. These results call for global evaluations of anti-corruption policies, investigating
areas and activities besides those directly targeted by the policy and taking into account
the strategic and fast-adjusting behavior of criminal actors.
22Conversely, there is a national authority focusing on corruption in public procurements (National Anti-
Corruption Authority).
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At least one important question is left unanswered: overall, does the strategic response
by mafia-affected firms outweigh the benefits of increased oversight on large contracts?
Does the gain from protecting some public funds from mafia appropriation compensate
for the cost of higher scrutiny from the state? In Appendix C.8, we provide a back of
the envelope calculation based on our findings and on estimates from previous studies on
the Antimafia screening costs. This calculation suggests that not only the state gains by
enforcing screening at 150,000 euros, but that the gains for the State in terms of reducing
misappropriation of subsidies by mafia firms would overcome screening costs even when
setting the screening threshold close to zero.
Besides reducing criminal profits, preventing the misappropriation of public funds by or-
ganized crime can generate a variety of positive consequences. It can dispossess criminal
organizations of patronage opportunities, such as employing the local population in their
companies and gain their consensus. It can improve the quality of the goods and services
generated for the community, for example avoiding the use of substandard materials. Sub-
tracting funds to criminals also means re-directing resources to clean companies, which can
use them to produce employment and growth in the territory. Designing appropriate poli-
cies that take into account the specific nature and behavior of criminal organizations is thus


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 5 : Conclusions
Conclusions
A vast literature has portrayed organized crime as a primitive state, emerging by replacing
institutions that are too weak to publicly provide essential functions. This dissertation
proposes a different perspective: criminal groups expand and thrive in strong states by
exploiting characteristics common to high capacity states, such as competitive markets
and elections and an abundant financing of public services. I study the determinants of
expansion to strong states as well as the effectiveness of policies that states and civil society
can adopt to mitigate the influence of organized crime.
I start by examining the determinants of expansion of southern Italian mafias to the eco-
nomically and institutionally developed North. I show that the joint impact of two factors
explains successful settlement of mafias in a city: the presence of high competition to hire
unskilled labor (due to a construction boom) and mafias’ capacity to offer cheap informal
labor (exploiting migrants from mafia-affected areas in the south). I also show that, once
settled, criminals were able to guarantee electoral returns to the party they had agreements
with, the Christian Democracy.
While competition is an integral and, in many ways, desirable component of market economies
and democracies, the possibility to exploit migrants is neither normatively desirable nor
functional. In the next chapter I thus assess whether reducing migrants’ exploitation can
also undermine criminal groups. I study the effects of a union campaign to fight against
migrants’ exploitation and inform civil society about the condition of enslavement migrants
are often subject to in the Italian fields. Using a difference-in-differences approach com-
paring treated locations before and after the campaign, I show that the union intervention
increased reporting of exploitation as well as crackdown against organized crime, measured
as the number of goods and properties seized to criminal groups. Unlike other policies
seeking to integrate migrants, this intervention did not increase the vote share of far-right
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parties and rather caused an increase in pro-immigration far-left party vote share.
While the third chapter focuses on a civil society intervention to mitigate the power of
organized crime, the fourth chapter examines a policy promoted by the state. Together
with Gianmarco Daniele, I study the effects of a policy fighting mafia misappropriation of
public funds by screening companies applying above a certain funding threshold for ties
with organized crime. I find that the policy caused mafia-related companies to sort below
the threshold of application of the law, causing an economic loss for mafia-firms. Sorting
itself indicates that criminal groups took the threat of state investigation seriously, rather
than resorting to alternative methods to avoid it, such as corruption. However, the policy
was only effective where screening took place and otherwise criminals kept misappropriating
funds. This underscores the importance of designing policies that take crime displacement
into account, especially when fighting against sophisticated criminal groups.
This dissertation provides three distinct contributions to the study of the origins and ex-
pansion of organized crime. First, it proposes and tests a theory for how expansion takes
place in the context of strong states. In the present work, I examine one case of expansion
- the move of southern Italian mafias to the north - and I rely on within-case variation to
explain how mafias expand. Across-cases analysis would be important to assess the external
validity of this theory. Several cases of expansion to strong states hold similar character-
istics as those encountered in the Italian case. Lupo (2009) has documented that at the
outset of the Italo-American mafia in the US, mafia-members were acting as intermediaries
between local businessmen and Italian migrants to exploit their compatriots as labor force.
Anecdotal evidence on the Nigerian Black Axe expansion into Italy suggests that this group
is thriving by exploiting the work of migrants from their country of origin at conditions close
to slavery in the agriculture and construction sectors. All the examples of organized crime
expansion to strong states mentioned in the second chapter, from the Mhallami criminal-
ity to the ’Ndrangheta in Australia and Germany, are cases in which the move of mafias
coincided with that of migrants from the same area of origin as criminal groups. Control
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over migrants, capacity to strike deals with local actors and necessity to build reputation,
networks and governance are features common to all types of criminal groups. That other
cases of expansion of criminal organizations to strong states have similar characteristics to
those studied in this chapter, suggests that the dynamics I documented using micro-level
evidence from Italy might travel to other regions.
Second, the three central chapters highlight how organized crime is able to exploit certain
characteristics common to strong states to both expand and to persist in those contexts.
In a strong state, the importance of using organized crime as an intermediary to enforce
informal contracts is higher because the likelihood that illegality is denounced and prose-
cuted is higher. From keeping an illegal political agreement, such as vote buying, secret
to overseeing an informal working relation so to prevent workers from denouncing, the role
of organized crime is more important where breaking the rule of law is costlier. Criminal
groups also thrive by misappropriating public funds, a strategy which yields higher returns
in the context of rich and modern states which spend larger sums in public service provision
projects.
The third contribution relates to policy design. A vast literature has unveiled the side effects
of repressive methods to fight against organized crime: wars on drugs increase drugs prices
and intra-groups conflict (Kronick, 2020); mass incarcerations can lead to the creation of
prison gangs (Skarbek, 2011); large police and military operations have created civilian
casualties to an extent that has put the credibility of the state into question (Lessing,
2017a). Both academic studies and practice point to the necessity of experimenting and
testing the effects of non-violent methods to fight against organized crime. The policies
studied in this dissertation are examples in which important sources of profits for criminal
groups are targeted without creating the scope for costly side effects, such as violence
against civilians. More broadly, this dissertation highlights the importance of taking into
account the strategies criminal groups to thrive in strong states when designing policies
to fight against these groups. New studies of the strategies modern criminal organizations
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use to expand and evaluations of the effects and side effects of interventions that try to
undermine them would provide important contributions both to the understanding of the
relation between organized crime and the state and for policy purposes.
A final, related, contribution is underscoring the importance of migrants’ exploitation as a
strategy for criminal organizations to expand and to make profits. This finding contributes
to the literature on the correlation between immigration and crime by proposing a new
explanation why these two variables might keep being associated, although migrants have
been shown not to commit crimes at higher rates than natives. In certain contexts, the
migration-crime association might exist because criminal organizations exploit migrants to
expand further. When this is the case, rather than causing crime, migrants are the primary
victims of criminals who thrive by exploiting their condition of vulnerability. This reverses
the policy recommendation that should be adopted to break the migration-crime link: rather
than imposing new restrictions on immigration to avoid the spread of crime, governments in
organized crime rigged areas (or areas where organized crime is expanding) should integrate
migrants at higher rates and subtract them from the condition of vulnerability that illegality
brings along. Other than protecting victims from exploitation, this policy could directly
hurt the profits and expansion capacity of organized crime.
In considering how to tackle the task of preventing migrants’ exploitation in practice, it is
important to highlight a tension existent between Chapter 2 and 3. In the period of early
expansion documented in the second chapter, mafias’ growth was uncontested. Neither in-
stitutions nor the civil society acknowledged that expansion was taking place until decades
later and, in line with it, no comprehensive effort to limit mafia transplantation was under-
taken. In the third chapter instead, a civil society institution - the union for agricultural
workers - undertook a campaign to fight against migrants’ exploitation, thereby damag-
ing criminal groups economically and attracting police attention on their activities. Set in
the same country, these two studies examine different time periods (the 1960s-1970s in the
first case, the current time in the second) and thus different levels of awareness on mafias’
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spread and methods. Nonetheless, in both cases, the state did not acknowledge the role of
migrants’ exploitation as a potential resource for criminals to thrive nor it adopted policies
to protect migrants and limit the profits of organized crime. While considerations on what
triggered this choice can only be speculative, it is worth noticing that the integration of
both southern Italian migrants in the 1970s and of international migrants in the 2010s was
a sensitive and polarizing political topic at the time. It is also worth noticing that, already
in the 1960s and 1970s, the unions - in this case, the union for construction workers - had
mobilized on the issue of mafia-controlled labor racketeering. Qualitative evidence pre-
sented in the second chapter highlights that their effort was less organized (there were only
individual initiatives of unionists visiting construction sites to talk to migrants), unionists
were less aware of the systematic role of mafias as labor racketeerers and did not have any
success in triggering reporting from migrants. This difference in outcomes highlights what
could be a crucial factor determining the success of the later union initiative: agricultural
unionists in the 2010s had a clear understanding of the situation of blackmailing migrants
were subject to and presented them with an alternative to exit the system of exploitation
- a path to legal residency. This suggests that, when possible, offering concrete alterna-
tives to victims of exploitation could make the difference between an ineffective anti-mafia,
anti-exploitation intervention and one that produces change. Future research disentangling
which factors are most effective at triggering anti-mafia reporting is needed to confirm or
reject this hypothesis.
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APPENDIX - Appendix to How Criminal Organizations
Expand to Strong States
A.1. Additional details on the contribution
The conditions for the expansion of criminal organizations to new areas is the topic of
investigation of the book by Federico Varese (2011). Pulling together evidence from seven
case studies of failed and successful transplantation, including two in northern Italy, Varese
finds that the unintended move of Mafiosi, the absence of other criminal groups and the
presence of new or booming markets in which mafias can provide private protection in
absence of the state are common to cases of successful expansion. The importance of the
move of Mafiosi, creating a supply of criminals, is confirmed in a number of studies, including
in the Italian case (Pinotti and Stanig, 2016; Scognamiglio, 2018; Sviatschi, 2018) and the
present paper will not delve into this aspect further. In examining the conditions allowing
for a successful establishment of organized crime, my study innovates over this seminal
contribution both methodologically and conceptually. First, instead of comparing across
case studies as in Varese (2011) or across provinces as in Buonanno and Pazzona (2014),
I use within-city and time variation comparing outcomes in 5900 cities over two decades
and using an identification strategy which accounts for the endogeneity of why certain
conditions take place in a certain set of cities. Second, I show that booming markets are
only relevant to the extent that they coincide with migration booms, an element which
has little role in Varese’s theory. Third and most importantly, while offering governance in
markets that states are unable to control is the activity Varese (2011) identifies as crucial
for transplantation, I contend that mafias expanded by offering cheap illegal labor to local
businessmen while protecting them from the prosecution of the state. The service provided
by expanding criminal groups is in some way the opposite than the service offered by
emerging criminals: they offered entrepreneurs protection from the state when businessmen
are hiring labor below market standards (a complement to a strong state), rather than
protection in place of a state unable to provide it publicly (a substitute to a weak state).
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A.2. Descriptive Statistics
I start by presenting a descriptive statistics table with all variables used in the analyses
(Table 45). Figures 25 and 26 map each source of data on the dependent variable individ-
ually. Differences in covariates balance between cities with and without mafia-related news
are reported in Table 16. Cities with at least one news related to mafia are on average
larger, have higher education, less analphabetism and less gender differentials in access to
education. They display similar levels of employment, but employ more people in industry
and agriculture than in services. They also differ in having less home owners but more
houses endowed with services. That cities with mafia-related news are larger on average
might reflect both the higher likelihood that mafias establish their presence in larger cities
(Dugato et al., 2019) and a higher likelihood of reporting events in larger cities. However,
while the mean population is larger in cities with mafia news, the median is much smaller
(6,016 inhabitants) and the range of cities in which we observe mafia-news is extremely
large, with mafia presence observed in the smallest city (32 inhabitants) and the standard
deviation of population in cities with at least one mafia-related news being 158,086. Addi-
tionally, a plot relating news per capita and population shows no positive relation between
the two (Figure 30). Finally, Figure 28 maps the number of news in the decade 1960-70,
before the scandal in Turin increased reporting about mafia in the region of Piedmont.
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics
N mean sd min max
Mafia Presence:
Mafia, news per capita 0.015 0.152 0.000 12.500
News selected by lasso 0.005 0.049 0.000 3.125
News selected by random forest 0.014 0.129 0.000 9.375
Assuming continuous presence 0.018 0.157 0.000 12.500
News mafia-crimes only 0.010 0.087 0.000 6.250
News winsorized 0.013 0.087 0.000 1.834
Mafia, t-1 0.002 0.051 0.000 5.093
Competition:
Emp Constr pc 0.000 1.000 -0.718 33.083
Z Emp Constr 0.000 1.000 -0.152 7.897
Z Emp C No leave out 0.0001 1 -0.152 7.57
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Constr Emp Growth since 1951 55.340 350.301 -18932 12747
Constr Emp Growth pc since 1951 0.052 0.536 -31.667 0.984
Above 10,000 inhab 1871 0.033 0.179 0.000 1.000
Migration:
Migr South pc -0.000 1.000 -0.742 4.248
Migr endog pop -0.000 1.000 -0.837 3.835
Z Migr South -0.000 1.000 -0.839 4.030
Z Migr Drought 0.000 1.000 -0.817 4.232
Z Migr No leave out 0.000 1.000 -0.738 4.722
Interaction:
Emp C x Migr -0.000 1.000 -0.419 48.547
Emp C x Migr endog pop 0.000 1.000 -0.471 42.311
Z Emp C x Migr -0.000 1.000 -0.134 30.179
Z Constr x Migr Drought 0.000 1.000 -0.139 24.628
Z Constr x Z Migr No leave out 0.000 1.000 -0.132 28.654
Controls:
Pop 1871 3076.261 8612.665 0.000 2910500
Pop 1871 x Growth (in 1000) 555859 1867916 0.000 82978060
Population 5901 45159 51 2781993
Family size 3.454 0.561 1.800 6.500
Pop density 207.010 395.286 1.000 9493.500
Gender educ differ 160.366 80.837 0.000 1337.000
Analphabetism 3.872 4.519 0.000 39.500
Emp Agric 9.955 5.606 0.000 85.000
Emp Industry 13.426 6.821 0.000 81.000
Emp Services 32.885 22.054 0.000 97.600
Emp Commerce 43.735 19.524 0.000 93.500
Property houses 64.044 18.067 2.600 100.000
With degree 3.601 2.190 0.000 20.700
Elderly Depend 20.127 8.124 5.700 89.300
Young Depend 31.377 7.837 5.000 76.000
House w services 51.773 28.438 0.000 100.000
Female Emp 50.195 6.515 25.000 86.200
Male Emp 26.036 10.382 1.900 85.800
Employment 74.827 6.099 39.400 98.500
Ratio male 98.964 7.571 55.500 243.400
Observations 11925
Politics:
DC vote share 0.309 0.251 0.000 0.992
Log total DC vote 6.108 1.635 0.000 13.393
Turnout 0.863 0.079 0.040 1.000
Berluconi vote share 0.078 0.126 0.000 0.750
Log tot Berlusconi vote 5.847 1.414 0.000 13.406
Lega Nord vote share 0.053 0.101 0.000 0.706
Mafia x Post 57 0.000 0.935 -27.131 19.430
114
Mafia x Post 62 0,000 0.901 -27.131 19.430
Observations 95392
Note: The letter Z indicates an instrumental variable. All inde-
pendent variables are considered in their zscores.
Figure 21: Mafia and construction employment over time, 1960-1980



































































































Table 16: Cities with and without mafia-related news, 1961-81
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No mafia news Mafia news Diff Mean Std Difference
Population -0.059 0.660 0.718 0.199
(0.110) (3.610) (0.035)
Pop density -0.055 0.806 0.861 0.325
(0.825) (2.513) (0.035)
Family size -0.264 -0.604 -0.340 -0.328
(0.811) (0.644) (0.026)
Analphabetism -0.172 -0.350 -0.178 -0.179
(0.816) (0.561) (0.026)
With degree 0.147 1.191 1.044 0.544
(0.925) (1.682) (0.033)
Gender educ differ -0.047 -0.101 -0.054 -0.048
(0.915) (0.654) (0.029)
Employment -0.423 -0.472 -0.050 -0.043
(0.877) (0.745) (0.028)
Female Emp -0.260 -0.307 -0.047 -0.041
(0.877) (0.731) (0.028)
Emp Agric 0.066 0.512 0.446 0.299
(1.006) (1.100) (0.033)
Emp Industry 0.225 0.944 0.719 0.417
(0.887) (1.481) (0.031)
Emp Services -0.236 -0.617 -0.381 -0.310
(0.879) (0.861) (0.029)
Emp Commerce 0.189 0.285 0.096 0.075
(0.935) (0.875) (0.030)
Share elderly 0.182 0.206 0.025 0.016
(1.108) (1.029) (0.036)
Elderly Depend 0.278 0.222 -0.056 -0.038
(1.051) (1.022) (0.034)
Young Depend -0.001 -0.261 -0.259 -0.194
(1.018) (0.863) (0.033)
Ratio male 0.019 -0.267 -0.286 -0.217
(0.987) (0.878) (0.032)
House w services 0.388 0.681 0.294 0.232
(0.923) (0.868) (0.030)
Property houses 0.208 -0.340 -0.548 -0.434
(0.895) (0.890) (0.029)
Inhab per room -0.067 0.050 0.117 0.030
(0.424) (3.836) (0.039)
Lack Services -0.388 -0.681 -0.294 -0.232
(0.923) (0.868) (0.030)
Observations 10,889 1,036 11,925
Note: All values are standardized
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Figure 24: Indicators of mafia presence mapped individually
Figure 25: Mafia-related news 1961-1981
Figure 26: Official mafia indicators 1990-2018
Note: The legend indicates the maximum number of episodes in a given municipality. The source
and time span of each indicator is discussed in Section 2.4.
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Figure 27: Construction employees and migrants from the south (per capita), 1950s
Note: The map on the left plots the population shares of employees in the construction sector in
1951; on the right, the population share of migrants coming from southern provinces in 1955. More
details on the data and their sources are included in Section 2.4.
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Figure 28: Number of mafia-related news in 1960-69
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Note: Mafia-related news per capita in all cities 1961-1981 against the log of population in 1961.
The loess curve describing the relation between the two variables is in blue.
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A.3. Interaction Effects, Diagnostic tests
To assess the validity of the linearity assumptions underlying the use of a linear model
(Equation 2.1), I consider a linear interaction diagnostic plot (Hainmueller et al., 2019).
This is a scatterplot of the independent variable on mafia-related news (both residualized
to account for city and decade fixed effects) in which a regression line assuming linearity is
super imposed on a non-linear loess curve. I perform this test using as independent vari-
able residualized construction employment (Figure 32) and the interaction of construction
employment and migration, both residualized (Figure 33). In all cases, I present results
also using binned data for visibility purposes. The same plot for construction is then repro-
duced by values of southern migration (low, medium, high) in Figure 35 and 36. The linear
regression line (in red, long dashes) and the non-linear curve (in blue, short dashes) do not
seem to considerably diverge across values of both construction and construction interacted
with migration, suggesting that linearity might be a good approximation. Looking at Fig-
ure 35 and Figure 36, we observe how for higher levels of migration, the relation between
construction and mafia becomes more positive.
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Figure 31: Linear Interaction Diagnostic Plot
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Note: The scatterplot in panel (a) represent the relation between construction employment and
mafia-related news per capita, both residulized to account for city and decade fixed effects. A linear
regression line is plotted in red and long dashes while a loess line is plotted in green with short
dashes. The same exercise is repeated in the panel on the right binning the data into 100 bins of
equal size for visibility purposes. In panel (b), the same plot is realized for the relation between the
interaction Construction x Migration and mafia-related news, both residualized.
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Figure 34: Linear Interaction Diagnostic Plot, by levels of Migration
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Note: The scatterplots in panel (a) represent the relation between construction employment and
mafia-related news per capita, both residulized to account for city and decade fixed effects, by
values of southern migration. A linear regression line is plotted in red and long dashes while a loess
line is plotted in green with short dashes. The same exercise is repeated in panel (b) binning the
data into 100 bins of equal size for visibility purposes.
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A.4. The Instrument for Construction
A.4.1. The Law on Regulatory Plan
Law 2359/1865, Capo VI established that cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants could
adopt a regulatory plan to manage the restoration of old buildings and design the future
development of the city. The plan could be adopted with a simple resolution from the City
Council after the approval of the Council for Public Works and it had a duration of 25 years.
Due to the city-specific nature of this plan and to this being the times of the Kingdom of
Italy, there is no full list of all cities that adopted it. The most complete source is a database
put together by the University of Milan cross-referencing information from three different
archives.1 It is, however, not exhaustive as each city adopted the act individually and not
all municipalities saved the acts from 1865 onwards. Of the 197 cities above threshold,
49 are listed in the database as having adopted a regulatory plan before 1942, but many
others could have adopted it and be missing in the database. Reassuringly, no city below
10,000 inhabitants is reported as having adopted a regulatory plan. Although cities which
surely adopted the plan (25%) tend to be larger on average (big cities have better historical
administrative records), the distribution of construction employment per capita looks fairly
similar to that of cities for which we do not know whether the plan was actually adopted.
Since the latter constitute 75% of the sample, we also observe larger variation in the range
of construction employee per capita in this subsample. Construction employment is lower
on average and also in the median in cities with no regulatory plan assignment (Table 17).
Law 2359/1865 stayed in place from 1865 to 1942, when a new construction law was ap-
proved removing the threshold of application of the regulatory plan and changing its charac-
teristics. In 1942 Italy was in the middle of WWII and not much construction development
took place until the end of the war, in April 1945. Between 1945 and 1950, most of the
construction activity taking place in Italy was aimed at the post-war reconstruction and
once this was completed, in the 1950s, the country entered in an economic boom. I hypoth-
esize that, after the removal of the law, cities which had been subject to a more regulated
1Rete Archivi Piani Urbanistici, http://www.rapu.it/
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urban development and which had therefore better and more homogeneously spread infras-
tructures in place to build new neighborhoods, experienced a larger growth in construction
from the 1950s.
Table 17: Distribution of construction 1961-71 in cities with and without regulatory plan
assignment
N mean sd min p1 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 max
No regulatory plan 11531 2.086 2.954 0.000 0.000 0.093 0.751 1.564 2.587 3.985 12.099 98.363
Reg plan, uncertain 294 2.094 1.019 0.262 0.352 1.068 1.513 2.016 2.561 3.101 5.167 11.365
Reg plan, certain 100 2.565 0.827 1.057 1.185 1.667 2.030 2.425 2.939 3.725 5.163 5.387
Note: The table shows the distribution of construction employment per capita in several percentiles
of the distribution for cities with absent, uncertain and certain adoption of the regulatory plan law.
A.4.2. Effect of the threshold on construction employment (RDD)
I test the hypothesis that at the start of the economic boom in the late 1950s, cities which
developed according to a regulatory plan were in a better position to expand further thanks
to having more homogeneously spread infrastructures already in place using a regression
discontinuity design in which population in 1871 (the first census after the approval of the
law) is the running variable. In particular:
Yit = ζ0 + ηCi + θ(Pop1871− 10, 000)i + κC(Pop1871− 10, 000)i + λi (A.1)
where Yi is construction employment growth and C is the cutoff at which the law applies
(10,000 inhabitants). Growth in construction employment for t=[1961,1971] is calculated
as the change in the number of construction employees from time zero (1951, pre-boom) to
time t . Standard errors clustered at the city level are included in all specifications.
Having developed according to the regulatory plan causes an increase in construction em-
ployment growth at the threshold equal to 99 employees (Figure 4 and Table 18, Col 1),
doubling the mean number of construction employee in a city. A similar effect can be
seen on the growth of construction employees over total employees (Col 2). This effect is
only present during the years of the boom and not before, as shown by the null effect on
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construction in 1951, before the boom started (Figure 38 and Table 18, Column 3). This
suggests that the plan produced no anticipation effects and that it is the start of the con-
struction boom that triggered a difference in construction employment across cities which
had and had not adopted a regulatory plan. Additionally, the advantage in construction
growth gained by these cities is temporary and disappears in 1981 (Figure 38 and Table 18,
Column 4). This is consistent with the effect we would expect from the regulatory plan: in
the beginning, after removal of the law, cities which developed according to the plan have
a slight advantage because of better spread infrastructures. Two decades after the start
of the boom, this advantage disappears and cities which had been exposed to regulated
development in the nineteenth century look the same as those that did not.
The effect of the regulatory plan law is absent if we consider as placebo any other population
thresholds at which the law does not apply (Table 19 and Figure 40). There is no sorting
of cities at the cutoff (Figure 39) and, to the best of my knowledge, no other discontinuous
change happened at the 10,000 inhabitant threshold at the time in which the law was passed.
Table 18: Effect of the regulatory plan on growth in construction employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Constr Emp ∆ Share Constr ∆ Constr Emp Constr Emp
1961, 1971 Emp, 1961, 1971 1951 (before) 1981 (after)
RD Estimate 99.58 0.0288 -7.004 57.84
(45.42) (0.0145) (48.20) (60.04)
Observations 1434 658 387 878
Robust p-value 0.0231 0.0589 0.804 0.283
Polyn. order 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 5551 3713 4050 5958
Outcome mean 100 0.0483 118.7 164.6
Note: Results from RDD specified in Equation A.1, capturing the effect of the regulatory plan
in place between 1865 and 1942 (for cities above 10,000 inhabitants) on growth in construction
employment. In Column 1 the dependent variable is the absolute change in number of employed
in construction in 1961 and 1971, while in Columns 2, I consider the change as a share of total
employment. In Column 3 I perform a test on the levels of construction before the start of the boom,
in 1951, showing no anticipation effect. In Column 4 I consider growth in construction employment
in 1981, after the boom. Robust bias-corrected standard errors as developed in Calonico, Cattaneo
and Titiunik (2014) are reported in parentheses.
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Note: Panel (a) plots the regression discontinuity specified in Equation A.1, capturing the effect of
the removal of a regulatory plan in place between 1865 and 1942 (for cities above 10,000 inhabitants)
on growth in construction employment in 1961 and 1971. In the top panel the dependent variable
is the change in number of employed in construction, while in the bottom panel, I consider the
change as a share of total employment. The panels on the left consider a first order polynomial, the
panels on the right a flexible polynomial. In Panel (b), I plot the results of the same estimation on
construction in 1951 (before the boom in construction) and after, in 1981. Corresponding results

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A particularly important condition for this law to be exploited as an instrument for con-
struction is showing that the discontinuity impacted construction employment growth in
the future, but not other outcomes which might have been affected by the adoption of
a regulatory plan and also have an effect on mafia presence. For example, one could be
concerned that regulating the development of the city might have resulted into different
population growth patterns and that this change, rather than the effect on construction,
is what drives the effect on mafia presence. In other words, it needs to be shown that the
exclusion restriction is not violated. I test the effect of the threshold on all the 20 variables
present in the census, including population and houses characteristics and employment in-
formation (Table 20 and Table 21). The threshold had no lasting effect on any of these
covariates, including population size and density, housing indicators - such as number of
private houses and presence of basic services in the houses - and it also had no effect on
education, employment and sectoral employment. Additionally, it can be shown that the
threshold also had no effect on covariates in 1951 (Table 22 and Table 23). The only census
indicator that is different across the threshold is the size of families in 1951 - likely a ran-
dom difference, given the number of indicators we are testing, and given that significance
disappears in the following decades.
As a final test of the validity of the regulatory plan as an instrument for construction, I
show that this threshold has no effect on migration from the south nor on migration in
general (Figure 41; Table 24). While producing a discontinuous increase in construction
employment, this law did not determine such a large increase in construction that it at-
tracted a disproportional higher number of migrants in cities right above the cutoff. As a
result, what we are capturing considering this threshold is only the increase in construction
employment, and not a consequential increase in migration, population, economic activity
nor any other measurable covariate in this time period.
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Table 20: Effect of threshold on covariates 1961-1981 (population and education)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Population Family Pop Gender educ Analpha- Large Educated With Elderly Young
size density differ abetism families young degree Depend Depend
RD Estimate 3,994 0.142 119.7 1.240 1.394 0.751 0.140 0.443 -0.877 1.641
(2,871) (0.0988) (117.9) (3.989) (0.951) (0.893) (0.779) (0.714) (1.155) (1.430)
Observations 1437 702 927 1536 705 500 644 1518 1485 798
Robust p-value 0.213 0.148 0.393 0.973 0.194 0.412 0.962 0.629 0.541 0.232
Polyn. order 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 4596 2912 3489 4821 2924 3084 3604 4794 4726 3193
Outcome mean 11014 3.311 289.7 134.9 4.130 6.831 4.846 6.794 21.55 29.16
Note: The Table shows results from estimation of Equation A.1 estimating the effect of the adoption
of a regulatory plan at the 10,000 inhabitants population cutoff. In this case, dependent variables
are covariates from the Census on which no effect is expected.
Table 21: Effect of threshold on covariates 1961-81 (employment and housing)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Emp Emp Emp Emp Female 2 Property Pop in Crowded Improper House w
Agric Industr Services Commerce Emp houses poverty houses houses services
RD Estimate -0.531 0.899 -0.258 0.306 3.923 0.379 1.187 0.940 0.317 -0.159
(1.170) (2.159) (3.301) (3.196) (3.444) (3.498) (0.864) (0.614) (0.508) (3.430)
Observations 879 1074 1922 1209 726 702 624 522 1678 873
Robust p-value 0.655 0.635 0.856 0.918 0.189 0.700 0.235 0.175 0.475 0.855
Polyn. order 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 3374 3908 5312 4134 2983 2891 3522 3171 5870 3362
Outcome mean 12603 19.06 24.78 45.29 27.48 56.54 6.220 3.492 0.236 67.02
Note: The Table shows results from estimation of Equation A.1 estimating the effect of the adoption
of a regulatory plan at the 10,000 inhabitants population cutoff. In this case, dependent variables
are covariates from the Census on which no effect is expected.
Table 22: Effect of threshold on covariates 1951 (population and education)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Population Family Pop Gender educ Analpha- With Elderly Young
size density differ betism degree Depend Depend
RD Estimate 1,219 0.656 41.61 9.325 2.752 -0.190 -0.297 1.377
(1,415) (0.250) (78.50) (9.487) (1.988) (0.406) (0.567) (1.808)
Observations 410 188 327 352 258 717 655 354
Robust p-value 0.521 0.00799 0.748 0.414 0.197 0.552 0.752 0.381
Polyn. order 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 4219 2488 3680 3878 3165 5545 5375 3897
Outcome mean 10776 4.239 250.2 158.5 9.385 2.551 12.88 30.23
Note: The Table shows results from estimation of Equation A.1 estimating the effect of the adoption
of a regulatory plan at the 10,000 inhabitants population cutoff. In this case, dependent variables are
covariates from the Census on which no effect is expected. Some of the variables in tables 1961-81
were absent in 1951.
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Table 23: Effect of threshold on covariates 1951 (employment and housing)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Emp Emp Emp Emp Female Property House w
Agric Industr Services Commerce Emp houses services
RD Estimate -0.191 -0.579 2.077 -1.210 1.360 -3.212 -0.838
(1.437) (1.894) (5.496) (4.322) (2.255) (3.837) (3.804)
Observations 237 370 580 413 404 447 270
Robust p-value 0.924 0.844 0.799 0.833 0.380 0.699 0.643
Polyn. order 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth 2926 3987 5094 4257 4148 4418 3244
Outcome mean 12192 9.220 50.71 31.36 12.01 41.87 16.08
Note: The Table shows results from estimation of Equation A.1 estimating the effect of the adoption
of a regulatory plan at the 10,000 inhabitants population cutoff. In this case, dependent variables are
covariates from the Census on which no effect is expected. Some of the variables in tables 1961-81
were absent in 1951.
Table 24: Effect of threshold on migration in 1961-71
(1) (2) (3)
N migrants Share migrants Share migrants
south 1961-71 south 1961-71 all regions 1961-71
RD Estimate 682.9614 0.0026 0.0111
(1,986.043) (0.019) (0.039)
Observations 1006 676 764
Robust p-value 0.756 0.992 0.839
Polyn. order 1 1 1
Bandwidth 4766 3814 4038
Outcome mean 4166 0.0718 0.284
Note: The Table shows results from estimation of Equation A.1 estimating the effect of the adoption
of a regulatory plan at the 10,000 inhabitants population cutoff on migration from the south (absolute
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Figure 39: McCrary test, cutoff for the regulatory plan adoption at 10,000
Note: McCrary test of the density of the running variable (population 1871) at the cutoff of 10,000
inhabitants. A manipulation test using the local polynomial density estimators proposed in Cattaneo
et al. (2018) shows that there is no statistical evidence of systematic manipulation of the running























Figure 40: Placebo at other thresholds
Note: Results from estimation of Equation A.1 capturing the effect of the adoption of a
regulatory plan on growth in construction employment at other population cutoff than the
one at which the law applies (10,000 inhabitants, in red). The cutoff at 14,000 inhabitants
is significant at 10%, the others are all insignificant. The cutoff 17,000 inhabitants is the













































































Figure 41: Effect of threshold on migration in 1961-71
Note: RDD estimates of Equation A.1 using as dependent variable the number of southern migrants
(fig upper-left), the population share of migrants from the south (fig upper-right) and the population
share of migrants from all region (fig in the bottom) in 1961-71. Corresponding results are reported
in Table 24.
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A.4.3. Graphical example of the instrument for construction
I provide a graphical example of the instrument for construction using the first city to
adopt a regulatory plan according to the Law 2359/1865, Firenze, and another large city in
the same region which at the time had only 5000 inhabitants, Grosseto (Figure 42). The
instrument predicts employment in construction in Firenze simply by tracing the evolution
of construction employment growth at the national level. In Firenze, employment per
capita in each decade was slightly larger than the national level growth in employment,
but the trend followed by the two quantities is similar. As Grosseto was below the 10,000
inhabitants discontinuity, instead, the instrument will return a zero predicted employment.
The difference between cities assigned to adopt a regulatory plan or not is thus the only
cross-sectional variation used in the instrument, while time variation is considered only at
the national level. As explained in Section 2.5.1, I also control for the interaction between
population in 1871 and growth in construction at the national level to further account for
the possibility that (i) cities with larger population grow more and (ii) the effect of the
regulatory plan on construction might be larger in bigger cities.
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Firenze (above 10,000)
Note: The figure plots actual (solid line) and predicted (dashed line) construction employment per
capita in a city below (Grosseto, on the left, in red) and above (Firenze, on the right, in blue) the
discontinuity.
A.5. Graphical example of the instrument for migration
In this section, I provide a practical representation of how the shift-share instrument predicts
migration using an example from two provinces of origin (Palermo and Naples) and three
provinces receiving migration in Tuscany (Grosseto, Florence and Lucca).
While large numbers of migrants departed from all provinces in the south, migration from
the Palermo province declined in the 1980s, when the oil crises reduced the economic devel-
opment and the employment opportunities in the North. At the same time, Neapolitans’
kept migrating at increasing rates. This pattern is reflected in the way values of migra-
tion and total immigration at destination are predicted. In Grosseto, for example, the
initial number of migrants from both origins was similar, with a slightly larger cluster of
Neapolitan settlers. However, in line with the national trends, the flows of Palermitans
decreased in the 1980s while the Neapolitans kept moving to Grosseto at high rates. Total
predicted migration in this province is thus the result of (i) the initial settlers from Naples
and Palermo and (ii) the national shock in migration for both groups. In Florence, instead,
the initial community of Palermitans was much larger and kept increasing at higher rates
than that of Neapolitans. However, after the 1970s, migration from Palermo declined to
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Palermo Naples
Lucca
Note: The figure reports the actual and predicted number of migrants from Palermo and Naples
who moved to 3 Provinces in Tuscany (Grosseto, Firenze and Lucca) in the period of observation
(1955-1980). Predicted values are obtained from the shift-share instrument discussed in Section 2.5.1.
the point that flows from Palermo and Naples converged to almost the same amount. Pre-
dicted migration in Florence in 1980 is thus the result of migrants from both origins in
almost equal amounts. In Lucca, instead, the initial number of migrants from Palermo and
Florence was very similar. Also in this case, in 1980 migration from Palermo hits a stop
and, from following each other in parallel, estimates of migration diverge. As discussed in
Section 2.5.1, the shift-share instrument exploits (i) cross-sectional variation in the initial
shares of migrants living the center and north in 1955 (ii) time variation caused by changes
in the number of migrants from each sending region at the national level in each subsequent
year (1961-1971).
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A.6. Instrumental Variable Identifying Assumptions
This section discusses the identifying assumptions underlying the validity of the instrumen-
tal variable approach that were not already examined in the text.
I start by plotting the relation between the instruments and the variables they predict in
Figure 44 and 45. While the first Figure simply plots one variable against the other, the
second plots the actual and fitted values for each instrument regression on the independent
variable, showing a positive and monotonic effect of each instrument on the respective
variable.
Section 2.5.1 and A.4.2 discuss in detail the exogeneity assumption for the construction
instrument. For the migration instrument, I follow the recent literature on the Shift-Share
Instrument (Jaeger et al., 2018) and rely on an exogenous source of variation in migration
flows caused by drought severity shocks in the south. In Figure 46 and Table 25, I document
a positive correlation between drought severity in the south of Italy and outmigration to
different provinces. This relation is used as an exogenous shock to predict migration flows
in the instrument for migration. Table 26, shows first stage results for all instruments
when using exogenous shocks produced by drought severity as predictors for migration.
Finally, Table 27 presents results from the procedure suggested by Borusyak et al. (2019)
to demonstrate the equivalence between shift-share and shock-level coefficients, so that
conventional standard errors of the IV can be considered as valid. Both considering decade
only (Column 1 and 2) and decade-province fixed effects (Column 3 and 4), the estimated
coefficient across standard and shock-level shift share is unchanged.
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Predicted Constr x Migr
Note: Actual (y-axis) and predicted (x-axis) values of construction employment per capita, southern
migration per capita and their interaction. Each point is obtained from regressing the instrument
on the correspondent actual value after partialling out decade and city fixed effects and clustering
standard errors at the city level. The dotted line shows the regression coefficients from a linear
regression of each DV on the predicted values, as in Table 2.
Table 25: Effect of drought severity on number of migrants
(1) (2)
N Migr N Migr
1961 1971






Note: Correlation between drought severity (Van der Schrier et al., 2006) and
the number of migrants in years 1961 and 1971, OLS estimates.
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Instrument for Constr x Migr
Note: Regressors (y-axis) and their respective instruments (x-axis) as scatterplots (panel above) and
binning data (panel below). In the scatterplot, the linear regression line in blue is overlapped to a
loess curve. In the binned plot, the dashed line represents the linear regression line. In the binned
plot, I control for population in 1871 interacted with construction growth at the national level (as
in the analyses).
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Drought Severity Index 1971
Note: Correlation between the index of drought severity in the south of Italy in 1961 (left) and 1971
(right) (Van der Schrier et al., 2006) and number of migrants from those provinces in the same years.
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Table 26: First Stage, Drought as push factor for migration
(1) (2) (3)
Emp Constr Migr South Emp Constr
per capita per capita x Migr South
Z Constr Emp 0.021 0.020 0.009
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
Z for Migr Drought -0.097 0.712 0.299
(0.021) (0.015) (0.037)
Z Constr x Migr Drought -0.008 0.010 0.046
(0.017) (0.038) (0.016)
Observations 11,926 11,926 11,926
Number of cities 5,963 5,963 5,963
City, Decade FE Yes Yes Yes
SW F-Stat 17.38 11.96 7.820
A-R Wald test 22 22 22
Mean DV 0 0 0
Note: First stage of the instrumental variable approach described in Section 2.5.1
using an alternative instrument for migration, predicting the flows of migrants
using as exogenous push factor drought severity in Southern Italy.
Table 27: Standard and shock-level shift-share estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard Shock-level Standard Shock-level
Mig South 8.051 8.051 4.704 4.704
(115.7) (241.1) (17.51) (39.65)
Observations 198 81 198 81
Decade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE No No Yes Yes
Sum of shares x Decade Yes No Yes No
Note: Estimates of the effect of migration on news per capita using the standard
and the shock-level version of the shift-share instrument, with decade only (Col
1,2) and decade-province fixed effects (Col 3,4).
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A.7. Main Results, Robustness
I start the robustness tests by considering alternative definitions of mafia presence that
account for the possibility that we only observe mafias where those are weakest and less
able to conceal their presence. I exploit indicators of mafia-presence existing from 1990
onwards which (i) have different sources of reporting (local, national, different institutions,
NGOs), reducing the probability that we only observe mafias where they are incapable to
corrupt the institutions, and (ii) capture several dimensions of mafias’ activity, from violence
to infiltration into the economy.2 I obtain a closer mapping between mafia-related news and
official indicators of mafia presence by considering only those types of news which a lasso
procedure and a random forest algorithm select as best predictors of official mafia presence.
Results are robust using both methods and presented in the first two columns of Table 28,
SI. A related concern is that in places with more construction and southern migration, there
might be just more talking about the possibility that mafias will expand thanks to their
activity of labor racketeering. This is not what was happening: as mentioned, institutions
acknowledged mafia expansion much later, starting from the mid 1990s. In fact, if I drop
from the sample all news related to labor racketeering, all news including the word mafia or
’Ndrangheta and I only consider news of typical mafia-related crimes (extortion, kidnapping,
drug trafficking, vote buying), results are still positive and significant. I then account for
the possibility that the absence of news related to mafia in a specific decade is due not to
absence of mafias, but rather to mafias’ capacity to hide their presence after being detected.
I replace all zero values following a positive with the positive value recorded in the previous
time period, thus assuming that mafia is present but unobserved. If this assumption is
imposed, the effect on mafia presence is very similar in size and significance as the main
result. Another possible worry is that more news could be reported in the region of Piedmont
just because this is where the newspaper is located. However, a placebo test shows that
using news at t−1 as dependent variable, the effect on mafia is negative, small and close to
2As described in the data section, those indicators are the city-level number of goods, properties and firms
seized to mafias, the number of city-councils dissolved due to mafia infiltration, the number of mafia-related
homicides and an indicator for whether the judiciary assessed the presence of a permenent ’Ndrangheta cell
(‘locale’) in a city.
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insignificant. Results are also similar when winsorizing the dependent variable to account
for the possibility that outliers determine the findings and when adopting a logarithmic
transformations to account for the skew of the dependent variable towards zero. All results
discussed in this section are presented in Table 28, SI.
In Table 29, SI, I test the robustness of results to variations in the instruments and in the
specification. First, I show robustness to using an instrument that predicts migration flows
using the severity of drought in the south of Italy. In Col 2, I restrict the sample to the
optimal bandwidth selected by the RDD for construction. I then modify the instrument for
construction to only interact the dummy for being above 10,000 inhabitants to national level
growth, without subtracting the contribution of the city. I repeat the same procedure on the
instrument for migration and consider a specification in which all instruments include the
contribution of city i or province p to national growth. I test the robustness of the findings
to clustering standard errors at the provincial level, which is the level of aggregation of the
migration variable. I also show robustness to normalizing migration for the endogenous
current population, rather than for population at time zero, before the migration boom.
Finally, I consider a specification in which the regions of Abruzzo and Molise, which are
considered as part of southern Italy according to some definitions, are included as southern
regions. Results are very similar, suggesting that cities in these regions do not drive the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.8. Characterizing the results
What type of competition? The demand for cheap unskilled labor in the construction
sector could have emerged as a result of two types of competition: (1) competition to
hire employees (market tightness) and (2) competition between incumbent and entrant
companies in the construction sector. The service mafias offered would have been needed in
either case, as a direct help in employing workers at low cost in the first case, as a resource
to gain a competitive edge over entrants in the second.
While my theory of mafia expansion is compatible with both types of competition, it is an
empirical question which of the two channels prevailed in the context of center and northern
Italy. I repeat the main analysis replacing employment in construction per capita with the
number of firms in the construction sector per capita. An increase in the population share
of construction companies in a city might mean that incumbent companies are facing a
larger number of entrants, if the number of projects stays constant.3 The same Bartik-type
instrumental variable approach used for employment is adopted for the number of firms.
While the Anderson Rubin test for joint weakness of the instruments rejects irrelevance,
the individual SW F-statistic is rather low (SW F=7.4).
Table 30, compares results from the main analysis on employment (Column 1) to those
obtained using the number of firms as independent variable (Column 2). The coefficient
capturing the effect of construction and migration when we consider an increase in firms per
capita is negative and insignificant. This finding suggests that, in this context, competition
for hiring unskilled workers created a demand for cheap unskilled labor and allowed mafia
expansion, rather than competition against new entrants. Results are in line with qualita-
tive evidence suggesting that the primary difficulty for construction companies was finding
employees to hire at low cost and whenever they needed, rather than beating competitors.
Intentionality of mafias’ move: As mentioned in the theory section, this chapter studies
where criminal groups expand, conditional on moving. But why did criminals leave the
3Data on the number of construction projects per city in this period are unfortunately unavailable.
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south in the first place and where did they decide to relocate? Evidence from the work of
Varese (2011) and Pinotti and Stanig (2016) shows that the initial move of Italian mafia
members towards north was largely caused by the policy of forced resettlement and thus
unintentional, both in the decision to move and in the choice of where to relocate. Still,
another part of population of mafiosi might have relocated intentionally and chose to go
exactly where they thought they would be able to relocate: where migration from the south
and employment in constructions were high.
While this is possible and compatible with the theory, we should observe at least a cor-
relation between construction employment, migration from the south and mafia presence.
Instead, OLS regression results show no significant correlation between these two variables
and mafia presence. For intentionality to have played a role, we must assume that mafia
members targeted not the cities with larger construction, but rather the cities in which
construction was marginally higher due to the application of the regulatory plan law be-
tween 1865 and 1942, and that they went not where many southern migrants lived but
where in the past initial colonies of settlers from the south had established their residency.
While intentionality of mafia move would not constitute a contradiction to the theory of
organized crime expansion, empirical evidence suggests that, at least in this case, mafias
decision of where to move might have been dictated by a variety of factors - perhaps also
including where migration and constructions were high, although not systematically - and
then expansion happened to be successful where an exchange with locals took place thanks
to incentives provided by competition and the availability of migrants.
Resettled mafia members: A related question is whether the resettlement of mafia-
members has a differential impact on the probability that mafias expand in cities with
high construction and southern migration levels. I import information on how many mafia-
members were forcibly relocated to each northern province from the reports of the Par-
liamentary Commission against Mafia, 1976. I then subset the estimates for whether a
province received more than zero, more than median or more than the 75th percentile of
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Table 30: Competition for hiring vs competition against entrants
(1) (2)
Mafia Mafia
Emp Constr pc -0.169
(0.052)
Migr South pc -0.032 0.056
(0.017) (0.057)
Emp Constr x Migr South 0.098
(0.041)
Firm Constr pc -0.067
(0.022)
Firm Constr x Migr South -0.030
(0.056)
Observations 11,926 11,926
Number of cities 5,963 5,963
City, Decade FE Yes Yes
SW F-Stat 81.70 7.400
A-R Wald test 28.10 28
Mean DV 0.0150 0.0150
Note: The table compares the main analyses (Col 1) with a specification replac-
ing construction employment per capita with the number of firms per capita
(Column 2). City and decade fixed effects are included in all estimates, together
with a control for the interaction of population in 1871 (determining the assign-
ment of the regulatory plan) and growth in construction employment. Standard
errors are clustered at the city level.
forcibly relocated mafiosi (Table 31). The effect of construction and migration tends to
become larger as the number of resettled mafiosi increases. This indicates that, although
more mafia members might have facilitated transplantation, the theory of mafia expansion
documented in this chapter is unlikely to be dependent by mafia members already being
present in places in which migration or construction was larger. Results are also replicated
for each different number of forcibly-resettled mafia members in a province and are included
in Figure 47.
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Figure 47: Effect on mafia presence depending on how many resettled mafia-members are




























N Resettled mafia members
Table 31: Effect on mafia presence depending on number of forcibly resettled mafia members
in a province
(1) (2) (3)
Forcibly resettled Forcibly resettled Forcibly resettled
mafiosi > 0 mafiosi > 50pc mafiosi > 75pc
Emp Constr pc -0.132 -0.174 -0.238
(0.037) (0.060) (0.100)
Migr South pc -0.033 -0.042 -0.065
(0.015) (0.021) (0.031)
Emp Constr x Migr South 0.117 0.137 0.179
(0.042) (0.062) (0.077)
Observations 10,384 5,958 2,732
Number of cities 5,192 2,979 1,366
City, Decade FE Yes Yes Yes
SW F-Stat 77.36 45.65 41.85
A-R Wald test 33.60 33.60 19.60
Note: Results of the main specification (Equation 2.1) by number of forcibly resettled mafia mem-
bers in the province. I consider whether their number is larger than 0 in Col 1, larger than the
50th percentile (n=35) in Col 2, larger than the 75th percentile (n=48) in Col 3.)
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A.9. Effect on politics
A.9.1. Identifying assumptions
To estimate the effect of mafia presence on politics, I adopt an instrumented difference-
in-difference design, combining a canonical IV (instrumenting mafia presence) and a DiD
(comparing infiltrated cities before and after mafia arrival). The identification assumptions
are the same as those necessary for an IV and for a DiD.
First, it is assumed that the only way the instrument affects the outcome is through the
treatment, conditional on covariates. In this case, the combination of the shift-share in-
strument for migration and the instrument for construction should only affect vote share
through mafia presence. I control for predicted employment in construction and migration
from the south in each regression to partial out their direct effect on mafia presence, as well
as for city and year fixed characteristics, in every regression.
Second, we assume that the instrument at time 1 only affects the treatment from time 1
onwards and not at time zero. In this case, this assumption is easily met as our treatment
(mafia presence) was zero in all time periods before period 1 (1958).
Third, as in every difference in difference design, we assume that trends in outcome before
the treatment period starts are parallel. I provide evidence for this assumption in Table 32,
Column 1. The insignificant coefficient for 1948 suggests that cities with and without mafia
only starts becoming significantly different in terms of vote share for the DC from 1958
onwards, when the boom in migration and construction starts. When we look at trends in
voting before the arrival of mafias using mafia presence not instrumented (i.e. not quasi-
randomly assigned), we see that trends are instead not parallel (Table 32, Column 2). The
vote share of the DC starts increasing already before the arrival of mafia in cities which
will be in the future infiltrated, a pattern which might suggest that mafias established in
these cities endogenously, due to a larger presence of the Christian Democracy. Using an
instrumented DiD design accounts for this endogeneity issue.
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Table 32: Parallel trends in voting pre-mafia arrival
(1) (2)
DC vote share (Mafia predicted) DC vote share (Mafia news)
Year = 1948 0.064 0.064
(0.001) (0.001)
Year = 1958 0.023 0.022
(0.001) (0.001)
Year = 1963 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
Year = 1968 0.003 0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
Year = 1972 0.035 0.033
(0.004) (0.004)
Year = 1976 0.007 0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Year = 1979 -0.003 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Year = 1983 -0.052 -0.054
(0.004) (0.004)
Year = 1987 -0.054 -0.056
(0.004) (0.004)
Year = 1992 -0.144 -0.146
(0.004) (0.004)
Mafia x 1948 0.001 0.022
(0.002) (0.006)
Mafia x 1958 0.005 0.013
(0.001) (0.006)
Mafia x 1963 0.006 0.014
(0.002) (0.005)
Mafia x 1968 0.010 0.004
(0.002) (0.005)
Mafia x 1972 0.012 0.001
(0.002) (0.008)
Mafia x 1976 0.012 0.013
(0.002) (0.006)
Mafia x 1979 0.018 0.005
(0.003) (0.006)
Mafia x 1983 0.016 -0.007
(0.003) (0.007)
Mafia x 1987 0.015 -0.004
(0.003) (0.008)
Mafia x 1992 0.021 0.005
(0.004) (0.012)
Observations 62,871 62,870
Number of cities 5,962 5,961
City FE Yes Yes
Election Year FE Yes Yes
Note: The table includes coefficients from the DiD regression in Equation 2.4 interacting
Mafia with year dummies. Mafia is the average predicted mafia presence in a city (from IV)
in Col 1 and average news per capita in Col 2.
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A.9.2. Additional results on politics
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Table 33: Effect of predicted mafia presence on Communist and Socialist Party vote share
1948-1992 (DiD)
(1) (2)
Vote share Left Log total Left vote
Mafia x Post 57 -0.002* 0.005
(0.001) (0.008)
Observations 62,881 62,694
Number of cities 5,962 5,962
City FE Yes Yes
Election Year FE Yes Yes
Mean DV 0.249 6.427
Note: Results from the DiD in Equation 2.4, estimating the effect
of mafia presence (predicted from IV estimates) on vote for the
Communist and Socialist Party after mafia-arrival (Post 1957).
In Col 1 I consider the vote share and in Col 2 the log of total
votes controlling for city population. Controls for construction
employment, southern migration and their interaction (predicted
from IV estimates), city and year fixed effects are included. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the city level.
Table 34: Effect of predicted mafia presence on DC Vote Share, robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DC share Log tot votes DC share Log tot votes
Use 1962 Use 1962 No controls No controls
as post as post migr, constr migr, constr
Mafia x Post 62 0.012 0.029
(0.002) (0.007)
Mafia x Post 57 0.012 0.019
(0.002) (0.006)
Observations 62,870 62,784 62,870 62,784
Number of cites 5,961 5,961 5,961 5,961
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Election Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table provides robustness tests of Table 5. In Col 1 and 2, I consider as
Post the period after 1962 instead of 1957. In Col 3 and 4, I remove controls for mi-
gration and employment in the construction sector. All regressions include city and
year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Table 35: Effect of other covariates on DC vote share 1953-1992
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DCshare DCshare DCshare DCshare DCshare DCshare
Population -0.000
(0.000)
















Emp x Post 0.001
(0.000)
Without property house -0.002
(0.000)
Wo Property x Post -0.000
(0.000)
Observations 62,877 62,876 62,876 62,876 62,876 62,876
Number of cities 5,963 5,962 5,962 5,962 5,962 5,962
City Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table replicates the specification in Equation 2.4 and the results in Table 5 replacing the
treatment (mafia presence) with other covariates which characterize the differences between cities with
and without mafia presence.
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APPENDIX - Appendix to The Electoral Effects of Fighting
Migrants’ Exploitation
B.1. Descriptive Statistics
Figure 48: Localities reached by the union (2007-2015)
155
Table 36: Political parties in each group
Far-Right Center-Right Center-Left Far-Left
Alleanza Lombarda Nuovo Psi (2001, 2006) Alleanza Democratica Comunisti Italiani
Alternativa Sociale Abolizione Scorporo Alleanza Democrativa Democrazia Atea
Alternativa Sociale Alleanza Nazionale Centro Democratico La Rete
Azione Sociale Ambienta-Lista Civica Popolare Lorenzin La Sinistra L’Arcobaleno
Blocco Nazionale Cantiere Popolare (2013) Cristiano Sociali Liberi E Uguali
per le liberta’
Casapound Centro Cristiano Democratico Democratici Cristiani Uniti
Destra Nazionale Centro Democratico Cristiano Democratici Di Sinistra Nuova Sinistra
Die Freiheitlichen Forza Italia Democratici Sinistra della Valle D’Aosta
Fiamma Tricolore Fratelli D’Italia Democrazia Cristiana (2006) Nuova Sinistra Unita
Forza Nuova Futuro E Liberta’ Federazione Laburista (1996) Smaller far-left parties
Fronte Nazionale Grande Sud (2013) Girasole Per Una Sinistra Rivoluzionaria
Grande Nord Il Popolo Della Famiglia Italia Dei Valori (2006, 2008) Potere Al Popolo
Grande Sud Intesa Popolare (2013) Italia Europa Insieme Proletaria
Italia Agli Italiani Liberal Democratici (2008) Lega Autonomia Veneta Rifondazione Comunista
La Destra Liberi Per Una Italia Equa Lega Consumatori (2006) Rivoluzione Civile
Lega Mir - Moderati In Rivoluzione Lega Pensionati (2006) Sardigna Natzione
Lega Alpina Lumbarda Moderati In Rivoluzione (2013) Liberal Democratici Europei Sinistra Critica
Lega Angela Bossi Nuovo Psi (2001, 2006) Liberali Per L’Italia Sinistra Ecologia Liberta’
Lega Nord Partito Pensionati Liga Fronte Veneto (2006) Verdi
Lega Per L’Autonomia Partito Repubblicano Lista Consumatori
Italiano (2001, 2006)
Lega Sud Partito Socialista (2001, 2006) Lista Dini
Movimento Per Pensionati Uniti L’Ulivo
L’Autonomia
Movimento Sociale Popolo Della Liberta’ Margherita
Movimento Sociale Italiano Riformisti Italiani Mastella (2006)
Mussolini Sos Italia Paese Nuovo
Rifondazione Missina UDC E Democratici Di Centro Partito Democratico
Terzo Polo Unione Democratici Cristiani Partito Pensionati (2006)
Partito Popolare Italiano








Rete - Movimento Democratico
Rinnovamento
Rinnovamento Democratico







Table 37: Balance in full (F) and matched (M) sample
Control Control Treat Std Diff Std Diff
Full Match F vs T M vs T
Variables for match
Employed in agriculture 9.146 21.005 18.598 0.643 -0.126
(8.543) (14.797) (11.968)
Employed Unskilled 18.440 24.120 23.483 0.434 -0.045
(7.424) (11.135) (8.930)
Unemployed 10.122 17.474 18.290 0.928 0.074
(6.402) (9.232) (6.034)
Foreign population 577.39 346.30 311.53 -0.53 -0.08
(421.24) (341.30) (274.19)
Union members 0.023 0.039 0.049 0.820 0.202
per capita 2006 (0.024) (0.028) (0.021)
Analphabetism 1.199 2.798 2.620 0.693 -0.071
(1.438) (2.030) (1.464)
Population density 294.8 463.3 628.9 0.204 0.091
(623.8) (1,004) (1,512)
Population 7089 62149 47751 0.282 -0.037
(38030) (366805) (139280)
Other covariates
City Surface 9.973 9.913 9.597 -0.018 -0.014
(13.441) (16.645) (16.049)
Share males 97.147 96.981 95.426 -0.238 -0.243
(6.398) (5.430) (3.369)
Elderly dependence 35.933 33.382 28.087 -0.544 -0.367
(12.300) (12.304) (7.513)
Young dependence 20.374 21.273 22.499 0.394 0.201
(3.899) (4.809) (3.730)
Index old people 195.352 174.140 132.959 -0.406 -0.368
(141.794) (95.043) (59.051)
Share divorced 4.669 3.044 2.832 -0.776 -0.103
(2.027) (1.668) (1.221)
Foreign pop minors 210.580 184.350 194.798 -0.159 0.109
(81.522) (77.505) (56.915)
Foreign italian couples 25.308 19.591 12.323 -0.755 -0.407
(15.265) (16.003) (7.948)
Foreign employment 556.489 538.618 549.891 -0.043 0.069
(108.161) (122.112) (107.622)
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Ratio foreign employed 833.100 733.244 697.427 -0.496 -0.149
(228.557) (188.175) (150.360)
Ratio foreign unemp 732.187 1,324.199 1,374.661 0.562 0.035
(599.829) (1,055.893) (973.356)
Foreign commuting 161.369 162.897 153.122 -0.081 -0.087
(83.542) (95.786) (57.507)
Foreign in education 356.537 347.947 282.594 -0.309 -0.242
(208.191) (243.243) (118.130)
Ratio foreign in educ 1,353.60 1,781.72 2,128.42 0.464 0.171
(1,011.2) (1,530.2) (1,328.6)
Family size 2.361 2.504 2.666 0.791 0.376
(0.269) (0.329) (0.276)
Young living alone 7.331 6.165 4.984 -0.429 -0.250
(4.477) (3.516) (3.151)
Single parent family 0.985 0.867 0.856 -0.152 -0.016
(0.794) (0.565) (0.308)
Couples without kids 3.055 2.592 2.858 -0.110 0.161
(1.535) (1.362) (0.938)
Old living alone 29.537 28.288 26.675 -0.340 -0.240
(7.538) (5.579) (3.774)
Property houses 76.884 73.763 71.583 -0.564 -0.203
(6.683) (8.487) (6.618)
Urban housing 28.988 28.320 23.136 -0.256 -0.259
(20.199) (16.886) (10.756)
Sparse housing 35.825 36.392 37.933 0.058 0.043
(25.590) (25.205) (25.459)
Age houses 29.233 29.673 28.627 -0.094 -0.149
(4.622) (5.412) (4.457)
Services in house 99.134 98.738 98.357 -0.195 -0.121
(3.005) (1.758) (2.614)
Houses in good state 82.797 79.049 76.297 -0.459 -0.187
(11.121) (11.831) (8.775)
Urbanistic expansion 8.468 7.725 7.284 -0.133 -0.053
(6.571) (5.751) (6.005)
Inhabitants per room 54.803 60.545 65.213 0.910 0.341
(7.322) (10.507) (8.794)
Gender differences 102.381 99.638 103.165 0.051 0.220
in education (13.466) (14.112) (7.619)
Adults studying 4.549 5.104 5.513 0.485 0.200
(1.454) (1.542) (1.351)
Early exit educ system 16.603 20.708 20.825 0.346 0.009
(9.974) (10.927) (7.054)
Diploma or bachelor 49.280 43.414 45.235 -0.303 0.122
(9.057) (11.347) (9.779)
Adults with diploma 18.625 17.397 17.759 -0.087 0.037
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or bachelor (7.540) (7.452) (6.547)
Education 15-19 y.o. 98.224 97.212 97.320 -0.291 0.037
(2.490) (2.222) (1.861)
Education, middle school 37.863 39.133 35.438 -0.276 -0.380
(6.996) (8.138) (5.331)
Not in empl nor educ 19.814 27.372 30.324 0.882 0.224
(8.539) (10.219) (8.310)
Active/inactive empl 62.935 53.187 48.372 -0.435 -0.176
(31.587) (24.923) (11.186)
Unemployed male 8.292 14.760 14.855 0.849 0.010
(5.720) (7.948) (5.204)
Unemployed female 12.889 22.194 24.035 0.949 0.124
(8.234) (12.227) (8.380)
Unemployed young 29.154 40.387 45.417 0.863 0.241
(15.436) (17.841) (10.811)
Employed Male 55.119 49.850 49.715 -0.585 -0.014
(7.714) (8.683) (5.074)
Employed Female 35.583 28.059 26.309 -0.876 -0.161
(8.768) (9.135) (5.939)
Employed 45.137 38.705 37.641 -0.793 -0.109
(7.955) (8.357) (5.099)
Employed in industry 31.306 22.997 22.232 -0.727 -0.073
(10.805) (8.506) (6.243)
Employed in services 40.773 39.509 42.519 0.130 0.210
(8.820) (10.171) (10.134)
Employed in commerce 18.774 16.480 16.639 -0.373 0.033
(5.137) (4.078) (2.534)
Employed high skill 25.829 24.635 29.266 0.322 0.377
(6.551) (8.918) (8.443)
Employed med skill 27.073 25.832 21.422 -0.613 -0.375
(7.755) (10.635) (4.985)
Share pop commuting 59.780 52.659 52.058 -0.756 -0.058
(8.531) (8.608) (5.626)
Improper housing 0.170 0.168 0.172 0.003 0.011
conditions (0.668) (0.255) (0.211)
Family economic issues 2.001 4.168 4.345 0.713 0.039
(1.881) (3.637) (2.695)
Overcrowded houses 1.010 1.727 1.973 0.462 0.098
(1.019) (1.701) (1.820)
Observations 136,595 816 833
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Figure 49: Parallel trends test on firms seized to mafias















































































































































































































































Note: Parallel trends for firms seized to mafias and destined for social use.
Coefficients from the interaction of treatment indicator (equal to 1 in treated
cities) and year dummies. The blue vertical line indicates the reference category
(year 2007). In the first year of treatment, only 10 cities are reached by the
intervention, while by 2013 they are 40. Regressions include city and year FE
and standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Figure 52: Parallel trends test on matched sample









































































































































































































































Figure 55: Mafia properties destined for social use
Note: Parallel trends repeated for the sample matched using nearest neighbor-
hood matching. Coefficients from the interaction of treatment indicator (equal
to 1 in treated cities) and year dummies. The blue vertical line indicates the
reference category (year 2007). In the first year of treatment, only 10 cities are
reached by the intervention, while by 2013 they are 40. Regressions include city
and year FE and standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Note: Parallel trends repeated for the sample matched using nearest neighborhood matching. Co-
efficients from the interaction of treatment indicator (equal to 1 in treated cities) and election-year
dummies. The blue vertical line indicates the reference category (election year 2006). In the first year
of treatment, only 10 cities are reached by the intervention, while by 2013 they are 40. Regressions
include city and year FE and standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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B.3. Robustness
Table 38: Treatment effect on news related to gangmaster system, by newspaper (DiD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Matched Full Matched
Corriere Corriere Repubblica Repubblica
Treated 0.0187** 0.0107** 0.0221* 0.0172**
(0.00946) (0.00445) (0.0120) (0.00783)
Observations 137,275 1,649 137,275 1,649
R-squared 0.080 0.124 0.162 0.174
City and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean DV 0.0001 0.0002 0.0020 0.0030
Note: The table reports results from a DiD capturing the change in news about
gangmaster system in cities treated with the union intervention, before and af-
ter the intervention took place. The DV is the population share of news from
Corriere (Col 1-2) and Repubblica (Col 3-4) in 1000 inhabitants. City and year
FE are included and standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Table 39: Treatment effect on news related to gangmaster system, total news (DiD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Matched Staggered Stacked
treated 0.729*** 0.507* 0.187 0.631***
(0.261) (0.260) (0.196) (0.215)
Observations 137,428 1,649 833 153,596
R-squared 0.295 0.358 0.362 0.332
City and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean DV 0.0138 0.160 0.419 0.0138
Note: The table reports results from a DiD capturing the change in news
about gangmaster system in cities treated with the union intervention,
before and after the intervention took place. The DV is the total num-
ber of news in a city-year. City and year FE are included and standard
errors are clustered at the city level.
Table 40: Treatment effect on firms seized to mafias (DiD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Matched Staggered Stacked
Treated 0.250** 0.0777 -0.665 0.124**
(0.112) (0.103) (0.620) (0.0567)
Observations 274,890 3,298 1,666 291,060
R-squared 0.328 0.363 0.393 0.310
City Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean DV 0.0180 0.0343 0.259 0.0170
Note: The table reports results from a DiD capturing the change
in firms seized to mafias in cities treated with the union interven-
tion, before and after the intervention took place. City and year
FE are included and standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Table 41: Treatment effect mafia properties destined for agricultural cooperatives and social
purposes (DiD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture Social use Social use Social use Social use
Full Matched Staggered Stacked Full Matched Staggered Stacked
Treated 0.385* 0.260 0.126* 0.389* 0.915* 0.746 0.315 0.906*
(0.223) (0.204) (0.0689) (0.199) (0.530) (0.460) (0.210) (0.480)
Observ 274,890 3,264 1,666 291,060 274,890 3,264 1,666 291,060
R-squared 0.056 0.064 0.060 0.055 0.100 0.110 0.120 0.096
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean DV 0.0078 0.0544 0.102 0.0089 0.0191 0.0707 0.254 0.0219
Note: The table reports results from a DiD capturing the change in seized properties that
were destined for agricultural cooperatives and for social purposes in cities treated with
the union intervention, before and after the intervention took place. City and year FE are
included and standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Table 42: Treatment effect on parties’ vote share (DiD)
Full Matched Staggered Stacked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Center-Right Center-Right Center-Right Center-Right
Treated 0.0116 0.00615 -0.0129 0.00580
(0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0111)
Mean DV 0.325 0.366 0.379 0.325
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Far-Right Far-Right Far-Right Far-Right
Treated -0.00791* -0.00194 0.0116 0.0187***
(0.00435) (0.00704) (0.0101) (0.00692)
Mean DV 0.125 0.0609 0.0385 0.125
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Center-Left Center-Left Center-Left Center-Left
Treated -0.0310*** -0.0124 -0.0232* -0.0201***
(0.00796) (0.0106) (0.0132) (0.00779)
Mean DV 0.314 0.300 0.295 0.314
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Far-Left Far-Left Far-Left Far-Left
Treated 0.0106*** 0.00520 0.0107** 0.0130***
(0.00356) (0.00526) (0.00477) (0.00359)
Mean DV 0.0619 0.0649 0.0670 0.0619
Observations 46,867 540 283 46,819
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports results from a DiD capturing treatment effect on parties vote
share in cities treated with the union intervention, before and after the intervention
took place. City and year FE are included and standard errors are clustered at the
city level. All data on national elections since 1994 are included.
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Table 43: Treatment effect on change in parties’ vote share, treatment close to elections
(DiD)
Full Matched Staggered Stacked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Center-Right Center-Right Center-Right Center-Right
Treated -0.0428 -0.0405 . -0.0626***
(0.0277) (0.0448) . (0.0224)
Mean DV -0.0207 0.0123 . -0.0206
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Far-Right Far-Right Far-Right Far-Right
Treated -0.600** -0.322 . -0.0958
(0.265) (0.559) . (0.324)
Mean DV 0.958 1.289 . 0.957
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Center-Left Center-Left Center-Left Center-Left
Treated -0.109*** -0.118** . -0.0775***
(0.0262) (0.0487) . (0.0295)
Mean DV -0.0786 -0.113 . -0.0784
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Far-Left Far-Left Far-Left Far-Left
Treated 0.410** 0.635** . 0.616***
(0.180) (0.282) . (0.166)
Mean DV 0.116 0.359 . 0.116
Observations 47,178 284 144 47,130
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports results from a DiD capturing treatment effect on change in
parties’ vote share in cities treated with the union intervention, before and after the
intervention took place. In this test, I only considered as treated cities in which the
intervention happened less than one year before elections and set the other treated
observations as missing. Due to lack of observations, the staggered design cannot be
estimated with this specification. City and year FE are included and standard errors
are clustered at the city level. All data on national elections since 1994 are included.
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B.3.1. Results for Lega Nord
As mentioned in the text, considering the Lega as separate from other far-right parties is
conceptually suboptimal, as both the Lega and all other parties in the far-right group have
an agenda explicitly against immigration. For this reason, in the main specification I present
aggregated results for all far-right parties and I only display results for the most famous
anti-immigrant party alone in Appendix. For this outcome, the parallel trends assumption
does not hold: coefficients before treatment are already on an increasing trajectory, both if
we consider the full sample and the matched sample (Figure 57). Treated cities were already
experience a growth in vote share for this far-right party. In absence of parallel trends, the
specification using a staggered design (Column 3) is fundamental to establish whether the
effects observed are credible, but this specification displays insignificant coefficients and of
opposite sign with respect to the other columns (Table 44). In conclusion, it seems that
treated cities were already voting for the Lega Nord at higher rates and that after the
intervention they continued to do so, but not at differentially higher rates.
B.4. Survey experiment
This section describes the design of a survey experiment to test the determinants of change
in vote share in treated cities. The hypothesis is that learning about the exploitation of
migrants fostered sentiments of sympathy and acceptance of integration towards them, with
an impact on voting for parties that support this policy.
Experimental design
The survey experiment is conducted on a sample of 2,000 Google Survey respondents living
in zip codes that were not treated by the union intervention but in which, according to
the report by the Placido Rizzotto Observatory, there is severe exploitation of migrants.
The treatment is intended to generate exogenous variation in respondents’ learning of the
condition of enslavement migrants are exposed to in their city. Treated individuals will be
given precise information on migrants’ living conditions and situation of exploitation and
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Note: Parallel trends test for the change in Lega Nord vote share. The figure displays coefficients
from the interaction of treatment indicator (equal to 1 in treated cities) and election-year dummies.
The blue vertical line indicates the reference category (election year 2006). In the first year of
treatment, only 10 cities are reached by the intervention, while by 2013 they are 40. Regressions
include city and year FE and standard errors are clustered at the city level.
Table 44: Treatment effect on change in vote share for the Lega Nord (DiD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Matched Staggered Stacked
Lega Nord Lega Nord Lega Nord Lega Nord
Treated 34.95*** 22.07*** -2.296 15.12*
(6.267) (6.956) (5.700) (7.976)
Observations 47,835 564 288 47,787
R-squared 0.302 0.511 0.618 0.298
City Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean DV 3.864 6.379 15 3.864
Note: The table reports results from a DiD estimating the change in vote
share for the Lega Nord in cities treated with the union intervention, be-
fore and after the intervention took place. City and year FE are included
and standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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will be informed about the information dissemination campaign which, in other cities, led
to increasing reporting of gangmasters. Individuals in the control group, instead, will learn
about the numbers of migrants’ presence and integration in the legal labor force in their city.
Treating subjects with information about migrants’ enslavement will enable me to estimate
the impact of learning about exploitation on policy preferences for migrants’ integration
and party vote. I compare this treatment to a control in which citizens learn basic statistics
about immigration in their city, a treatment which is not expected to shift citizens’ view on
immigration. Respondents are randomized into two groups and are assigned equal (50%)
probability to be treated.
Primary Outcomes:
I will measure the following primary outcomes: respondents’ support (i) for migrants’ inte-
gration policies; (ii) for politicians supporting policies favoring migrants’ integration; (iii)
for current political parties.
Secondary Outcomes: I will measure the following secondary and intermediate outcomes:
(i) respondents’ view of immigration (from positive to negative) and main motive for it; (ii)
respondents’ vote in past elections; (iii) respondents’ belief in the position of the party they
voted for with respect to immigration and whether it mattered for their vote.
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APPENDIX - Appendix to Fighting Organized Crime by
Targeting their Revenue
C.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 45: Descriptive statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of subsidies for bin
(binned database) 1608 5.985 6.56 0 96
Amount of subsidies 116,001 51,998 50,000 250,000
Just Below 150k, dummy 0.018 0.133 0.000 1.000
Mafia presence 0.648 0.478 0 1
Mafia, restrictive 0.454 0.498 0 1
Delay, months -1.960 10.366 -72.36 71.79
Private cofinancing 0.678 0.467 0.000 1.000
Construction, transport 0.280 0.449 0.000 1.000
Research, education 0.395 0.489 0.000 1.000
Company Life 16.821 13.445 0.000 127
Created 2 years before call 0.084 0.278 0.000 1.000
BoD from mafia area 0.555 0.497 0.000 1.000
Bank Debt, winsorized 599.2 894.3 0.000 2,743
Total Debt, winsorized 3,284 3,802 157 11,675
Cash Ratio 0.006 0.031 -0.000 0.873
Total Cash 22.49 491 -7.510 35,823
Return on Assets 2.155 14.88 -884.8 162.2
Observations 9,624
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Figure 58: Distribution of subsidies by sector and awarding institutions


















Table 46: Number of subsidies per year in full and matched database
Full database Matched database
Year N subs % N subs %
2007 671 3.05 . .
2008 1,723 7.83 750 7.79
2009 3,055 13.88 1,354 14.07
2010 3,796 17.25 1,675 17.4
2011 3,190 14.49 1,418 14.73
2012 2,978 13.53 1,327 13.79
2013 2,918 13.26 1,218 12.66
2014 2,340 10.63 1,184 12.3
2015 1,341 6.09 698 7.25
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Figure 59: Presence of mafias (as defined in Section 4.5) and sorting at the threshold
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Table 47: Effect of institutional corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency
(1) (2)
Corruption Inefficiency
Just Below 0.0177 0.0295
(0.0447) (0.487)
Antimafia Law 0.0621* 0.894*
(0.0240) (0.320)




Province Year FE Yes Yes
C.2. Sorting at the threshold: robustness tests
We start by discussing in detail the consequences of having subsidies awarded rather than
requested in Section C.2.1. We then present robustness and placebo checks on the main
analysis.
C.2.1. Is sorting driven by a higher volume of requests?
As described in the Data section, we can only observe subsidies awarded and not subsidies
requested. This means that the jump we observe at the threshold could be driven by either
(i) firms requesting more subsidies for this amount, as we suggest, or (ii) local governments
awarding subsidies at a higher rate only in this bin and only after 2013. While it seems
difficult to imagine a story supporting this time sensitive and bin-specific variation in local
government behavior, it is indeed possible that the awarding rate changed as a result of
a change in the type of firms populating this bin after 2013. If the 150,000-euro bin is
comprised of a different type of firm (mafia-related) after 2013, then the probability that
these firms are awarded a subsidy might change as a result of their different characteristics.
Mafia-related firms might be more likely to win subsidies than the average firm (for example,
because they corrupt the awarding committee); in this case, part of the jump we observe
would be driven by more subsidies being awarded for this amount. Alternatively, mafia-
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related firms might be less likely to win subsidies because they perform worse on average
(we show results in line with this idea in Section 4.6.3). If this was the case, we might be
observing a smaller jump than the increase in requests due to a negative awarding rate. In
either of these scenarios, in order for a change in local government behavior that is bin and
time specific to take place, we need to assume that there was a change in the type of firms
applying for funds only at this bin and only after 2013. In other words, even if the jump
could be partially driven by a change in the awarding rate, it must be initially driven by an
increase in requests for subsidies from a different type of company.
C.2.2. Robustness tests
We start by testing a more demanding specification including region times year fixed effects
in Figure 60. Second, we define Post as the period after 2014 (instead of 2013) to account for
a potential delay in the time in which the law becomes effective (Figure 64, Panel a). Third,
we vary the size of bin from 1,000 to 2,000, 500 and 100 Euro to address the possibility that
the way subsidies are binned drives the spike we observe (Figure 64, Panels b-d). We then
consider results changing the reference category, removing year fixed effects and dropping
2013 (Figure 65).
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Note: The figure reproduces the main DID specification described in Equation 2.1 including region
times year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is at the 150,000-euro threshold (vertical line).





































































Figure 64: (d) Bin 100 euro































































In cities dissolved for mafia infiltration in the last 5 years, companies have to be screened for
mafia infiltration for any subsidy requested, independently of the amount. Given the lack of
incentives for requesting less than 150,000 euros, we should see no sorting at the threshold.
This is indeed what we find: while observations are considerably less than in the full sample,
we observe no jump in subsidies around the discontinuity (Figure 66, Panel a). The second
placebo test we perform is on agricultural funds, which, as discussed in Section 4.5, are
subject to lower incentives for sorting. In line with the expectations, we see no substantial
sorting at the 150,000-euro threshold and only a small increase at the 147,000–148,000 euros
bin. This increase suggests some strategic sorting even in this setting.













































C.3. Bunching with a kink
An alternative specification to test for the presence of sorting is to estimate the amount of
bunching at the threshold. Our case is a kink, as defined by Kleven and Waseem (2013),
a discontinuity in the choice sets of business owners caused by the threshold which creates
an incentive for firms to move from the region above the cutoff to the region below. We
group subsidies into 100 euro bins and calculate the counterfactual distribution of subsidies
as the probability density function of our observed distribution, excluding the area where
we observe the kink – 149,900–150,000 euros. In particular, grouping subsidies into bins of






i + εj (C.1)
where Binj is each bin in the distribution; Nj is the number of subsidies awarded in each
bin j; p is the order of polynomial and βj is the estimate of the counterfactual distribution.








γ0j 1{Amount = j}+ εij (C.2)
where βj is the counterfactual distribution estimated above and γi is the effect of the
threshold on the number of subsidies in the affected range [z0−, z
0
+]. This procedure, how-
ever, overestimates the amount of bunching because it does not account for the additional
subsidies awarded at 150,000 euros due to the fact that this is a round number. We there-
fore consider the amount of bunching to be the difference between the probability density
function of the distribution before and after the 2013 law enforcement, estimated above,
and the observed distribution. We display our findings in Figure 68 below (left panel). Our
estimated coefficient for bunching is 56 before 2013 and 79 after the strengthening of the
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2013 law. We also estimate the amount of bunching on the difference between the number
of subsidies awarded after and before the new law (right panel). In line with our main
results, the amount of bunching at the threshold is significantly higher in the period after







































150,000145,000 148,000 157,000 160,000
Note: The figures show the distribution of subsidies around the 150,000 discontinuity, overlayed with
the counterfactual distribution (blue line) estimated as in Equation C.2 and using a seventh-degree
polynomial. In the panel above, the DV is the number of subsidies in each 100-euro bins, in the
panel below, the difference from before/after 2013. The independent variable is each bin in the
distribution. We calculate standard errors using a parametric bootstrap procedure.
C.4. Full sample from OpenCoesione
In this section we replicate all the tests from Section 4.5 using the full sample of companies
from OpenCoesione.

































Figure 70: Full sample OpenCoesione, bin size 2,000 (left) and 500 euros (center); placebo

















































































































C.5. Firms characteristics, robustness tests
We present results from robustness tests on our analysis on firms’ characteristics. First, we
consider the results on balance-sheet outcomes. A recent empirical literature has started
investigating the effects of the presence of mafias on the characteristics of firms, providing
descriptive evidence on balance sheet outcomes after mafia penetration or in mafia-affected
areas. As mentioned in Section 4.6, a consistent finding is on bank debt: firms affected
by mafias display lower levels of bank debts, in line with a money laundering explanation
in which ‘fake debts’ used to launder dirty money are more difficult to set up with banks
(Transcrime, 2013; Furciniti and Frustagli, 2013). Consistently with this evidence, in our
data, firms sorting after 2013 display 514,000 euros lower bank debts and 1,789,000 lower
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total debts than other firms (Table 48, Column 1). The literature provides contrasting
conclusions about cash and cash ratio (Bianchi et al., 2017; Transcrime, 2013) and return
on assets (Bianchi et al., 2017; Mirenda et al., 2017). We find a weakly positive effect on
cash ratio, and a null impact on cash and return on assets (Table 48).1 However, due to
the contrasting conclusions provided by this literature, on cash ratio, cash and ROA, we
consider these results to be inconclusive.
In Table 49 we present the same analysis on the main firms characteristics repeated compar-
ing the sample just below the threshold to the sample just above it, in the group 150,000–
160,000 euros. The group applying for little more than 150,000 euros is made of firms
deliberately accepting to undergo the the Antimafia investigation, even when they could
avoid it with very limited losses in terms of foregone profits. Therefore, they constitute an
ideal control group of firms with no mafia connections. Due to the much smaller sample size
(we pass from 9,657 to 500 firms), we have insignificant findings if we consider a specifica-
tion with the full set of firm–type, city, year and year of activity fixed effects (odd columns
in Table 49). However, if we remove fixed effects, we obtain significant and much stronger
results (even columns).
1We also test the effect on other types of debts, and find inconclusive evidence. Results are available
upon request. Note also that the number of observations changes across columns due to missing data in the
dependent variables.
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Table 48: Subsidies by bin after 2013 – Balance sheet outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank Debt Tot Debt Cash Cash ROA
winsorized winsorized Ratio
Just Below 394.3* 1,405* -0.00211 -2.579 -2.139
(121.4) (469.5) (0.00173) (6.640) (1.169)
Antimafia Law -58.44 -37.39 0.00197 10.41 0.887
(50.78) (195.1) (0.00270) (14.09) (0.724)
JustBelow×Law -514.3* -1,789* 0.0185 104.0 -2.254
(158.5) (607.1) (0.0109) (140.8) (3.229)
Observations 6,382 6,554 4,683 4,683 6,571
R-squared 0.335 0.428 0.075 0.010 0.053
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years of Activity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table shows results from estimating Equation 2.4 using different financial out-
comes of the companies we study as dependent variables. BankDebt and TotalDebt are
continuous variables winsorized at the top 0.1 percentile. CashRatio is the fraction of









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.6. Circumventing the threshold: figureheads and other strategies
Sorting below the threshold might not be the only game in town. A first alternative way
to circumvent the screening process could be to apply for more than one subsidy under
150,000 euros within the same call. However, we do not find any increase in the number
of firms receiving more than one subsidy within the same call for values below 150,000
after 2013. The few companies who do apply for multiple subsidies are well–known public
firms created by regional governments specifically to attract investments, such as European
Funds. It seems therefore possible that, while repackaging might be attempted and firms
might be requesting more than one subsidy for less than 150,000 euros, the probability of
actually winning more than one subsidy for the same company might be small, excluding
large public companies.
A second possibility is that criminal organizations file multiple applications below the
threshold using different front firms. Detecting this strategy is more difficult, as we cannot
establish which of the firms applying for funds is linked to mafias. As an indirect test of this
hypothesis, we check whether the number of companies applying for funds below 150,000
Euros increases more in mafia affected cities after 2013 as criminals might have created new
ad-hoc companies to apply for multiple small funds after the Antimafia Information Law is
reinforced. However, this does not seem to be the case. The number of new firms is larger
before 2013 in mafia affected areas: before 2013, 89 newly created firms apply for funds
below the threshold in mafia-affected cities versus 50 in cities without mafia. After 2013,
this number is 18 in mafia affected cities and 22 in areas without mafia.2
A third strategy is to circumvent police controls by registering the company to trusted
figureheads, people who have never been convicted of mafia-related or any other crimes. This
allows criminal organizations to conduct legal businesses and access calls for subsidies, and
even obtain the Antimafia certificate for funds above the 150,000-euro threshold (Fiandaca,
2007; Savona and Berlusconi, 2015; Savona et al., 2016).
2As a complementary test, we also look at whether the same owner creates multiple firms to claim several
smaller subsidies below the 150,000 threshold after 2013: we do not find any evidence on this channel.
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While figureheads are clearly convenient to use, a trustworthy individual with a clean crim-
inal record who is willing to undergo the risk of being imprisoned for mafia ties might be a
rather scarce resource. This is especially true if, as established by the new Antimafia Law,
family members undergo the same screening as business owners. The limited availability
of this resource allows us to formulate some suggestive hypotheses on the characteristics of
the owners in charge of companies circumventing the Antimafia Law through a figurehead.
First, as figureheads are hard to find, we expect that the same resource will be used multiple
times, i.e. the same person will be appointed in several positions of the firm. Second, we
exploit a demographic feature that is apparently common among figureheads: as explained
by a ’Ndràngheta member in a phone-tapped conversation, the figurehead “must be someone
in his 60s or 70s”3. Older people tend to be employed as figureheads because they are less
likely to be screened by the police, they have proven loyalty over time, they are unlikely to
be used for other criminal tasks and, if charged, they are more likely to face house arrest
rather than jail.
Our data on business owners allows us to run tests to check whether, after the 2013 law
change, there is an increase in ‘fishy’ business owners among firms applying for subsidies
above the 150,000-euro threshold. In particular, based on the assumption that it would
not be worth it to use a figurehead to apply for just over 150,000 euros, we use 160,000
euros as a discontinuity for this test.4 In Table 50 we test the triple-interaction coefficient
Antimafia Law x Mafia x Above, which captures the behavior of firms obtaining subsidies
above 160,000 euros after 2013 in cities with mafias.
We find that firms in mafia-affected areas applying for more than 160,000 euros after 2013
are more likely to have a higher level of power concentration, i.e. the same person is
appointed to many positions of the company board (Column 1). We also show that firms’
3http://www.affaritaliani.it/milano/tangenti-21-persone-arrestate
in-quattro-regioni-anche-un-ex-magistrato-541211.html?refresh_ce
4The results do not depend on this specific choice, and are similar when exploiting other cutoffs above
150,000 euros or when using a continuous variable.
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ownership is more likely to be registered to people aged 65 or over (Columns 2–3) only
when focusing on old individuals born in regions traditionally affected by mafias (i.e. Sicily,
Calabria and Campania) (Column 3). We interpret this set of findings as preliminary
evidence that, in areas with a higher mafia presence, criminal organizations might resort
to trustworthy figureheads to circumvent the Antimafia certificate and still apply for funds
above the 150,000-euro threshold.
C.7. Evidence of subsidies displacement
One last piece of evidence in line with our story comes from observing where the increase in
subsidies for 150,000 Euros is coming from in terms of the pre-2013 distribution. If sorting is
caused by avoiding the Antimafia Information threshold, we should observe a missing mass
in subsidies above the threshold after 2013. This trend is difficult to see in Figure 19, where
we consider the change in subsidies at each value in the distribution. In this context, in
fact, we do not expect to observe a missing mass only right above the threshold, we should
rather see an overall decrease in subsidies for value more than 150,000 Euros, as they are
all affected by the policy. Since we are not interested in the behavior of any particular
bin, but rather we want to capture the overall effect for any value above the threshold and
after 2013, we simply consider the effect of the triple interaction Above x AntimafiaLaw
x Mafia on subsidies released, where Above is a dummy equal to 1 for any subsidy above
150,000 euros.
Table 52 reports this specification. Column 1 shows that there is not any lower or higher
number of subsidies released above 150,000 after the law strengthening. However, when
we consider the triple interaction in Column 2, we find that in mafia areas, this is the
case. The negative coefficient of the triple interaction indicates that for each bin above
150,000 euros there are 0.5 less subsidies awarded after 2013 from firms located in areas
with mafia presence, a coefficient which is barely insignificant (pvalue=0.12). This analysis
is consistent with the hypothesis that the increase in subsidies below 150,000 euros comes
from a reduction in funding for larger amounts. In other words, mafia-related companies
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Table 50: Characteristics of business owners (alleged figureheads)
(1) (2) (3)
Board Age 65+ 65+ from
Concentration Mafia Region
Antimafia Law -0.0365 -0.0399 0.0229*
(0.0198) (0.0282) (0.00988)
Mafia 0.0522* -0.0537* 0.0174*
(0.0107) (0.0140) (0.00371)
Law×Mafia -0.0980* -0.0333 -0.0134
(0.0170) (0.0228) (0.00738)
Above -0.0347* 0.0737* 0.0275*
(0.0148) (0.0200) (0.00546)
Law×Above 0.0331 -0.0697 -0.0251
(0.0314) (0.0390) (0.0151)
Mafia×Above -0.0486* -0.0573* -0.0324*
(0.0181) (0.0238) (0.00674)
Law×Mafia×Above 0.123* 0.0781 0.0396*
(0.0385) (0.0484) (0.0192)
Observations 12,029 12,029 12,029
R-squared 0.423 0.145 0.059
City FE Yes Yes Yes
Institution Type FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
N Projects Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table shows results from a triple-diff estimation of the effects of the
AntimafiaLaw (dummy=1 post 2013) in Mafia-affected cities (dummy=1) for
companies applying Above the Antimafia threshold (dummy=1 for funding above
160,000 euros). The dependent variable in Column 1 is the share of positions
held by the same person; in Column 2, the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to 1 when the owner is more than 65 years old and in Column 3 when the owner
is older than 65 and from Sicily, Calabria or Campania, i.e. highly mafia-affected
areas.
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Table 51: Descriptive statistics, figureheads analysis (database at the firms owner level)
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mafia presence, dummy 0.657 0.475 0.000 1.000
Board composed of same person 0.456 0.368 0.001 1.000
Company owner 65+ years old 0.218 0.413 0.000 1.000
Company owner 65+ years old–mafia area 0.163 0.126 0.000 1.000
Observations 12,073
have lost potential income in terms of missed subsidies for larger amounts due to the barrier
represented by the antimafia screening.
C.8. Optimal threshold choice
The selection of a threshold above which screening for mafia–connection is performed im-
poses a trade–off for any government willing to fight public fund misappropriation. On the
one hand, governments gain from reducing profits made by criminal organizations – both
by reducing looting of public resources and by avoiding reinforcing criminal organizations,
making it attractive to reduce the threshold to zero. On the other hand, screening imposes
costs on the government and lowering the threshold increases the number of subsidies re-
quiring police attention. A natural policy question arising from this trade–off is what would
be the optimal threshold to minimize mafia gains and screening costs. In this section, we
run a back of the envelope exercise based on estimates from our study and on approximate
costs that the Italian government faces to screen more subsidies.
For the purpose of this simulation, we will assume the utility of the State to depend
positively on mafia losses and negatively on screening costs (Ustate = ((1 − πmafia) −
costscreening)). A government might deem it optimal to incur in an economic loss from
over screening if they think that misappropriation has larger negative effects than the sim-
ple welfare loss caused by the misappropriation of public funds. However, for the purpose
of this exercise, we simply consider the net gains and losses from reducing subsidies misap-
propriation and screening costs.
For each hypothetical threshold value, we calculate the net gains of the state as the difference
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Table 52: Evidence of displacement: Change in subsidies above the threshold after 2013
Law
(1) (2)
N subsidies N subsidies
Above -6.006* -2.188*
(0.633) (0.244)











Number of bins 201 402
Year FE Yes Yes
Note: The table displays regression coefficients from a DID
model. Differently from Equation 2.1, our main indepen-
dent variable, Above, is a dummy equals to 1 for subsidies
above 150,000 euros. The dependent variable is the num-
ber of subsidies in each bin from 50,000 to 250,000 euros.
AntimafiaLaw is a dummy equal to 1 after 2013, when the
new law is strengthening. Mafia is a dummy equal to 1 in
cities with a history of mafia presence.
191
between yearly mafia losses and yearly estimated costs from screening, as summarized in
Table 53. For a given threshold (θ), screening costs are equal to the number of subsidies
below θ times the cost to screen each subsidy. Calderoni (2012) undertook an exploratory
study on this topic, interviewing two large Prefetture, one in the North (Milan) and one in
the South (Catania). Based on this work, on average one official is in charge of releasing
327 Antimafia Information per year.5 Based both on Calderoni (2012) and on the law
establishing the wage of police officers in Italy6, the yearly cost of hiring an additional
official in charge of the Antimafia Certificate is 30,000 Euros per year. The cost of screening
one subsidy is thus estimated at 92 Euros.
We estimate mafia gains as the summation of the gains from sorting at the threshold plus the
gains from applying below the threshold. Both these quantities require some assumptions.
First, we assume the number of subsidies at θ to be the same that we observe at 150,000
Euros for every bin and multiply this number for the threshold to obtain the gains at θ.
Second, we need to make an assumption on the share of subsidies connected to mafia below
θ. Based on the 3.8% increase in subsidies at 150,000 after 2013, we assume that this share
cannot be larger than 3.8% and we set it at 1%.7 Mafia gains below the threshold are
calculated as the number of subsidies in our sample per year below every θ times this share.
Total mafia losses simply correspond to the total mafia gains when there is no screening
(i.e. when θ=250,000) minus total mafia gains.8 Finally, we estimate state gains as the
difference between mafia losses and the cost of screening. Using data from our sample,
estimated screening costs and assumptions on the mafia-related subsidies, the net utility
for the state becomes close to negative when the threshold is set at 4,000 euros. This
5According to Calderoni (2012), in Catania the yearly number of Information released is 1,354 per 6
officials, i.e. 225 per person per year. In Milan, the yearly number of Information is 3,858 per 9 people, or
428 Information per official per year. Our benchmark is thus the average of these two.
6Wages are established every three years, as regulated by D.L. 1980, n. 312.
7We chose a low-bound to account for the possibility that a share of mafia-related companies stop sorting
once the threshold is lowered and start using a different strategy to avoid the screening, for example hiring
figureheads.
8The number of firms sorting below the threshold might be increasing for lower thresholds, as more and
more mafia-connected firms get screened. The inclusion of this dynamic would require additional assumptions
without substantially affecting our findings.
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back of the envelope calculation suggests that reducing the threshold could be optimal even
for subsidies of small amounts, close to 4,000 euros. This result crucially depends on the
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